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Contemporary sentiments both 'African and Western indicate the inadequacy of modern
~---..
approaches to ethics and the failure of an individualistic ethics as a basis for public and private
morality. Modern ethics is inadequate as a moral framework within which communities live their
lives. As a result there is a need for a paradigm shift form this mainly individualistic and
.4
universalistic modern ways of doings ethics to a more communally oriented and contextual
approach reminiscent of traditional African ethics.
If we hope to have a more satisfactory moral framework than the current one we need to have
a moral outlook that encompasses both the ethical code governing the individual Le personal
ethics and the ethical code governing social groups and their conduct. And that framework will
be something similar to the communal model that we see in traditional African communities such
as the Basotho's. Such a moral framework made it possible for communities not only to be
contextual in the way they approached personal conduct, but also communal.
The current moral uncertainty accompanied by vicious moral individualism in places like
Lesotho, seems to me to be the result of the introduction of an individualistic ethic to the Basotho
way of life. Ethics as found among traditional Basotho communities was not just a matter of the
>l
individual alone, but also of the community within which the individual found his or her true
identity. This eo-responsibility and mutual inter-dependency for the moral life, something which
modernism and the influence of liberal ideas is increasingly eroding from the contemporary life
of Basotho, ensured that there was a moral centre through which people found their moral
reference point.
It ensured there was a moral thought and practice that was coherent enough to give both the
individual and the community a moral base, an approved way of conduct with an implicit, but
nevertheless clearly understandable rationale and justification. Such a communal approach to
ethics made it possible for communities to have a recognizable moral character and it is only
when communities are themselves moral that we can hope to have a moral society.
So in order to help contemporary Basotho and indeed most Africans, from the pervasive self
imposed moral bankruptcy and inconsistencies there is a need to revisit and rediscover that
traditional ethos to see what lessons can be learned from it for the present. We need to look back
to where we come from as Africans and only then are we going to be able to navigate our future
correctly and authentically, and see what lessons of life and proper ways of conduct can we learn
from our past, lessons which will be more in line with who we are as Africans in the context of





"Anybody who stands for nothing will fall for anything and
when we as a people lack things to stand for
we become easy victims to any other culture of our times
which promises us something.
This is our problem as Africans today"
ABELUNGU BAMNYAMA
My nephew say she does not know how to speak Zulu
It only speaks English. Was she born by whites? .
When I greet "sawubona", she asks "what are you talking about?"
When I greet "sawubona", she says "don't talk that silly language".
What are the elders doing, if not teaching kids their traditions?
Our ancestors are weeping, where they are resting.
The Western culture is prospering while ours is dying.
Words from the song Abelungu bamnyama, by SABELA
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In contemporary Africa, which is increasingly becoming a meeting point of two different
worldviews, namely the African worldview and contemporary Western culture, many Africans
manifest a kind of moral ambivalence and inconsistency in their daily conduct. One senses a
degree of uncertainty whereby people lack the moral confidence of their predecessors. Hannah
.'
Kinoti describing this situation says that
today Africa is at a cross roads and the path has forked. In terms of everyday conduct for
individuals and communities there is uncertainty, disillusionment and even despair (1992:
73).
As a result of this modern people are not only reluctant to speak the language of morality in most
cases they are not prepared to commit themselves in moral debates and discussions. This
manifests itself in the common attitude one often hears in which the modern person, afraid of
taking a moral stance, say that "it's up to the individual concerned". All this is indicative of the
greater challenge, namely the moral dilemma and confusion facing individuals and communities.
This is partly due to the conflicting value systems embedded in the Western and Traditional
worldviews . The traditional worldview emphasises the communal approach to life. By contrast
the Western worldview has as its main focus the welfare of the individual. According to the
traditional African worldview ethics was communal by nature, and not individualistic. With the
westernization of African societies, there has been a noticeable change from this communal
orientation of thinking about ways of conduct.
One finds these days more and more people who think of ethics or morality primarily in
individualistic terms. In Lesotho for instance, there is a growing tendency of saying what I do
is my own business. According to this, ethics is primarily about how I choose to lead my life as
an individual . The communal aspect of ethics is ·thus not only fading but also seems strange to
the younger generation, something uncharacteristic of their predecessors.
However, since the traditional worldview and its ethos has not totally disappeared, it is still
playing a significant role in many peoples lives. According to Mugambi and Nasimiyu-Wasike
the societal moral issues we are experiencing today in Africa
are the same old issues, but they have taken on the new forms and amplitudes of our
time. Moral issues have become very difficult and complex, particularly in the African
1
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context where structures and forms are changing so fast that African society seems to be
in a permanent transitional stage of history (1992: 1).
In other words the disruption of the African social life by modern political and economic
systems, did not mean an end to the African culture. So what we have is unplanned co-existence
of these two different ways of approaching life, functioning simultaneously within the same
person. This naturally results in an inner tension, and moral incoherency which, as I will argue,
is the experience of many Basotho and indeed many Africans.
The practical implications of this is that sometimes people approach their way of conduct from
the perspective of traditional morality, and sometimes from the perspective of their newly found
moral framework. It is this growing moral incoherency and the lack of a moral centre guiding
individuals and communities, that has given rise to the general unhappiness with the
contemporary state of ethics and morality.
Contemporary sentiments both African and Western indicate the inadequacy of modern
approaches to ethics and the failure of an individualistic ethics as a basis for public and private
morality. As such I will attempt to show that in order to have a moral society we need a
communal approach to ethics. It is by having moral communities that we can be able to have a
moral society. The current moral uncertainty accompanied by vicious moral individualism in
Lesotho, seems to me to be the result of the introduction of an individrialistic ethic to the Basotho
way of life.
My hypothesis, therefore, is that ethics as found among traditional Basotho communities was not
just a matter of the individual alone, but also of the community within which the individual found
his or her true identity. This eo-responsibility and mutual inter-dependency for the moral life,
something which modernism and the influence of liberal ideas is increasingly eroding from the
contemporary life of Basotho, ensured that there was a moral centre through which people found
their moral reference point.
In other words there was moral thought and practice that was coherent enough to give both the
individual and the community a moral base, an approved way of life with an implicit, but
nevertheless clearly understandable rationale and justification. So in order to help contemporary
Basotho and indeed most Africans, from the pervasive self imposed moral bankruptcy and
inconsistencies there is a need to revisit and rediscover that traditional ethos to see what lessons
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can be learned from it for the present. Before doing this there are some preliminary remarks I
want to make regarding this enterprise.
0.1 The Diversity in the African Culture
One of the arguments against generalisations about some aspects of the African peoples is what
"
is seen as the irreconcilable differences found within the African culture . While I will agree that
there are some differences I do not agree that they are such that we cannot not speak about
African culture in general as this argument often tends to suggest. These differences should
therefore not be used to discourage us to speak for and about Africa and its values.
According to those who emphasise the diversity of African culture, Africa is inhabited by many
different peoples with different perspectives on life'. The continent is not a homogenous society,
with common practices, ritual, customs and beliefs. It is argued that in some cases even within
the same country, there will be found differences that do not concern merely trivial matters of
- ---...__. ' , . - . -.
life; but moral and religious values considered central in the cultural fabric of the people (cf.
Waruta 1992: 122). As a result the feeling is that it is often not possible to speak about
something as African w~~9yt the immediate need to qualify it, asac~ording to such and such a
tradition. This is also said to be true when one tries to uncover ethical traditions and systems of
Africa. It will suffice to point out that even if this is so, that which is being qualified is
something African. Not European or Indian or Chinese. It is further argued that this problem is
compounded by yet another factor and that is, within contemporary African culture, which is
largely characterized by complacent adoption of western ways of living and doing things, there
are significant differences between Africans living in urban areas and those living in rural areas.
All these are raised as a way of pointing to the difficulty of the enterprise of organizing society
..... - . - ~._-~ .. •_-_..__•..-._- --.-....,-- --- -- - "
and the moral life around African values and standards. Faced with these obvious constraints,
' __ .' •• _"h~ ' ·~-"'-----~·· ·-·~-··-···----·-- ·_·---· · -· ·_ · _.~-_ .• - --- , • • ' -_•• - _. _. . .- • • • _-' - ..-
especially the pace ill which African culture is developing and giving way to the dominant
-.' - -- - -._- _.-
_~_~!~llres of Europe and America, the temptation to abandon the project is a real one. For some
For a more deta iled account o f t h e di v e r s i ty and homogeneity o f Afr i can e xpe rienc e a nd t he ir
i mp lic a t ion to studies about Afric a. see Cha pter 1 o f Mugambi. Af r ica n Ch r i s t i a n Th eology 198 9 . Na i rob i .
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it would seem better for Africans to humbly acknowledge the obvious fact that one can no longer
speak of African culture -it has long since ceased to exist for what we now have is a mixture of
cultures, and what is often called the African worldview no longer exists.
And yet it is such an attitude that I question and argue that it must be challenged as an excuse
for the kind of intellectual laziness we who are concerned about African traditions cannot afford.
It is with the same concern that in agreement with Mugambi it needs to be emphasised that\he
recognition of diversity in Africa should not be used to overlook the reality of aspirations fO~~
commonality and homogeneity in the African experience (1989: 5). The problems that are being
raised, instead of discouraging us, should help us to be realistic about the kind of project we are
undertaking. Such difficulties should not be the reasons for giving up on the project of self
explanation and reflection on our ethical traditions. Rather they should help us to be critical of
what we are trying to do, aware of the complexity and difficulty it involves. It means that such
difficulties and problems should not be dismissed out of hand or taken lightly, but at the same
time they should not be accepted too readily as valid reasons. My reflection and examination of
the ethical traditions of the Basotho is an attempt to do this.
0.2 The Unity in African Culture
The question that the above argument has to answer, and hence the challenge to such concerns,
is whether the culture of the people, their sense of who they are, in this case the African people, .
can simply be effaced by changing their political and economic structure. The answer is an
obvious no. Rather what is clear about the African culture, and perhaps the point that the
foregoing concerns is making is that the present situation in Africa makes it very difficult to
practice and exercise traditional African values and virtues. As much as there are differences
among Africans and change is continuously taking place, the African worldview, those basic
assumptions of the African people have not changed. What has changed is what that worldview
has to interpret, i.e. the life experiences of African peoples. The basic framework on the basis
of which an African person approaches life, interprets facts of experience and conducts his life
has not fundamentally changed. It is therefore not surprising to find that sometimes, for most
. Africans even at present, the way people conduct themselves, contains elements of the traditional
4. .
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worldview. Most people today when they have achieved some success, like graduating from
university still have mokete oa balimo -a feast in honour and thanks to the ancestors. What this
shows is that the African worldview, the fundamentals of the African culture have not been
totally abolished from the social conscience of the people, not even by modernity'.
One will find, therefore, in some instances African people sharing many things in common, such
as the belief in ancestors, living within a matrix of invisible loyalties, social roles and obligations
,"
and responsibility to one's family and community. These may not be that visible from their
observable public life today, but they are there. So in spite of their cultural differences, I will
argue that African peoples do not have fundamental differences in their worldview. Hence one
does find common values and practices, and sometimes a noticeable uniformity (Kasenene 1994:
138).
Hannah Kinoti, writing about this, points out that:
although Africa is a vast continent and much fragmented in terms of languages, beliefs
and customs, there is adequate evidence from various studies that where the basics of
cultural and moral assumptions are concerned, the bottom line is fairly solid, and that it
is therefore possible to generalize to a large extent (1992: 76).
In the moral sphere this implies that there are basic traits within African moral thought and
practice which are uniquely African, and thus grounds for speaking about African ethics i.e. a
" .
reflection on the adequacy of their norms and values, a reflection which should let us know who
we are and who we ought to be.
What I am intimating, therefore, is that in spite of our various cultures as Africans, there are
basic characteristics of our moral traditions that we have in common, which distinguish them
from ethical traditions and moral practices of other cultures to warrant them as African. Here I
will agree with Kasenene that while it would be misleading to overlook cultural differences in
Africa culture, since the continent has always been a home to a variety of people with different
cultures
2 .
By modernity here it is meant philosophical, s ocial and political ideas of rationality, objectivity,
truth, equality, freedom and the overcoming of the domination of tradition . .. ideas that came to birth in the
philosophical revolution of the Enlightenment . These ideas found their political expression in democratic
rev?l~tions, thei~ so~ial expres~i~n in bur~aucratic rationalism, their cultural expression in modern art, their
re11g10us expreSS10n 1n the trad1t10n of l1beral scholarship, and their moral expression in the ideal of human
progress towards equality and tolerance under the guidance of reason (Pertersen 1994 : 103).
F?r a more readings on the subject see post-modern theorists like Jean-Francois Lyottard, Jacques Derrida,
G1ddens, Habermas and C. Jencks' book The Post-Modern Reader, 1992 .
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it would, however, be equally wrong not to recognize the common values and, at times,
uniformity that exists within their diversity, south of the Sahara. There is a common
Africanness, which must not be lost sight of (1994 : 138).
It is from this conviction that in agreement with him it must be emphasised that in spite of the
....:.o-~~--- __.."-_ - .
different contexts found in Africa there can still be found alive in Africa today sparks of
traditional values, attitudes, ideas and norms, because the traditional ethos has survived (cf. Ibid
1994: 138,). As I have suggested the modem way oflife does make living these very difficult and
this may be the reason why it appears as if they do not exist.
I am going to argue, therefore, that for Africans to makes sense of their present moral condition
they will need to do indeed as Kasenene suggests, rediscover their Africanness. This again I will
argue they can not do as antecedently individuated individuals, but as connected, inter-dependent
members of communities. To do this we need to look back at traditional culture and its morality
from the perspective of the particular tradition from which we have come. It is only through this
re-examination of the past, looking back to where we come from, that we will know not only
what we ought to do in the present moral unhappiness, but even more important what we ought
to be.
I propose to do this from my particular tradition as a Mosotho. Such a self-examination, or
looking into our past should not be interpre~d as nostalgia or a romantic call to return to pre-
. modern Africa. Its value is that since most African societies are increasiIlgly becomi.~g
secularized and modernized it becomes necessary to re-examine traditional morality .~d . ~ts
ethical traditions and values. The purpose of this is so that we can find out what lessons can be
learned from it in view of building and sustaining moral communities (cf. Moyo 1992: 49) for
our times. We also need to do this because we must recognize the fact that the traditional way
of life and its ethic is still viable for many African people today, and any attempt to understand
contemporary moral problems of Africans which does not take this into account will remain
superficial and misleading. This is because the African that we see today is a product of lives
lived before him, and is a part of the chain of cultural continuity which carries the past into the
present (cf. Kasenene 1993: 6). In other words in__c.!~<JJil}KJ¥ith_.the_etbj~s_QLAfrica we need to---------- ._---- -_...- -
recognize _~~.f.aE!_!~~~~by ~!!!~~~. ~lican joins an already existing moral .story and when he
_ . . ----_. .~ _. . - . . -
leaves t~e sc~neth~_ll!!folding~or.aJdrama being acted by the community continues.
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It is the intention of this work to re-examine that traditional world view and ethos within the
matrix of contemporary Basotho society, and identify its implications for a re-discovery of
community based ethics for the complex types of contemporary interpersonal relations and the
nourishment of both private and public morality. If we hope to have a moral society in Lesotho,
a society that is characterised by kindness, feelings of mutual responsibility, solidarity and
goodwill, perhaps we can learn a lot from traditional society and its morality.
.'
0.3 My starting Point
Due to the obstacles I have pointed out and the fact that it is impossible to explore satisfactorily
the various African ethical traditions, and thus give a complete understanding of their ways of
conduct, the primary focus here will be on the traditional culture of the Basotho. This will
provide me with a handy starting point, because being a Mosotho I am more familiar with their
tradition and culture than with other African cultures and traditions. This will also provide a
stepping stone or an entry point to exploring African moral traditions and thought and a basis
upon which general statements about contemporary African ethics can be made.
So while the primary purpose is to look at ethics among Basotho, I will also be reflecting upon
. ~
broader issues concerning African ethical traditions and practices and suggesting what the
hallmarks of African ethics are. What I will then say about the Basotho, in most cases will not
necessarily be unique to that culture and as such will in most cases be true for other places in
Africa. In that sense I will often speak interchangeably of African ethics and Basotho ethics .
It will be important to bear in mind as we reflect on ethical traditions and practices of the
Basotho some central questions which will guide our focus. It is therefore my intention to explore
how ethics functions among the Basotho. What influence does their conception and experience
of community have on personal conduct? How does the way the Basotho think and experience
community shape their understanding and definition of what it means to be a person and in turn
how does this influence ethics? In short how does community form the basis of morality and
function as a basis for moral judgements? How does it provide a communal and personal moral
identity? Such questions as how the Basotho arrive at making ethical or moral decisions and
judgments, their moral point of reference, what is it that informs their moral thought and practice
7
thus will become important for our study.
In other words it will be in seeking answers to such questions that the central elements of their
ethical traditions and practices will become apparent. It will be by articulating elements of
traditional morality that a clearer picture of what I take to be Basotho ethics will emerge, along
with its communal orientation.
Before identifying some salient aspects of ethical traditions and practices of Basotho, and
.'
beginning the discussion on community and its significance for their ethical conduct, I want to
look at the contemporary state of morality and the situation in ethical debates and moral thought.
This is necessary because not only is this the larger context within which the moral life of the
Basotho is a part, but also because it will shape much of the discussion that follows and why I
think that a communal approach to ethics or morality is a much better alternative.
1. CONTEMPORARY MORAL ENVIRONMENT
A cursory glance into the contemporary moral sphere reveals a general confusion and
unhappiness about ethics and its function . Describing this Hannah Kinoti says that
There is much grumbling and lamentation... People lament Qnd grumble because they
possess some knowledge of traditional morality which ensured the well-being of
communities and individuals alike. That morality has been superimposed, and in certain
respects rudely crossed, by other influences of the day and age in which we find ourselves
(1992: 73).
This unhappiness is both on the theoretical and practical level. On the theoretical level the
dissatisfaction is partly due to abstract universalistic and objectivist tendencies towards ethical
reflection. This has gradually undermined the moral significance of the context of the agent i.e.
the local and particular. One's context, or moral particularity is not only important but
imperative for any authentic ethical reflection. The reason for this is that all ethics is contextual,
because it speaks to a specific context or community. On the practical level this unhappiness is
with the lack of moral accountability together with the accompanying individualistic tendencies.
It is partly due to this transformation of the status of ethics that not only do we have a general
confusion but often opposing views and feelings about ethics in modern societies.
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1.1 Concerns and Views About the State of Morality
-, For most people today ways of conduct are a personal matter. Personal conduct is understood-- ----- ~. --- -~--- _.
primarily as a private and no~~_a public matter~ This has ~e~ult~~ i.~. _~ .f~Il<:l'!IJl~ntal change to
the traditional idea of ethics as a communal enterprise, In traditional societies, beliefs and morals
. .'- ~ ...
were not private matters or aspects of life to be left entirely to individuals. As such the
.. & -- - ' - ' - '_ ., . ._ , .. ~ - - . . " - _ . .• - _ .- . . . ,
subsequent dichotomy between the private and public sphere that we now see developing in many
contemporary African societies was non-existent. Commenting on this Mwikamba points out that
with the advent of Christianity and Western culture, life has been compartmentalized into
public and private sectors. This explains the existing dichotomy between public and
private, individual and collective, and above all lack of "accountability" in different
spheres of life (1992:85) .
Because of this attitude one finds in places like Lesotho today, a growing trend in which personal
conduct is almost untouchable and often not open to be evaluated by others. It is something
which other people have no business getting involved in it According to this, the individual is
morally accountable to no one except himself or herself. This has not only led to individualism
and privatization of ways of conduct but also to a feeling of uneasiness and unhappiness about
the state of contemporary African moral environment. There is unhallpiness because the society
is lamenting a moral world fallen apart and because as Kinoti points out
today African society may seem to be in a state of near chaos in the realm of morality.
sPeople are disillusioned after suffering major cultural upheavals... The emergent new
African-Western educated, Christianized and clothed-has been something of a caricature,
least pleasing to himself (Kinoti 1992: 80).
This change, particularly its Euro-American spirit of individualism' with its selfish tendency, has
not only made it hard to practice traditional African values but has also given rise to
unsatisfactory moral conditions and attitudes. Ethics as an expression of the particular
community's ideals, values and purposes is essentially communal, and thus cannot be privatized
in this way. In this sense morality Le. as a codification of community's standards and values,
likewise is essentially institutional. It is that which evolves within a particular social institution
3
By ind i v i du ali sm here i t i s meant an at t i tude a nd conception o f t he sel f Whe reby the individual is
understood as autonomous , i nde pen den t and a s essential ly dist i nc t f r om"society. An unders t anding t ha t sees t he
i ndiv idual as having a sphere o f life that only a ffects him or he r , and withi n which he or she i s s overei gn.
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and it is therefore the thing of that particular institution or community (cf. Mackie 1977: 80).
This provides the community with its own moral base. The purpose of ethics will, therefore, be
to ensure that as individuals and communities we live our lives in line with this moral base. It
becomes a recognized way of conduct providing people with guidelines that can serve as a basis
for personal conduct.
When ethics is understood in this sense it will not make much sense outside the context of..
communal living. It is a kind of language that is spoken between people and not by oneself as
liberal individualism tries to do. For this reason the community has a very important moral role
to play, and that is to ensure that ethics is not left to the peril of individualism but rather that it
remains open to the critical input of the members, or the prophetic voices within the community.
In modem societies this communal responsibility towards ethics is increasingly declining and in
some cases it is almost non existent. All these things have given rise to the feeling that the state
and status of morality in recent years is one which is terribly unsatisfactory. The general feeling
is that moral standards have deteriorated and continue to do so. On the African scene people are
unhappy because as Mwikamba points out
in the past Africans were much more community-centred, today Africans are becoming
more and more ego-centred. Furthermore Africans are caught up in a moral contradiction.
Should one be faithful and loyal to herselflhimself, to the comrhunity. the religious group,
nation,... or to their wealth? (1992: 86).
This situation plus increasing individualistic moral attitudes have thus left many people without
a clear sense where and what is the moral reference point and in comparison to earlier ».
generations, morality in our age is not what it used to be nor what it should be. The traditional
values and virtues such as respect for elders, charity, honesty, hospitality and communal solidarity
are not only fading (Ibid. 1992: 84) but a rare phenomenon. These values and virtues gave ethics
a tangible social content.
At the observable level of actions and omissions Kinoti says, one finds increasing cases of
giving and receiving of bribes, parents neglecting their children, adult "children"
abandoning their aging parents,... failure to show respect for one another, ...(Kinoti. 1992:
76).
All these things according to African culture cast doubt on the moral integrity of a person. At
the theoretical and conceptual level, we are a people that live in a state of moral uncertainty and
10
a generation lacking the conceptual moral framework within which we make moral utterances.
We lack conceptual tools with which to think and reflect adequately about ethics. The present
modern framework, particular its devotion to the individual is unsatisfactory because by posing
individuals as independent and operating on the principle of choice , it makes our moral
statements and judgments inconsist~nt. This in turn makes our moral identity inconsistent because
it lacks the enduring quali ties made possible by inhabiting roles and not by choice". The reason..
is that an identity that is determined by choices has no enduring character, because choices
change substantially from day to day. The need for freedom, and in turn freedom of choice that
we now see in contemporary way of living is so strong and predominant that it has been a major
factor separating the traditional way of life and the modem one. This has resulted in a shift from
extended family to nuclear family and subsequently from communalism and community to
individualism.
This shift is not only physical or sociological i.e. where a family is no longer understood in terms
of at least three generations (children, parents and grand-parents). It is also psychological and
intellectual whereby most people think of themselves in very individualistic terms. Many rarely
think of themselves in terms of collective identity, which is linked with inter-generational ties,
social responsibilities and duty. Contemporary people think of themselves in terms of the
"relationship with parents, brothers, sisters and friends, but even these are dependent on choice.
As a result the communal bonds of friendship which used to characterise traditional communities
are weaker today than in the past. The impact on morality of this shift together with the
conception of the self that accompanied it has resulted in societies where life is lived with no
recognizable shared values and moral standards. What worries many people is that with this
decline in the value and sense of community on the one hand, and the rise of individualism on
the other, a new social phenomenon has emerged and that is a society where there can be no
judgment of the conduct of others because this would interfere with the greater freedom of the
4 • The whole idea and concept o f · c ho i c e· a s a modern phenomenon typifying the l iberation o f the sel f
needs t o be pu~ und er serious scrut i ny becaus e mode r n i t y g i ves t he i mpr e s s i on that people are now free r t o
cho?se . But t h 1s 1S ha rd t o compr e he nd when t he maj ori ty o f pe ople t oday, e.g i n third wor l d countries, for
V~r 10US r ea s ons are o f t e n ~orced to · c hoos e · , whe n in fact t here is no cho ice t o ma ke . For these people they
slmply have to accept the d1ctate s o f gl obal eco nomies a nd pr ogrammes o f the mighty r i c h nat ions o f the We s t .
5 . h
.Mor a l 1t y e r e mea ns a sys tem or a code o f c ondu ct containing val ues a nd standards by wh i c h pe op le
in a give n commun ity live . Et h i c s i s a reflection on or a s t udy o f such systems and ha s t o do with evalua tions
of such systems through pr i nc i p l e s o f r i ght an d wrong .
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individual.
According to Melanie Phillips this is the case with modem Western society. She points out that
according to Himmelfarb in comparison to traditional societies, modem Western societies are
very reluctant to speak the language of morality and that
individuals can devise their own moral codes; any attempt to rank them is illiberal... No
one can pass judgment on other's behaviour lest they give offence. Sensibility has
replaced moral sense... "Values"...is itself a neutral word that denies the firm basis of
those... principles which should be more properly described as virtues (1995: 832).
The modem Western society she says is one which has rejected such principles as family values,
neighbourliness and self respect which contributed among other things to personal integrity,
altruism and a sense of community. Modem societies she argues have "rejected the very idea that
a set of firm principles should animate society" (Ibid.1995: 832). Perhaps it is not so much that
people have rejected the idea that morality should animate society, but rather that morality is
interpreted primarily in individualistic terms. In other words there are moral standards but these
are self chosen and informed by an ethic of happiness which in turn is closely linked and in most
cases driven by consumerism. So what is good and right is essentially what makes me happy as
an individual.
This way of thinking about ethics and morality is fast becoming the dominant moral attitude..
wherever modernity has taken .root and Africa is no .exception. People are not only reluctant to
speak the language of morality or prepared to be morally accountable to anyone, they are after
the pursuit of happinessin the form of contemporary materialism. What is perhaps more worrying
is that because personal conduct has been virtually removed from the public arena and
exclusively confined to the private sphere, the effect of individualism on people means that as
people we no longer have any moral obligations to one another.
1.1.1 Moral Confusion and Uncertainty
Charles Kammer likewise expresses unhappiness with contemporary Western moral environment.
According to him modem society is marked by both moral confusion and intense moral concern
in which there seems to be not only uncertainty about the shape of the moral life, but also about
what to value and what rules to honour. The emergence of pluralism ~nd its implications for the
moral existence he says is both a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing because with the
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emergence of moral pluralism there is the knowledge of the varieties of moral life but while
such knowledge frees us,...it also leaves us feeling adrift. Is all morality relative? ...Is it
possible that there is no right and wrong, that the moral life,...is simply a product of
personal and social preferences. We feel as if our moral lives have no grounding (1988:
33).
Indeed this is the feeling that is becoming increasingly the experience of many people. The
contemporary situation i.e. one of lives lived without a moral centre, gives rise to the experience
"
of the world as being morally bankrupt and so chaotic that the only alternative is for each person
to choose if not to create his/her own standards (cf. Hauerwas 1983: 2). As a result more and
more people live profoundly confused lives in which they are uncertain about how to respond
to fundamental moral questions of who they are and who they should be (cf. Kammer 1988: 34).
Because we are uncertain about answers to these fundamental moral questions deciding what to
do on a day to day basis and making moral judgements becomes more difficult and more
arbitrary, and the more we are uncertain as people about how to respond to questions of who we
are and who we should be, the more we become attracted and vulnerable to emotivist" tendencies
of modernity. We do not only find it easy but politically correct to believe that moral statements
are nothing more than just expressions of attitudes and feelings which are not governed by any
criterion, principle or value (MacIntyre 1981: 31). With this we d,p not have to be morally
accountable and by implication agents that can be morally committed.
Our problems in Africa are largely due to the fact that, because we have lost common meanings
I
and shared values, we have no clear stand on these issues and as such we stand for nothing, and
anybody who stands for nothing will fall for anything. When we lack things to stand for we
become easy victims to any other culture with its social and moral attitudes.
1.1.2. Moral Neutrality, Pluralism and Tolerance
Contemporary moral attitudes are not only worrying because of the increasing tendencies towards
individualism, but also because they seem to lack the kind of moral seriousness required for a
society with a recognizable moral system. This lack of moral seriousness is often justified by the
6
Macl ntyre descr ibes emotivi sm i s a doc t rine which assert s t ha t all eva luative judge ments and mor e
spec ~ f ical ~y al l mora l judgements are no t h i ng b ut expression s o f pr e ference, ex press i on s o f atti t ude and
feel l ngs , l n s o far as they a re mor a l or evaluative i n character (1981: 11 ) . For a mor e de tailed account of
emot ivism see chapters 2 a nd 3 o f Maclntyre's Aft e r Virtue .
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modern person as appropriate because it promotes moral pluralism and tolerance. While I do not
question the value of moral pluralism and tolerance, I question the underlying motives behind
their use in the life of contemporary moral and ethical discussion. I think much of their use and
application is suspect. It seems that much of this may be motivated more by concerns by people
to avoid moral responsibility and in turn to cop out from moral accountability to the larger
communi~y, than by a genuine value for moral tolerance. Unwilling to be morally accountable
to others and for others the modern person tells us that they do not want to impose their own
moral viewpoint on others.
No one would disagree that it's a good thing not to impose one's moral standards on others, but
this does not entail moral neutrality or that a person should make moral evaluation of another
persons' conduct. The reason modem people are hostile to external dimension of moral evaluation
is understandable if we look back at the situation in the past. The contemporary person unlike
his counterpart in traditional society, is stripped of communal significance. It is a self with no
social roles and any social status and as such lacks the confidence that goes along with this i.e.
speaking for and on behalf of the group. The status that person enjoyed as a representative of the
community in traditional societies gave the agent authority. So when he or she made moral
statements they were expressions of something more than just the ipdividual's own likes and
dislikes, but when the agent speaks purely on his or her own behalf their views become just one
among many and hence they are less authoritative. This is because, as MacIntyre points out,
the price paid for liberation from what appeared to be external authority of traditional
morality was the loss of any authoritative content from the would-be moral utterances of
the newly autonomous agent (MacIntyre 1981: 65t).
MacIntyre poses a very challenging question and asks why anyone should listen to such an
individual or pay any attention to his moral views, and indeed we should ask, why should they?
Perhaps it is this more than the supposed high regard for moral pluralism that is the motive
behind the lack of moral seriousness exhibited by the autonomous self of modernity.
While there is in general a great deal of unhappiness with the contemporary moral environment,
there are those who do not agree with this view. Among liberals especially, there is a feeling that
the situation does not call for any concern, at least not for the same reasons given by the view
just presented. For these people it is not true that contemporary moral life is unsatisfactory. This
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is because in their view we are now free to do as we like, with no one telling us what to do. Our
age is the age of free choice and individual rights. According to this view the contemporary
moral environment could not be any healthier. Through freedom of choice and the liberation of
the self from social roles and social control, the individual can claim full responsibility for his
or her conduct unlike in the past when you did what you were supposed to do, not what you
wanted or chose to do. So what is lamented by some as lost value in community, is seen by..
others as liberation and free dom from social control. It is in view of the latter, that Singer says
some people speaking of morality and ethics, have in mind a set of puritanical prohibitions
mainly designed to stop people having fun (1979: lff), particularly in some form of
unencumbered or indulgent behaviour. As I will argue, ethics is much more than this. It is about
1 -
how we come to choose who we want to be and the people we ought to be.
1.2 Individualism and Liberal tendencies in Africa
In Africa the unhappiness with the contemporary moral environment can be described as a result
of the introduction of the liberal's individualistic and universalistic ethics within a moral scheme
that was essentially communitarian. In that sense what we are dealjng with is in many -ways
similar to the debate in Europe and America between liberalism and communitarianism. In Africa
however this has not evolved or come about for the same reasons. In other words individualism
'I Le. selfish concern with oneself, and its emergence among African communities both as a social
and moral phenomenon has come as a result of social change, modernization and the exportation
of Western ethics to Africa. Unlike the West; individualism in Afric~has not come ab~as .~
\
~ctive to what was perceived as the abuses of authority by communities or groups. It was not
a so~ial reaction to the inadequacies of community,although this may well be the reason why
some people are drawn towards it today . However the current dualism among Africans indicates
that individualism has not emerged as a corrective to community. One finds, therefore, that some-- -- ' .....
peoplehave a4()J?t.~d._ .~ .QickllIJ(L~_hoos~_~t!it':l4~ and approachwhereby they have opted for the
best of the two. In the West the situation is different. In most cases people in the West have clear
positions around the issue: you are either in the liberal carrip or in the communitarian camp. In .
Africa these positions have not as yet crystallized to that level. There are still a lot of grey areas.
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The majority of people in Africa are, therefore, in the middle and have one leg in each side of
the debate at different times. As such the debate in Africa will have to be looking at the issues
not as mutually exclusive. This means at the best the debate will have to be concerned with the
mutual purification of the excess and shortcomings of both liberalism and communitarianism.
For this reason my critique of liberalism and individualism must first be seen from this
/
perspective and as aimed towards the nature of the problem as it has emerged in Africa.
Secondly '~his critique is not of liberalism as such, but rather of individualistic ethics which has
come as a result of individualistic liberal influences among Africans. This means that my interest
in the debate is only in so far as it will help in understanding the implications of communal
ethics on the one hand and individualistic ethics on the other. In other words I will follow it only
as a way of making a critique of individualistic ethics in favour of communal ethics, which I
believe is not only the traditional African approach to ethics, but with some minor improvements
offers a much better moral framework for ethics today.
Since a lot of what underlies these problems .even as they are found in Africa derives from
similar concerns as those that were informing the debate in Europe and America, it will be
necessary to briefly outline the nature of that debate as it has developed. The current debate
between liberalism and communitarianism may be described as a second phase development in
"the chronology and history of the debate, which seems to have been characterised by a reaction-
counter-reaction movement First the debate was initiated by what later became liberal tradition,
as a reaction to dissatisfactions with the limitations and weakness of European monarchies (Daly
1994: xix). In the current phase the roles have changed. Now it is liberalism that is being
attacked by communitarianism. Markate Daly describing this points out that
communitarianism is a postliberal phil<f0phy in the sense that it could only have
developed within a liberal tradition of established democratic practices, and in a liberal
culture that had allowed community values to decline to the extent that a corrective
seemed necessary. Communitarianism was proposed as just such a corrective...(Ibid. 1994:
xiii).
If Daly is correct this is a serious indictment to liberalism. An indictment to the effect that it has
failed to be a workable framework on which people should base their lives, including their moral
lives. It means there have been some inadequacies and shortcomings that were so serious that
people felt there is a need for a paradigm shift. This has largely been pioneered by those people
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who call -for a return to community as just the shift that needs to be made, or communitarians
as they are now commonly know~. In order to appreciate the communitarian critique, we need
to know what it is that they are attacking within liberalism. Before doing that there are some
preliminary remarks that need to made about liberalism.
Liberalism has evolved and branched into many directions because it has not remained static, but
has adapted to changing social conditions. This means no single characterization of the
."
phenomenon will be able to encompass all of its major adherents. However I will try to give a
definition of liberalism that will provide not only the context for understanding the current
debate, but also of understanding liberalism as the basis of an individualistic ethic now informing
contemporary moral attitudes in Africa.
1.3 Liberalism and the Liberal Tradition
At the risk of sounding too simplistic, liberalism can be described as essentially a philosophy
devoted to the welfare of the individual because as liberals would say "the bench mark of justice
is the individual" (cf. Phillips 1994: 178). Its guiding principle is justice whose function is to
protect the individual's rights. Central to this philosophy is freedom Qfchoice, autonomy of the
individual, neutrality of government towards conceptions of the good life and which way of life
is morally preferable. Describing this Childress says the corner stone of liberalism is
the belief in the supreme value of the individual...a conviction that the only value of the
state is to remove obstacles in the path of liberty and to create the positive conditions of
freedom...(1986: 347).
In similar words Daly describes liberalism as starting from the basic premise that the right is
prior to the good and says
this means that in constitutional democracy, the guarantees of individual political and civil
liberties take priority over any good that could be accomplished by rescinding those rights
(Daly 1994: xvi).
The common factor to all these elements from the moral point of view is that they presuppose
a certain conception of the self i.e. the liberal conception of the-self, a self that is understood as
- ~
<,
free, autonomous, independent, and has rights and is not defined"by its social roles. This
- ,
conception of the self I will argue is not only informed by the liberal social construction of
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reality, which it also presupposes, but that in turn it informs and is presupposed by that social
construction of reality. In other words it is in the mutual inter-dependency and influence of the
two that the liberal philosophy originates.
1.3.1 The Liberal Conception of the Self
.'
One of the key features of the liberal self is that it is an individual who is free to do as he or she
chooses with his or her life. In other words an individual free who is free from the social control
i.e. society or the community in which one belongs. Describing what this means Mill argued that
the only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it (1994: 17).
According to this freedom means th~_ aQWJy-Jo_pJJr~ue W11~1.~~~h_p-eI~QILCOnsiders-gQo.d._in their .
. _.~ ..~._- -... ~~--..,- ~+----- -_.-
QWR_.way,-.asj~~ong..as_Jhis~dQ~§..!lQL;lffect .otheLpeQple~_s .freedom..negatiszely, This notion of
freedom implies that as individuals we have two clearly distinct spheres in our life -one that we
share with others and from which society can make legitimate claims, and one which has only
to do with ourselves and no one else. In this sphere the individual is not only sovereign but their
liberty may not be interfered with. Thus Mill argues that in that part'of the individual's life
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over
his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign (Ibid. 1994: 16).
According to this there is another aspect to the notion of liberty of the individual; sovereignty.
/"-
(r be individual being his or her own master. In this we have the foundation and the core of the
liberal perspective regarding freedom. It is freedom from something and freedom to do something
or what Isaiah Berlin describes as negative and positive concepts of liberty. The former he says
stresses
that some portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere of social
control... liberty in this sense means liberty from; absence of interference beyond the
shifting, but always recognisable frontier (1984: 19).
Concerning the latter i.e. the 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty', Berlin says it derives from
the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. He says its meaning
comes to light if we try to answer the question, not 'What am I free to do or be?', but
'By whom am I ruled' or 'Who is to say what I am, and what I am not, to be or do?' ...
18
(Ibid. 1984: 22).
Both of these conceptions have not only become the corner stone of liberalism, but are major
influences informing contemporary moral attitudes in Africa.
Liberals have not only put forward a view of the self which is individualistic, independent and
free as John Locke puts it (cf. Daly 1994: 4), they have also argued that as individuals we have
rights Le. an inviolability which even the welfare of every one else cannot override. According
.'
to the liberal perspective as John Rawls argues, these rights are best secured by a political
framework founded on justice as fairness', which denies that the loss of freedom for some is
made right by a greater good shared by others (1984: 39). According to this theory as Rawls says
quoted by Sandel
one does not take men's propensities and inclinations as a given ...Rather, their desires
and aspirations are restricted from the outset by principles of justice which specify the
boundaries that men's systems of ends must respect (1984: 42). .
Liberals argue, therefore, that on the basis of this all that is needed is a basic framework of rights
which would be binding to all, but also within which the, individual can pursue their own
conception of the good life. Justice in this way would serve that purpose. In justice as fairness
the priority of the right over the good, Rawls argues
imposes certain criteria on the design of the basic structure as a whole; these
arrangements must not tend to generate propensities and attitudes contrary to the
...principles of justice (1984: 42).
So the liberal self is a self that has rights, and these rights must not only be protected but
individuals must be able to enjoy them without impeding others from doing the same.
The third aspect of the liberal conception of the self, and which has been heavily criticized by
communitarians, has to do with personal identity. Liberals postulate an image of the individual
in which the self is prior to its aims and ends, and distinguisheable from its values. What is
important is that in line with the liberal concern with freedom, the self is also understood in
terms of freedom of choice. In other words the liberal self is a self-choosing individual who is
independent of the desires and ends they may have at any moment. According to Rawls, quoted
by Sandel, to say that the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it means that
7
For a more detai led account o f thi s see J onn Rawls ' s book : A Theory of Justice, 1971 .
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even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities...I am never
defined by my aims and attachments, but always capable of standing back to survey and
assess and possibly to revise them (1984: 5).
This means that the self has priority to choose what are its aims and ends and does not assume
inherited ones as a given. David Gauthier in relation to this says of the process of socialization
that there must be a non-neutral moment in it. That is to say a moment in the life of a person
in which jheir preference and ways of conduct are not self chosen. However, because the key
factor in liberalism is freedom of choice, even this must be seen as a very temporary state of
being, because as he points out
this non-neutral moment, even if no threat to autonomy, seems an arbitrary factor that
stands in need of justification to the rational autonomous individual (1992: 158).
The centrality of choice to the liberal self means the significance of inherited factors such as
one's preferences, values and ends is not only very small, but these very factors need to be put
through the purification process of choice. As such they do not contain any moral weight nor are
they binding. Hence Gauthier points out that even if it can be assumed that an individual begins
with preferences and capacities that are, at least in part, socially determined
what matters is that their preferences and, within limits, their capacities are not fixed by
their socialization, which is not a process by which persons are hard-wired, but rather, at
least in part, a process for the development of soft-wired beings, who have the capacity
to change the manner in which they are constituted (Ibid.1992: 158).
This means that the idea that people are constituted by their inherited aims and ends will not only
be unacceptable, but found to be incompatible with the liberal perspective. Our identity as
individuals according to the liberal perspective is not defined by our social inheritances, but
rather by what we choose to be.
1.3.2 The Liberal Social Construction of Reality
What we have presented was a broad picture of the principles and ideas that form the context of
the liberal conception of the self and by implication the liberal view of society. This then forms
that c~ntext within which liberalism must be understood. The principles and ideas we have
touched have to do with claims to freedom and rights. From this basic premis~ a whole range
of other liberal values follow such as freedom of choice, moral neutrality, autonomy and
20
independence of the individual.
While these go someway towards explaining liberalism, they do not nevertheless clearly explain
its link with individualism. That link I will argue is in the fact that they all presuppose a
particular type of social construction of reality". One which I will describes as essentially
individualistic and sees people as separate. These values all assume a social construction of
reality which does not only treat people essentially as individuals but one which aims at just that:
individual~, not their togetherness but their separateness. In other words liberal values make sense
only from the perspective where social relations are fundamentally understood in individualistic
. terms i.e. a perspective that sees a clear distinction between the individual and society and one
which aims at advancing the course of individualism.
As such liberalism must be understood as a theory of social construction of reality that is
essentially individualistic and one that has lost faith in community or has no interest as such in
community. It is in this sense that liberalism is individualistic or atomistic. The social and
political agenda of liberalism bears testimony to this because it is only concerned with limiting
the sphere of social control on the individual to as little as possible, and maximizing the scope
of individual freedom as much as is realistically possible. Describing this Jacques Maritain says
in the bourgeois-individualist type of society there is no common work to do, nor is there
any form of communion. Each one asks only that the state protect his individual freedom
of profit against the possible encroachments of other men's freedoms ...the function of the
State is only to insure the material convenience of the scattered individuals, each absorbed
in his own well-being and in enriching himself (Ibid 1986: 122, 124).
So even though liberalism may appear to be dealing with groups or collectives i.e. the
relationship between the individual and society, this is coincidental. Its main concern is not this
relationship as a valuable thing in its self, it only deals with it as something it had to do. This
means that as such this relationship may not only be seen as unimportant, but it is not the interest
of the liberal agenda. The thrust behind that agenda is fundamentally individualistic and its
motivation derives from the concern with the interests of the individual.
2. Individualism as a Social Phenomenon
8
• The phrase 'social cons t r uc t ion o f r ea lity' is borrowed f r om Pe t er L Berger and Thomas Luckmann 's
book The soc ia l const ruc t i on o f Reality . 1966 . As employed here i t i s a way o f descr i bi ng t he ove ra l l liberal
concept Ion o t how SOCIe ty i s cons tructed.
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Individualism as a social and economic phenomenon can be ascribed to the emergence of notions
of freedom and rights in people's consciousness. It originates from a desire to choose one's way
to be in charge of his or her life rather than being trapped in social norms and traditions. The
flowering of liberal thought in the philosophy of thinkers such as Locke, Jefferson, Burke, Paine
and Mill and others, played a central part in the social forces behind individualism. It is also
important to realize that as we see it today individualism rests on two factors: economic and
political. i~ the economic sphere liberal capitalism has a major impact on societies and hence one
of the important factors behind individualism. On the socio-political sphere the enlightenment
enterprise seems to have had a huge influence on societies and the way people understand
themselves.
While I will not go into detail identifying the weaknesses of liberalism, it is nevertheless
important to point out that in Africa in particular it has resulted in unsatisfactory social and moral
condition. As William Makgoba points out there are a number of problems with classical Western
liberal democracies namely their value systems and in general the whole Western liberal ethic.
According to Makgoba
the most threatening of these are ...a reduction of human values, materialism, an
expansionist mentality, disdain for morality and spirituality, an over emphasis on the
individual above the community and a profound crisis of authority (1996: 23)
Aspects of life such as morality and spirituality are to the African people very important and to
dismiss or take them lightly as liberalism seems to do will create conflicts of all sorts.
Liberalism, as a central feature of Western-style democracies, can be described in Makgoba's
words as having attained liberty but having lost humanism. It is this perceived loss or lack of
interest in humanism and the unqualified pursuit of freedom and happiness that is worrying with
the liberal ideal. When the concerns of liberty are pursued with disregard for community, the end
result is the sort of uncaring individualism we see developing today. Roger L Shinn describes this
as the magnification "of the valid experiences of the self' in which its social formation and
involvement are minimised. The starting premise here is individual persons and society becomes
just an aggregate of individuals, whereby social institutions exis~ to serve individuals (1986:
295). This view of society together with contemporary market forces, in particular liberal
capitalism, are key to understanding individualism as the social background informing
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contemporary moral attitudes. For this reason it is important in looking at the historical
development of individualism to pay attention also to liberalism which is where it is clearly
articulated.
2.1 Liberal Capitalism and Individualism
The close affinity between Liberalism and individualism is not so much because of the liberal
.'
rejection of collectivism or excessive individualism of libertarians. Rather it is
its concentration on rights and for its failure to attend sufficiently to the common good
as well as its inadequate appreciation of community, ..(Childress 1986: 349).
In other words it is by down-playing the significance of the collective and tradition arguing "that
the individual has natural rights" and is therefore autonomous, that liberalism is a vehicle for
individualism . The moment people start entertaining a position like this, it is an indication that
they understand themselves primarily as separate independent individuals. We see then how the
need for the individual to have maximum personal freedom goes hand in hand with the need to
have as little external control as is possible. To this Isaiah Berlin makes an important observation.
He says
if I wish to preserve my liberty, it is not enough to say that i~ (sic) must not be violated .
unless someone or other... authorizes its violation. I must establish a society in which
there must be some frontiers of freedom which nobody should be permitted to cross
(1984: 27, my emphasis).
What Berlin is saying is of great significance because in it we can see how liberalism links up
with capitalism. What is of prime importance to a liberal over and above securing of political
rights is the establishment of a social order for the individual to thrive. In other words conditions
must be made that will allow each individual to reach full liberty and happiness. It does not take
much insight to see that one such condition would have to do with the economic sphere because
it is the second most important sphere in the life of people besides politics. According to this,
therefore it would be economic systems that are coherent with allowing individuals their freedom
to do as they like. This means liberalize the economy, i.e. have as little external control as
possible, along the same lines as the political rights in the political sphere.
So just as freedom formed an integral part of the liberal political agenda in the same way it
formed a central part of their economic agenda. So we see in the economic sphere that free
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economic enterprise is regarded as the best economic system even today. It is believed that it
offers not only positive conditions for the liberty of all, but also equal opportunities. One has
only to look at the majority of the so called third world countries in contrast to the first world
to see the injustice and unfairness of liberal capitalism. Materialism, Le. the chronic condition
of acquiring more and more material things, is not only seen as a sign of freedom but of meeting
the individual's desire for happiness and pleasure. As William Makgoba points out the
.a
"overemphasis on the economy as the standard of judging and evaluating recognition, respects,
acceptance and success" has resulted in people losing their "dignity, status, and respect", and this
in turn has lead to moral and ethical decay (1996: 23).
We can now see how the emergence of individualism is closely linked to the market forces and
in particular liberal capitalism. The reason is that through its individualistic economic ethic, i.e.
the pursuit of profit, liberal capitalism pulls people away from the more traditional selfless ethic
centred around communal solidarity and concern. Contemporary life style makes it almost
impossible for many people to see the value of community or to live it up even when they do
see it, because it is seen as uneconomical.
2.2 The Enlightenment Project and Individualism ..
We have seen how a number of factors are the reasons behind individualism in the social-
political sphere. While these have also had their impact in the moral sphere others factors seem
to have been most prominent, and of these the enlightenment is a case in point. What can be said
from the outset is that in this project alone we fmd all the central tenets of contemporary moral
environment: objectivity and universality on the one hand and ethical relativism accompanied by
emotivist\ tendencies on the other.
As a socio-cultural reaction to the culture of the time, the enlightenment set as its objective
justification of morality and the emancipation of the individual from what was perceived as
authoritarian and oppressive traditional moral values. This was to be achieved by giving an
account of the self that was not depend~on ~social standing for its identity. So inherited
factors of the situated self e.g. one's roles and obligations, loyalties and commitments were
stripped and regarded as not morally befitting a rational moral agent.
By dismantling these central features of traditional society, features which formed part of the
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personal and moral identity of people, but failing to find satisfactory replacement, the
enlightenment left that which constituted the moral centre empty and without shape or form. This
meant that the idea of a shared and common moral and value system which formed the
foundation of both personal and communal moral life was effectively abolished. With this the
individual was then made free to create and devise his or her own moral standards. So even if
the individual was still contracted to others by means of social contract i.e. a loose voluntary
"
association of individuals to common causes, this individual could still choose to follow their
own standards different from those he is in contract with. Today this is often backed up by
labelling as illiberal or conservative any attempt to judge any such standards. Because of this the,
influence of the project was a favourable factor to the liberal project and objectives.
Along with its social agenda the enlightenment enterprise had a cultural agenda, and here too the
end results were as unsettling as they were to the conception of the self that it produced. The
project having dismantled traditional social organization extended to traditional morality. It put
aside its central elements of ultimate ends or telos and tried to find a rational justification for
morality. The reason for this was seen as the need to avoid the arbitrariness of moral judgments.
To do this it had to do away with the traditional context and old moral assumptions. That context
had three basic elements:
•
untutored human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-
telos and the precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the
other (cf.MacIntyre 1981: 51).
What the project did was to do away with two of these elements and just concentrate on ethics.
As Maclntyre points out each of these three elements requires reference to the other two if its
status and function is to be intelligible (Ibid. 1981: 51) and it was because this was done away
with that the project failed. This failure" left ethics without any public significance and
individuals and communities without a moral centre. This virtually opened a way whereby ethics
and morality would be rejected as a communal practice under communal responsibility. It was
then regarded as a private matter and an individual's responsibility, a responsibility which the
society has no\business getting involved in.
9
. • For a more de tailed a na l ysis o f thi s failure a nd why the project had to fail, see Maclntyre's After
~, chapter 5. ------
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So we find in the post-Enlightenment period liberal philosophers speaking of what they
considered the tyranny of public opinion and the need for people to be protected against society
to impose its own ideas and practices as unwritten rules of conduct on people who dissented from
them. Statements like this are indicative of the type of relationship that was to become more and
more predominant between the individual and the community in the post-Enlightenment period
in many Western societies. It is one that is understood essentially in tenus of competing interests
."
and choices and one in which the individual is no longer an ally of the community or the society.
Such a relationship is described less in tenus of unity of life in which the individual and
community mutually grow from each other's respective strengths, and at the same time mutually
cure their respective weaknesses. This kind of individualism which has become liberal orthodoxy,
I believe is still the dominating characteristic of modernity.
The consequences of this has been a very individualistic view of human nature and in turn of
ethics. This became possible because the enlightenment stripped morality of the notion of human
purposes or ends. In traditional thought and practice the purpose of ethics was to allow human
beings to realise their ultimate purposes and ends, and in their life time work towards the
achievement of these. Ethics was that which would lead people from who they are to who they
ought to be. By removing teleology and then failing to find an alternative context within which
ethics functioned, the enlightenment left ethics as a matter to be decided here and now alone by
the individual. This made ethics vulnerable to privatising individualistic tendencies which
characterise contemporary moral attitudes. It is in this sense that contemporary moral culture can
be described as a culture centred around the devotion of the individual. It is a culture that
functions within the framework and worldview that celebrates individualism, free choice, self
autonomy, and the demand for rights, usually understood in terms of individual liberties and
interests, in the liberalist culture. It follows then that moral values and virtues like kindness,
rightness, wrongness, duty, obligation, justice, and trust-worthiness or ways of conduct will all
be interpreted through the principle of vicious individualism of the autonomous self.
MacIntyre describing this points out that the individual that was produced by the enlightenment
project who is typical of modernity, is sovereign in his moral authority because he is now freed
from hierarchy and teleology, the very substance of the moral terms and concepts he uses. It is
the individual with no social roles, obligations, civic duty or social responsibility (Ibid. 1981: 60,
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650. In traditional African societies it was these social roles that helped to curb extreme
individualism . In modem societies the type of person we have is an individual whose relation to
society is one of mutual convenience where people are only in communion with others purely
for pragmatic purposes and personal benefit (cf. Taylor 1984: 191). In such a relationship society
or life-together becomes morally irrelevant and does not stand in any substantive relationship to
the moral life, moral identity and personal conduct of the agent.
.'
This is the condition and the moral landscape of much of Western society, which unfortunately
is finding its way into Africa in an alarming rate.
2.3 The Problem of Pursuing the Liberal Ideal
Now that I have sketched the liberal position, I can proceed with the identification of the
weaknesses of liberalism or the dangers and problems of pursuing the liberal ideal. I want to
emphasis again that as I have suggested this critique will be made primarily with an African
situation in mind. As such it is informed by an African perspective. A perspective that is
informed by a worldview that is fundamentally holistic and makes no division between the
private and public, the individual and the community, the religious" and the political, and the
sacred and the mundane. I need to emphasise this because I ben~~~ _ ~hil)j~_ ~11__j!!!port~t
difference to bear in mind and because as I said the implications of liberalism in Africa are not
-----~.- - - -- -- --_ .-- - - ._-- - .- .- - - --~ _.- - .. ----~ -
Ilecessarily going to be the same as in Europe and America or other places. So it is important
to keep that contextual perspective in focus. We must not, therefore, lose sight of the African
n'!tur~o!-_t~~ pro~J~f!l: J~Y_1l_~surI1ing _,! _~niv~~~a}p~r~p_~cJiY_~,J?~~~~~e<!s I_:'rYil.LMgue_what we.are
dealing with .here is an African_problem.
2.3.1 The Individual-Community DichotomyrZ
T~!!rs!.J~E2blem with the liberal ideal is its distinction of the individual from the community,
-_._-_._------_._-_._' --~._-.----_._.._~ ,•.__ -. _~---_._------ -.-_.._--_. _-. ._ _._---_..... ,- _. .- --.-.-, ." " ..-_. , ..- . -- .-.--- - ---..__....•
a dj§t!~ctionwhich is alm_ost separatist.The extent to which it dichotomizes the individual from
thecommunity I think is not only unhealthy but can lead to impersonal communities where
~opl~~~~,,-e _ ~~II_~tt~e_f~I~~g~ and concern for one another because they don't have too.
According to Phillips, liberalism as a theory -oi-j~~~~e, insi~ts iliat the individual is -~--b~~~h
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mark of justice and therefore
all judgements concerning the justice or injustice of people's conduct or of various social
arrangements pertain ultimately to individuals. Even when liberals say that blacks,
women, or one or another group have been treated unjustly, they mean that the
individuals comprising that group have been so treated (1994: 178, my emphasis).
This view of people and society as a whole does not bring much hope for fostering feelings of
cal1Ull}.Q_JeSPQnsibility for others, nor is it good for inculcatingthe~pirjt ~ot1:>E~~~~!~??~'
C~Qmm}!!!~~,sQlidarity, and a S~!!s,~~~of duty towards others because it encourages indivi~uCl;!ism.
," -, - ' . " .. ," - , . -_"~_.,....,..-.-....~_~...""" ...._~.~. ".,.,,..,,, _ _,-.,.,_ ,, ._, _ •• ~,_. -",,-~.•~ ~ ,,, , , -, c , , , - ~,~,,, ,-, ,__,,,_," ",, , ",,~.........._,...,,..,,,",,,·_ _··~ ·, ,"'''''~' ' '. -~..,_~"" .,,,~,.<.'_'~~"""
Tbis_lead~L1Q ano!ll~t(!ift!<;~ltY ~\\'!th li1:>~r'!lism,a.nd.thaLhas-to-do .with agenGy~,trld_th~ _!Ql~ _ of .
choice. Besides the fact that this is too centred around the individual, it is also not clear "what
exactly this choice consists in and how one comes to make it (cf. Sande11994: 80, my emphasis).
The individualistic rationality that seems to be the process by which the individual comes to
make his or her choices is not only impoverished in terms of our ability to feel for one another,
it isalsounableto.address the question of dutLand one's resRonsibili~L!Q_Q!!!~§: Besides the
, ------~-------
fact Jnaj:jtis._Q.<mgerous_to.leave .important .issues.such.as.morality...tochoiG.~,J!_ .~Q~*~!Y_ilIlimated
by a voluntaristic idea of doing good has no real prospect for achievingj], because of the selfish
.-._._., ".., .,~ -- _ .._ ~ ~,• ..,...-."."-~ . ,--_.~._ "-" -"
i~pulse_jn-peop!~ _\:yhich -needs§Qll1ethiJ:lg.... Qth~!JllilI! .indiyi~l:l~I~ .~~~~lves _.to _help __them
~~ercomejt. In other words it needs tobe checked.by something overpdabovethe individual's
conscience.
- " ' - -' . ,..
To leave one's social participation purely to choice I think is not only undesirable but also
threaten~ to hamp-!~L1b~_Y_\!l!i.YaliolL.oLthose-virtueswhich-l-think.are-importanUf.Q.QLs-o~ieties.,
~r~.Jo remain human. A~,Reoplt:?we..are notin .this.Iife.just.for, ourselves.we.have..asocial
t-e.sp_Qn~jQUity_JQwards-our-families,-otheLp.e.QPJ~_,_QJJLllatiQl1..and.imteed-our-planet.
~<;c~P.ting a strong dichotomy, as opposed tonsoftone between .the . individual andjhe
~,, " - --- - --" ",, - _ _,.•._-- --- - - .-
community, therefore, runs the risk of belittling those things that.we value and can only achieve
in common. 1}1i$j~ beca~l~.~ _~~<;h ~ individualistic view of societysendsa wrongsignal .. .~Q..,
peQpl~,.~Mllil~m-people;.::i)1~ividualistic_and_seln~sJ:Li:!$_they,.. are not going!Q~be motivated to have
._-_.,.--_ .-•.._,-~.-.._-,-~ -_ ..;.;..:..." .:.:.._ ......:...;.;-.:.;,...-..~~~~--"""'""- .~,,_ ..;.;.;~ - -...;:;;: ' . . " ,
g252~wi1Las a~JTI;:tin ..characteristicoft]JeirJ!Ye.~.$hen as a;lJ.!l~ ;$gciety is preaching the opposite.
... _ .-. .. ---_~_. ,._. _"" , . ~ , . _._..• "<' . ~. , - . ,-, ' ~ __. ~ •.~._~ < .~. 0,, · _.,· __0_' .• ' - .. - - , .. , . ~_.__ ~ ...,.._.-.----.---.. _. .;;..;.~~..:.._ _. ' " __
The instinct to do good under that sort of social order is less likely to have greater influence over
----'"- -_._-~. _..---_.,~_.--_..-._.- . - ~ ',..' - -- _.. .. .-
illQiyjg!}al~Jh~in a society where~ndiyi.d.\!a.li~Qlis beillg discouraged,
Because such a rigid distinction between the individual and the community, as proposed by
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liberalism did not exist in an African worldview, the process of evaluating conduct and
interpretation of such concepts as justice and rights was approached from a very different angle.
That approach valued above all else that the wellbeing of the community, or the common good
,---- - - - _ .._- - .- . .._ - ._._-- _.._ .--._---•.._ ._-_.-.._~_.._.._----- -- "- ,_ ... "
t'!kes.-priority. T~.Li~1>~cause frQ.!A an ~fu£.an..2..~~spective to be is to belong or as we say in- ...-... .~---._---~--------._~--_ .........,....--,-
Sesotho motho ke motho ka batho -a P~!S~!!.-!~~-P~r~QIJ -tht()~gh .other persons.
According to this the individual is understood .as... existing .only.inrelationto..oJbe.rs.J &..one's
__ .. _n_._ _"__' .__~. - J
family.jelatives and COII}mll.I1Hy.: ::IJ1~)mplications of such an understanding of a person are that.....-'-
not only will people not maintain this dichotomy but also that most people do not approach their
own life and identity and that of others from this understanding i.e. as separate from the
community. To a large extent this is still the case in most people's lives today, even though the
.s->
parameters or scope of this may have shrunk to just close family members and relatives.
2.3.2 The Liberal Individual
Closely related to the liberal social construction of reality which is essentially individualistic, is
the liberalist conception of the self. And ~aLconception is of a self that is an antecedently
individuated subject always standing at a certain distance from society, a seIL\V.h()js~not()_nly
~lincLand-free-;-but-is·..indep~ ~3..!!!.Q.!!QmQJ!L@~L9J!!L9.h.Q.Q_~.~_:'?{.ML~~Y.._9f}~~~._~~._~5!L!~~d.
This is because as Mill argued, the individual's liberty means
liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of
doing as we like,...without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what we do
does not harm them even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or
wrong. (1994: 17).
As people we cannot think of ourselves in this way. w,,;- are always connected to others in more---- ._- --_....--
t~AD--just-·superfki~Lways. From an African perspective this image of the self that is being
presented is simply not there, and not many people would identify themselves in that way.
While we hav~_gur own recognizable individuality and identity, we also think of ourselves in
. ,"._;......""'-- ~_._---,.....-_ .__.~_.~ . ',- -- . - -', . -. ,.. . ,
terms of our communities or somt? community with which our sense of identity cannot be fully
_ .- . . " - . , - V "'" --"'.~- -' . • . ~ -- ...... - .. ,;.:::"'.-'--_. - -- --.....""'-".._, . .........~ ........ ~-~~~-- -,_. ' ~----~ .-~-.' ... )
known ~I1(Lachieved.apart from it.
,",-. , ~ . --_. ..~' - -
I.!L?~her word.~~hil~ ..~~ are distinct from the community, we art? ~t the same time not separate
..----- -~ ._ _ _ _. __. __.. __ .. · 'r..,.~ : ' --,',0" ' '' . '''; '...,,-., -;-; . • ....:-' " .,., . .~..,-,~ " . . .,, ' - .,,. .,. '!
from it. So ~y~n though to.question .one's identitycan be achieved individually, knowing one's
-------- . - - .
iQ.~!.Y..i.~.g.nly-achievable-ftotrr-knowing·where·one-comes·from ·.and.where.one..is..going..and we
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know these from our communities and by being part of their traditions.
"-" "- - - " -' '- " _-- "" _~-- .._---~--~--...... ~-
2.3.3 Choice as a Moral Requirement
The destruction of shared meaning and values caused by individualism, marked the em~rgence
of the culture of free,choice, according to which as individuals we would now,be free to.choose
how, to conduct ourselves and what moral standards to keep. This is very different from the way
.r' .;J - ' - - - . _, , ._._ . .• . • . _ ~. . - - .--- -
things were with classical or traditional African morality.
According to traditional thought we do not choose who we want to be, nor what standards we
are to follow. This is because we can not choose who we become. As people, part of who we
'--- - _. - .-- .. -"- -- -. -
are is already established for us by the givenness of our lives. As a person I am not born into
...a-~~·-
a social and moral vacuum. JI:1y,J ife, as,an ,entry into.an already existing story, is~n2t something",-",-,,_,_. .~.~- ...,
t~~t_ .!!1g§.!_~e given shape and meaning bya framework or yalu t:§ ,and standardsjha] J!5. ~.
individual I still have Jo .choose....-.~~. -~- . .-~ - .- . - . .
~y birth one is born with a basic framework upon which one conducts one's life. This includes
~ :lFertain obligations and responsibilities, it involves goals, ends and loyalties, and adoption of
\!certain values and rejection of others. It includes the fact that we do not choose the parents we .
~\ ' 0 - _ . " ' ,~--, .",--,,,•• ", -~,,,--
are born to, the community we grow up in, and the history that wf are a part of, and most
important, the moral tradition that we inherit.
The story of our lives is always embedded in the story of the community. We are born with a
past which becomes part of who we are, and to try to cut ourselves off from it through an
individualistic account of our identity is to deform our present relationshipsjcf. MacIntyre 1981:
205). This cannot happen without a serious identity crisis and confusion taking place in our lives.
This is true for most people today. We are a generation which suffers from profound identity
crisis and confusion.
In other words we have no choice about many factors in our lives because they form part of who
we are. I as a first born and the only one in my family to have reached this level of education,
I have my life pla,kd out for me by these very things, among which taking care of my brothers
and sisters would be part of that plan. I have no choice about this, or as my mother said when
I complained about this "why did you become the eldest child?" Part of being the first born is
to do just that. According to the liberal view I am not exactly free, because I have not chosen
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these things, and yet this is the reality of many Africans. While it has been problematic to some,
it has equally not been a problem to many.
A traditional African person confronted with this idea of choosing one's moral conduct would
~ not only be cO~fused, ~ut would ~ot understand what is being sai.d. T.hiS .is because the whole
. concept of choice, particularly as It relates to moral conduct and Identity IS not only strange to
African moral practice but it has no place within traditional African thought...
That morality is part of the givenness of our lives and something we do not choose, can still be
found today among most African communities, in the case of parents in relation to their children.
To many parents for example in Lesotho the idea that their children can choose their moral
conduct, even if these are men and women with their own families, is not only confusing and
something they can't understand, it is simply unacceptable . For them as parents it is their
responsibility to raise their children in good and proper ways of conduct
Allowing children to choose their own moral standards would not only be incompatible with what
the role of a parent is, it would be failing to function as a parent. As such matters of conduct are
not something that they have to deliberate about. It is simply a given and a part of what it means
to be a parent This explains why many African parents do not understand the irrational phobia
and hostility towards authority exhibited by youngsters today. TJ1e difference lies in the
conception of the self that most of these young people have of themselves today. They primarily
understand themselves as individuals who are autonomous and with the right to choose.
2.3.4 The Unqualified Pursuit of Justice
Another difficulty with the liberal ideal has to do with their idea of justice. While the liberal
concern with justice as the highest moral ideal for society is a good thi~g, when it is geared
primarily to serve individuals who are essentially individuated selves, and not communities it can
lead to a society that has no compassion, love and kindness, because each person would only be
interested in what they deserve. It would seem preferable, if we are to avoid a pursuit of justice
that might result in great peril to society, that it must be brought under the control of goodwill.
This is because as Niebuhr points out
any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into something less than justice. It must
be saved by something which is more than justice (1960: 258, my emphasis).
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It is that which is "more than justice" that seems to be lacking within the liberal position,
something which in traditional societies was a prominent part of life. That something was called
community or kutloano in Sesotho (friendship in a communal relationship). Maritain makes a
similar observation that
while the structure of society depends primarily on justice, the vital dynamism and the
internal creative force of society depend on civic friendship (1986: 118).
Such a virtue is not developed by adherence to a strict minimalistic conduct of life, restricted
only to doing no more and no less than what is expected. It is rather cultivated in taking
initiatives, going beyond the call of duty. It is not only encouraged but is the ideal which
becomes one's goal and purpose. For the Basotho and most Africans for that matter, this meant
that concepts like justice were not interpreted in a minimalistic narrow way. Rather they were
understood in their broadest terms than the impoverished and narrow modem understanding .
This leads me to another related problem and that has to do with the portrayal of rights in the
liberal position. My unhappiness with the liberal position on rights is not only that it says
nothing about people's obligations towards one another, but that it centres too much around the
idea of a basic framework of rights. By this it is meant an establishment of a framework which
would ensure that the rights of people are protected and at the same time the individual does
>l
what he or she likes within that framework. While this is good to ensure justice, my problem is
that it can too easily and too often be interpreted so narrowly and legalistically that justice
becomes an impersonal process that excludes other human values and virtues like goodwill,
mercy, reconciliation or kindness, values which keep communities human. According to Rawls
the priority of justice is accounted for, in part, by holding that the interests requiring the
violation of justice have no value (1984: 42, my emphasis).
This is a heavy indictment on processess like the current work of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), and in particular the granting of amnesty to people, especially in the wake
of calls for prosecutions in the wake of the horrifying disclosures of the activities some of the
people were involved in. By contrast to this and because as a national community we have other
ideals and interests equally important as justice, we have put their priority first, in this case
reconciliation. What this has done is not only to suspend justice, but even more miraculous
through this process we began to see the emergence of repenting and forgiving community as
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some of the TRC hearings have shown.
These are the things that make us community and human, which a naked pursuit of justice will
not necessarily allow to come forth. A community that is based on observing the demands of
pure justice and not informed by other human values very soon will degenerate into a cold and
impersonal community.
Another p.loblem here is with John Rawls' argument that the principle of justice as fairness. He
says that as a guide for how basic structures of modern constitutional democracies are to realize
the values of liberty and equality, justice as fairness means that
each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and
liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all (1992: 191, my
emphasis) .
According to him this scheme can be achieved by what he calls the natural position, with the
feature of veil of ignorance (Ibid. 1992: 2(0), in which those involved would have no prior
knowledge of where they will be placed in the scheme once established (cf. Rawls 1994: 72f).
Two important issues emerge here. The first is the idea of a scheme of basic rights and the
second is the idea of original position and a veil of ignorance. Rawls goes to great lengths to
explain that the latter has no metaphysical implications and that it can be adopted any time
simply by reasoning for principles of justice in accordance with tl\e enumerated restrictions
(1992: 203). To both I find Niebuhr's observation relevant regarding the way to bring about
justice. He says
where human relations are intimate..., the way of love may be the only way to justice.
Where rights and interests are closely interwoven, it is impossible to engage in a shrewd
and prudent calculation of comparative rights... Justice by assertion and counter-assertion
therefore becomes impossible. Justice by a careful calculation of competing rights is
equally difficult if not impossible (1960: 266, my emphasis).
And thisis just the point. The liberal perspective assumes it is possible to separate a person from
their interest, desires and goals, and in turn be able to carefully calculate the demands of justice,
something which I will argue is close to an impossibility. The Basotho way of life in many ways
fits this picture, because of the holistic nature of their worldview. The notion of justice in this
sense would be difficult to establish because in such a worldview interests are too mutual to
allow for their interpretation in individualistic terms. Not only does it go against the spirit of
mutuality, it is lacking in important communal values such communal solidarity and care, aspects
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which are important in people's lives.
We can sum up this by saying that the liberal idea of rights does not only fail to encourage
people to care, but would not be able to help us to deal with the question "why should I care?"
a question which is important in many
people's lives and communities.
w·
2.3.5 The Liberal Conception of Freedom
Another problem with liberalism has to do with its position on freedom . The problem is that it
presupposes an individualistic social order. Freedom as an .e_s.se1].t,i,'!L~h~i:l:~~~~~~~c of human ~
. ---_..'--- - -_.' --- '- . . - ._ -._ --~--~-_._----
agency is something to be encouraged, butanypursuitof freedom likeallother.aspects.of.Iife
...... -._- -"---
that have to do with the individual,J)1ust not lose sight of that communal aspect. This means in
•••__" _,or " ~ ,- ,,~-,- ~ - - - •. • ,•. _ . ~.,~ ... . ,.- . - , _• . - ' _. . . - , -, "-- ~"" " '- •• •,-~.- • •. • • .• _,_ •. _ -,,-, .• __ .- . . - _ _ ._ , . __ • • "., . ~._ , • •• ~- ." • • - ,,_ ..... -<. ..- -
the process of securing freedom for individuals, ~t ~_l1.~t not be stripped of its social dimension.
The bestway ~f-d~ing· thi~ is-to-~do~~ a communally oriented conception and pursuit of freedom.
The reason is simply that we can never be totally free. We will always share this with other
people. This is even more important from an African point of view because these two spheres
of life Le. the individual and communal are very closely intertwined. It implies that the pursuit
of freedom for individuals will, therefore, need to take into account the context and culture of
14
the African people.
Since freedom in the liberal perspective presupposeia social construction of reality in which the
individual is distinct, almost separate from society, entrenching freedom within African culture
and moral practice will need to be informed by communal concerns, over and above those of the
individuals. This is because most people in Africa live their lives from a social construction of
reality that is communal. A social construction that sees the individual as part of the community,
and not separate from it. This explains why most people even today still have strong ties with
. their communities in spite of the claims to freedom. This can be seen in the way most African
~people still regard for instance their responsibility to their families as an integral part of their life.
On top of this there is still concern among people about how one is regarded in and by the
community Le. whether they are seen as good people or not, even if this is only a distant
concern. One finds that on the one hand for these people the image that the community has of
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them and in general how they are rated is of great concern, while on the other hand they will say
they do not care what the same community has to say about them, its their life that they are
leading. So in spite of people having adopted the idea of freedom, they have not done away with
Jil: traditional ideas such as communal approval which still seems to play a major role in most
people's lives. Freedom in an African context will have to seek to promote the wellbeing of the
individual without belittling communal concerns and endangering the community's goals and
.'
ends.
In this context the conception of freedom put forward by liberalism, will need to be redeemed
from its individualistic orientation towards a more communal understanding and conception of
freedom. It will need to be informed and based on the idea of collective identity and be protected
from artificial and arbitrary dichotomies between the individual and community, the public and
private life. This is because as people we are always connected to others and what ever we do
will always have an impact on others, either now or in the future. As such we can never strictly
speaking have a sphere of life in which the interest is ours only. Not only is it simply not true
that such a sphere does exist, but as people we are not always entirely at liberty to do as we like
. with our lives without affecting other people in some way.
As people our life is always having social implications and in that sense the society has an
interest in it. The degree of this interest may vary, but it is always there. Because of this it would
seem difficult to say without doubt that there is any significant area of our lives which has no
interest other than our own.
3. THE PROBLEM WITH MODERN ETHICAL APPROACHES
What has become clear about contemporary ethics is that not only is it founded on the
complacent acceptance of liberal individualism, hence its individualistic orientation, but it is also
centred around actions and rules or moral quandaries. Hauerwas thus describing this says
it thus appears that "ethics" is primarily concerned with ambiguous situations and hard
decisions. Such a concentration on "quandaries" obscures the fact that they make sense
only in the light of convictions that tell us who we are (1983: 4).
This way of understanding ethics gives ethics a narrow scope and a meaning that is shallow.
35
.'
Along with this understanding contemporary ethics is also too concerned with abstract, universal
moral absolutes which are supposed to be free from historical relativity. From this perspective
it is often thought that one of the primary tasks of ethics is to show how morality is
grounded in unchangeable principles and convictions (Ibid. 1983: 1).
Understanding the task of ethics in this way has resulted in a universal "ethics" which seeks a
foundation of morality that will free moral judgements from their dependence on historical
contingenf communities (Ibid. 1983: 17). This view of ethics is unsatisfactory and inadequate for
an understanding of ethics as a reflection of who we are. It is inadequate not so much because
of the centrality of the individual in making moral decisions, or because of the its need for
objectivity and moral absolutes. It is rather that this view is only concerned with minor questions
of "is abortion wrong?" or "should one always tell the truth?". It does not address the important
question of "how or why a "situation" came to be described as a "moral" problem in the first
place. In other words "no account is given for why and how certain set of circumstances have
thus come to be describe e.g. abortion, or adultery, or murder, and so on (cf. Ibid. 1983: 21).
The reason why or how situation comes to be thus described is because of the persons we are.
As such moral judgements are like action or conduct descriptions, and these gain their
intelligibility from the role they play in the history of communities. In other words moral
judgements are made from the stand point of the persons we are an"il our intentions. From an
African perspective, "who we are" is fundamentally linked to bein~community. As such our
intentions are not only informed by the community but the community teaches us what are good
intentions.
3.1 The Task of Ethics
Among the Basotho ethics is not primarily about rules and obligations, whose function is to give
directives on what actions are right nor is it about what actions are good or bad. To be sure it
is about these and more. It is about a particular way of life in which the main emphasis is not
on "doings" but rather on "being", i.e. the character of people. In other words ethics is about the
ways of conduct that people have. It is about personal conduct or "boitsoaro" in Sesotho. It has
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to do with the nature and character of my conduct as a person, so formed by the community to
which I belong. What is important in this is the person as a moral agent.
When ethics is understood this way, it becomes more concerned with the quality of conduct
within the context of communal living. Its emphasis becomes the formation of good qualities of
character. From this we can then describe ethics as essentially having to do with how we arrive
at adoptil}.g certain ways of conduct rather than others. It is about how we arrive at making
judgements of right and wrong. For we all know that everyone has their own idea of what is right
or wrong, what is good or bad and will argue passionately and forcefully about them. What is
often lacking is how people arrive at these judgments. Ethical reflection, therefore, should explain
this.
As a reflection on our moral norms and values, ethics must indicate the criterion by which we
evaluate conduct and judge actions andthis is what Basotho ethics tries to do. It is an explanation
of the criteria I use in making moral decisions and in leading life in a particular way. Because
this is often lacking in modem ethics, it fails to make explicit what makes actions right or wrong.
It is not always clear w~at is the moral point of reference.
In ethics it is important to be able to identify this so that it can be tested, in dialogue with other
moral criteria. For this reason it is necessary to know, why and how.certain moral judgements
are arrived at Are moral judgements made on the basis of breaking some laws and or rules? Or
are they made on the basis of the type of persons we are as a moral agents and as members of
specific communities? In other words is the type of person I am inconsequential to the way I
conduct myself and on what I may permit myself to do? I will argue that not only does this
influence and shape personal conduct but that it should be the basis for the way we conduct
ourselves. For the Basotho "who I am" or personal identity is closely linked to a sense of
community and collective identity , because as we say in sesotho "motho ke motho ka batho" (a
person is a person through others}. According to this, personal identity is fundamentally linked
with being in community, and this does not only inform, it also influences personal conduct.
3.2 Events Precede Ethical Reflection
Another problem with modem ethical reflection is the tendency to do ethics in abstraction and
37
fascination with rules and principles. This alters the function and purpose of ethics and
encourages universalist ethics. It changes the contextual basis of ethical reflection because it
separates it from the events and context that precedes and shapes it. Rules play an important part
in this because they give an appearance of ensuring objectivity and rationality. However as
Hauerwas points out
oUJ relatively recent fascination with rules draws on the promise they seem to hold for
the impersonal justification of our moral behaviour... Accordingly, moral reasoning
attempts to justify any particular judgment by appeal to a more universal rule of principle
to which any rational creature must adhere (1983: 19, my emphasis).
Such a picture of ethics fails to do justice to our historical contexts our identity and a sense of
who we are because all these things are located and take their significance from local and
particular. As such the adoption of a contextual perspective in ethical reflection is not only
important but imperative. It is imperative because without it ethics becomes an abstract exercise
without any context informing it This points to a reinstatement of context at the centre of ethical
reflection. By contextual perspective here I mean ethical reflection that recognises the uniqueness
of the particular and local. I mean a reflection which is therefore not timeless but one that speaks
for and to a particular community or period. One of the sad facts about modem ethics is that we
have forgotten that ethics is essentially social and that morality evolves out of a larger reality
than the individual (cf. Kammer 1988: 9). This is because ethics is a story of a particular people
or community. As an attempt to explain the way a particular people live, ethics is essentially a
second order activity. It is preceded by events and life experiences. For this reason it is
misleading to think of ethics apart from these events and approach it in terms of universal and
abstract principles. It is as a result of this being neglected in modem ethics that it is necessary
to speak once more loud and clear for the reinstatement of a contextual perspective in ethical
reflection and discussion.
3.3 Ethical Relativism or Universalism
In explaining some of the problems in modem ethical reflections I have suggest that authentic
ethical reflection is one which acknowledges its particularity. I tried to show how ethics is first
and foremost something belonging to and situated in a particular community or social group. This
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acknowledgement of the significance of context for ethics is closely related to another ethical
concern, namely the debate between ethical relativism and universalism. I will not go into the
philosophical complexities around this debate, but only as they shed some light on the ethical
importance of context. My interest will only be to show the necessity for the moral agent to
acknowledge his or her moral particularity. It is also important to realise that objectivity in
modem ethics has not only been the force behind the demand for moral absolutes, but also the
.'
catalyst for ethical universalism.
3.3.1 Relativism, Objectivity and Universalism
In doing ethics it is important to avoid two dangers: extreme ethical relativism on the one hand
and extreme ethical universalism on the other. In regards to the latter ethics, as a reflection on
the adequacy of our norms and values, must take on a universal point of view. This does not
mean that ethical judgments must be universally applicable. Rather it means that in making
ethical judgments, our actions and decisions must show concern beyond one's own immediate
dislikes and likes and how we stand to benefit (cf. Singer 1979: 10f). It means that our ethical
approach must not be so completely particular that one fails to recognize the universal aspects
of ethics. At the same tim_t:jLmeaI1sn9L!?~ing so._wholly universal in ap'P'£()~ch that w~ disregard
-" ~" """ ~-" ".-~,-~~-~--_ ..- ,....... -_ .~. --~- ......~,.,~..,-....,...- -:,.,,~_._..,..,., ..........-.,._.,. ''''~'''' > - ' ._~........,.,..,... """.-.--"'-~,..,... .............,~_.............._,~
!h.~ local and p~r~£~]J.a.:r~ In other words in making ethical judgments my actions or decisions
.... . ...,_"" ' ;-.' ._,.... ,.. .... , ·~... ,., ......'"h..: ." .... Lh.
must be found to be compatible with more broadly based ethical concerns (Ibid. 1979: 1Of). This
is not the same as asking for the modem ideas of universality and objectivity. According to
Hauerwas what is often presented as "objectivity is actually the distorted image of subjectivism"
which
schools us to assume we can, and perhaps always should, respond to any purported
immoral action with "Who am I to say that is wrong" (1983: 17).
The result of this type of attitude has been vicious moral relativism and the continued
requirement of universality as central to ethical reflection by contemporary moral thought and
practice. Accordingly, the justification of moral statements must be such that it is not only seen
as objective but is also universal or can be universal. It's not hard to see why this is so. The
concern with universality is almost always accompanied by an implied concern with objectivity.
As moral agents we are thus required and expected to regard our situations from the perspective
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of disinterested observers.
Personally I do not think this kind of objectivity is ever possible, for the simple reason that as
people we have desires, ideals, goals, aims and values that we aspire to. More often than not we
can not separate our desires, aims and goals or ideals from who we are and hence become purely
objective .
.'
3.3.2 Contextual Ethical Perspective
Because of the problems we have just mentioned regarding too much concern with rules and
objectivity, a contextual perspective becomes a necessary ethical stance to prevent ethics from
even contemplating such a task. Ethics as a reflection of a particular peoples' history or story (cf.
Ibid 1983: 1), while it will have a universal perspective, is anything but a universal campaign for
objectivity and making moral principles universally applicable .
A universal perspective recognizes the broader implications to ethical reflection, but it does not
attempt to be universal. An ethic that takes on a universal point of view, therefore, ensures that
ethics is more than just what I as an individual think or want It recognize that ethics implies
something bigger than the interest and or concerns of the individual (Singer 1979: 10). This is
..~~
because ethics implies in~rests, ideals, aims and goals of a people ,w~~~h hay~ evoLve~~ye~~~~e
...............~..............."""" ................, ., .......,=<. ............... . ,...,~... .._u.~~._."...a.."""",-'c.c:....... ...."-.!."' ,;.l~ ..' "'- k ., ...." , '"' ~ , ~.,.,,......,,,""•• ,'~ .. __......-,.. _ .. . . _ ..... ,, '"'_... .. : ; •.-..'.~.~.~.,~ ..... ,, '~ ..-. ~ _...... ~ ,'- - . .. ~-,..- .... ,. ~ , .. .
and continue to evolve. Interests wl!iQ.lLQQ.~ inherits and become binding and authoritative, and
-r_·........._ .. •.. ... ".~,..,\;<r,...'" .... \'t,._.· _·~'>'· YIi"7<';:".,.."';~..' ._>--.• ..,' '''._~•• :f_.....~;'- ,...-~ ~~~;,;, ;
whose imperatives become that which we ought to obey and do.
The universalistic tendencies of modem ethics must be seen against the background of the need ,I, i
.I ",;
for moral absolutes, objectivity and an 0~r..~!!1Q!}~i§~,,211Jh~"uniY~I§.'~L~~p.~£Lo_C~lhics~aupe l .'
ex:pense of attaching no significance to theJQS~,t,l.1...anJLthe...Rarticu!M,. Having discarded the "\......~ _- _.- _ " -., _ - .. .. .. . .. ~ ,,~ '. ~. !'
significance of the local and particular ~~st~m ethicsJ!£~~,a .~Qn!~ al perspective and rejects ~l'
- ~'cW.'; -.:i;~~:,..:=-.egT"'"~ ~ ~
-it as..art.important aspect of ethical reflection. Influenced and informed by the ideas of the
.' enlightenme ~~"'~~d·~~p~~I~~is't-European ·ment;ii'tY·~western ethics accepted without question the
notion of universal moral principles. This in turn paved a way for an abstract way of thinking
about ethics and proper ways of conduct, a phenomenon which is becoming the popular moral
attitude of many people in Lesotho, and iOJleed many Africans. This is not only because many
of them have been detached from traditional communities and way of life, but as in many cases
relating to Euro-American culture when it meets Africa, there has been too quick an embrace of
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this attitude . The result has been that in spite of it being intellectually and theoretically possible
to think about ethics in abstract universal principles, complex problems arise as soon as these
have to be applied practically to concrete cases and situations. A local application and
interpretation becomes necessary. For this reason I agree with Kasenene who says that
whereas it is true that ther~_'!E.~_s9_IIl~ ~!}i~er~~L.~th!£C}.LRrin£!RI~'§Jlch fl.§..J!J!thfulne.§s,
honesty.and.justice, these too, are ~EJ:L1.!~llce<!J?Y"~.~,I}~~~t in their application and the moral
system in which a person operates (1993: 4). .
This means that while people might agree theoretically about these, they almost always differ and
disagree on their meaning and interpretation, and like wise about the evaluation of action and
conduct. This is because what constitutes the practical social content of principles will differ
according to how these have been experienced and interpreted in different communities. The
universality of moral principles must be understood, therefore, as existing only in so far as they
are found in their particularity, and not as independent concepts as such.
3.3.3 Context as the Social Content of Ethics
What we have just pointed out shows how ethics is not only relevant but depends in a significant
way on the context for its social content and application. Charles Taylor makes an important
remark in this regard in his comparison of Kant's and Hegel's moral philosophies. He points out
that
Kant's moral theory remained at the edges of politics, ... setting limits which the state or
individuals should not tread. For Hegel, in contrast, morality can only receive a concrete
content in politics, in the design of the society we have to further and sustain" (1984: 177,
my emphasis).
Taylor's remark is important in two ways. In the first place it helps in understanding origins of
contemporary moral attitudes which are largely influenced by ideas of people like Kant. Secondly
because it reiterates the significance of context as the content of ethics. It is from the context that
ultimately moral principles and moral judgments derive their meaning and not from some
theoretical deduction of an abstract universal principle. The community, therefore, as the context
for ethical reflection is an important ethical entity. It provides the content of ethics by its identity,
i.e. its tradition, norms and practices by which it determines what is .good and bad.
As we said earlier if answers to questions of who we are resides in part in our communities and
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if we arrive at making moral judgements by way of our identity, then our communities are an
important component in the process of ethical reflection. They teach us what things to value and
not to value. For this reason the community as the primary ethical context, where people learn
what is justice, honesty, and other moral values and virtues; is very important as the proper
context for ethics. As the first form of human interaction larger than the immediate family, the
community is a school where we learn how ethical principles function. It~Il_E2JE_f!l1l*~,i.ty t.hat
• ~ ~'~."'~'.\":l:
,."p~~£!~..l~a[Il .to be ~,Sl.~~!;'-j'"
Since the community is not static, but is evolving, it is of its very essence to defy any tendencies
/
/
towards moral conclusiveness 9r absolutism, elements which are always implicitly inherent in
"
moral universalism. So as thecontext in which we come to terms with the complexity of moral
principles and their application the community is also the appropriate moral starting point for
ethical reflection. Only from here are we able to explore and dialogue with the broader moral
context
3.4 Reinstating Context in Ethical Reflection
The attempt in modem ethics to secure a moral framework whjch is "unfettered by the
contingencies of our histories and communities" (cf. Hauerwas 1983: 7) has resulted in modem
people finding themselves in an ethically difficult situation. This is because the more and more
we try to be objective, the more we realize that to "disentangle" oneself from his or her our own
engagements in that way is not only difficult, but impossible. As a result we feel it's better to
be reluctant to make moral statements. The centrality of objectivity in ethics means that, in
making moral statements the agent is supposed to put little significance, if any at all, to their
context This renunciation of context has a peculiar effect of disembedding us as agents, hence
the feeling of being morally adrift. If anything is to be learned from the lack of agreement on
application of the so called universal moral principles, it is that there is more going on between
the context Le. the culture, experiences and history of people, and how moral concepts are
understood and interpreted than we want to admit. The lack of appreciation of the moral
significance of the local and particular can thus be ascribed to an over emphasis on objectivity
as the standard for evaluating and judging. However there are problems with an unqualified
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pursuit of objectivity. There is no doubt that some of the concerns behind the need for objectivity
are necessary. In other words not everything about modernity and its relation to ethics is bad. For
instance it is important that ethics is not just an arbitrary imposition of constraints on others, that
it is not be a disguised way of imposing purely subjective sentiments upon other people. So
instead of attempting to be objective, it seems preferable that we should rather incorporate those
concerns it was meant to address into a contextual approach to ethics.
~ . .
3.4.1 Disembedding of Ethics and People
As moral agents we are always embedded subjects. We are members of communities with a
particular moral identity, culture and environment and these constitute our context. We are always
operating from these particularities as our specific moral starting points and the givenness of our
moral life. It is here that we are embedded and so is ethics. For this reason ethical reflection that
starts with the complacent acceptance of universality and objectivity and the relegation of the
particular and historical to insignificance is an illusion. This is because as MacIntyre points out
particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from
it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belongs to man as such, whether in its
eighteenth-century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modem analytical moral
philosophies, is an illusion, and an illusion with painful consequences (1981: 205).
According to modern ethics the moral agent is supposed to regard the ethical issues they are
confronted with from anyone's point of view (cf. Hauerwas 1983: 17). This requires the moral
agents to think of their context as immaterial to their ethical processes. This is not possible
because as people we are essentially bearers of tradition ~her we acknowledge it or not
(MacIntyre 1981: 206). Modern ethical thought and practice, desperate to disassociate itself from
the historically contingent, tried to develop universal maxims and reject the significance of the
~~':>Oh>;' """",•••o:It• •Io"",""",~",.-,,,,~,; ,,;,;.,,,,,,,,",,;;':~.ot.. .;o,;,~..., ._...;r.r.s~":i\""""~..4"'~ .~_~.e'<"",,".- """'___ ::.k-....~~~Ji.."':I'.:';;.~).;.~'i'_¥."._~~p_,'-""'• •~.. .
lQ.te.~2,!),~ ,.n<:l,ni£~.!.~. Its reflection would be one that comes from "above" not from "below", and
its content is abstract principles or propositions and not the events of peoples lives and
experiences. Hauerwas thus states that motivated by the desire
to avoid any arbitrary normative recommendation, ethicists have sought to formulate
"metaethics"-that is, a formal account of the nature and basis of moral principles-which
in itself entails no single proscriptive alternative (1983: 17).
This fear among ethicists of being regarded as relativists pushed ethics further away from its
43
mutually exclusive is a misplaced debate. According to him the debate becomes over simplified
because often it does not take into account other base points and the way they are related to the
discussion of context and the use and authority of principles (1971: 101, 125). While his concern
for an awareness of the interrelatedness of the sources of ethics is valid, it does however make
a big difference to one's ethical reflection, which of these is chosen as the starting point. I agree
with him that holding context and principles as mutually exclusive is not healthy for ethical
,"
reflection. However I shall insist that it is important to have a clear distinction between them
when it comes to the starting point of ethical reflection, because there is big difference between
them.
Context acknowledges that there is no neutral starting point from which reflection on the nature
of the moral life can begin. The authority of principle by contrast runs the risk of ignoring this
and often it treats principles as set of rules justifiable in themselves. The truth is they are not
because when treated like this they become unintelligible. They will only make sense within the
particularity of the context in which they function.
It is because of this that I believe that it makes more sense and hence preferable to choose
context and not the use and authority of principles. We are what we are because of our contexts,
~_"~~~.--...v .....""",-~....""_~~~,-._~_;O;~_-'~-?""__';"'~;:;;;"--'--".-'~'"4-",,,,".oA.~ ' ......
both in terms.of our.past.inheritance and the present communities we are members of. We / "
-. ,~ ' ~;~~~~ enter .a.reflection arena aI1y.other;a; -~~h-~; ·than as the perso~s we are. As such it is riot \
only logical. but proper that our contexts be our moral starting point because.as'M~fi!!!Yr~ ,says .J
it is not just that different individualslive in different social circumstance; it is also that
we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am
someone's son or daughter, someone's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this and that
city, ... I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation . ...As such, I inherit from the past of
my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful
expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting
point. This gives my life its moral particularity (1981: 204f, my emphases).
In other words as a moral agent I am situated in a specific set of social circumstances which
forms my immediate moral context. In it the meaning of so called "universal" moral principles
will be understood differently from another context. One of the concerns that Gustafson sees as
problematic with an exclusive choice between context and principles is that by not sufficiently
moving to other levels, this debate has assumed that the matter of how moral decisions are made
could be separated from other considerations, which are equally important as the basis upon
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which moral decisions are made (1971 : 125). To this it should be said that one can only move
to other considerations, such as the situation or consequences, from one's given moral
particularity. This does not mean an exclusive use of context for making moral decisions nor does
it mean a rejection or devaluation of the moral significance of context and is not equal to the
extreme relativism found in emotivism. It is only saying that it is important to acknowledge one's
context as primary and that is important to adopt of what I called a contextual perspective. This
."
we do by acknowledging our moral particularity. Without this to begin from there would not even
be anywhere to begin. In other words I am only able to embrace other base points by moving
forward from such particularity.
It is equally important to realize that, the fact that I have this moral particularity and that I find
my moral identity in and through my membership to a particular community e.g. my family, or
my village community, does not mean that I have to accept the moral limitations that may obtain
there (cf. Macintyre 1981: 205). Rather that through my interaction and dialogue with other moral
particularities and being challenged by them, I continue to reflect on the adequacy of the norms
and values of my moral particularity and starting point.
According to this our historical circumstances and context are, therefore, not morally incidental
but rather stand in a substantive relation to our moral thought and practice. All of which ensures
. .<4
that ethical reflection does not become a floating enterprise with no reference to its context. It
is in this sense that I will argue that ethics as found among the Basotho was contextual, because
their moral life was lived and organized around the community as their primary context. .
4. THE BASOTHO CULTURE AND WAY OF LIFE.
Traditional life in Basotho culture was essentially organized around community in the form of
numerous clusters of "metse", or villages. Some were small others were big, but what ever the
size members of the village knew one another, even much better than people who live on the
same street in urban areas. The community or "motse" (village) both as the basic social
organization and social institution is, therefore an important background, as the place where the
Basotho's concept and experience of community derived its meaning and character.
Today villages have not only become closer to one another but have become bigger (Lapointe
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1986: 29). This means that the majority of Basotho still live their life primarily within the context
of community as the basic form of social organization and institution. However the corresponding
attitudes or rather the spirit that in the past characterised the community as found in the village
is fading. The tone of inter-personal relationships, the bond of friendship that characterized earlier
social relations in the community are increasingly becoming rare, noticeably in urban areas.
But in general life for the Basotho is lived in close social relationships or communion in which..
there is a face-to-face presence. Because of this it is not common to find single homesteads,
hence the saying in Sesotho "ha ho ntloana- 'ngoe?- there is no house by itself. Life lived within
the framework of community means more than just being in the same locale. It means a face-to-
face contact with neighbours, whereby they are known by name and as persons with social roles.
Life lived in this manner meant that social relations were aimed at having a healthy bond of
. friendship among members of the community. Before looking at this in detail there are a few
preliminary remarks I have to make concerning contemporary discussions around the subject of
community.
Today the term community is surrounded by much ambiguity. The reason seems to be either that
people speak of community primarily as a concept and then only afterwards do they look at the
social realities to which the concept applies. This way of discussil},p the subject is bound to
encounter problems, because in the first place the concept has come out of a specific social
reality. Secondly in each of these social realities community takes on a local variance. As such
trying to find a definition, which often can be universalized, through a deductive process is not
going to offer workable alternative.
Community , as a concept describing a way of life, comes about as a result of observing, and
f
trying to name a particular way in which people relate and live. In other words the concept is
not prior to the life experiences out of which it has emerged . As such it cannot have an
independent meaning, which can be accessed and then applied to various human groupings, and
where it fits there is community, and where it does not there is no community. Such a
mechanical view will not work because community refers primarily to a way of life and the
corresponding tone of inter-personal relations.
By focusing on the concept or definition of the term, the events that preceded and from which
the concept was found are pushed to the periphery. It is not surprising that in their absence the
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concept is not only illusive, but seems to have no concrete meaning because it is these that give
content to the meaning of the concept.
As I understand it community can not be reduced to this kind simple definition or explanation.
As such even as I describe it, I will deliberately avoid giving a specific definition because I want
to avoid the obsession with definitions, which to my mind is the quintessential feature of
modernity in its campaign to master and have full control over everything. Community as found..
among the Basotho and indeed many African societies was something that could not be mastered
in this sense. One grew into it theoretically and practically, and could only get better at it. This
meant that at best it was understood by observing it in action. In other words I will argue that
it is only after being exposed to the community in action that a correct description could be
made. Even then such a description is not definitive, because community as a lived experience
is a living reality that is always evolving. All that such a description will do, therefore is to
highlight central aspects of community as a kind of commentary on the observation of the reality
in real life situations.
4.1 The Basotho Understanding of Community
"
Community among the Basotho is primarily a statement about life, ..~Jif~~lqg~!h~rjI). (;.9J!!JPon.
This understanding can be seen in some of the common proverbs and expression that the Basotho
used in their daily life, proverbs such as "hlaahlela le lla ka le leng", "matsoho mabeli a ea
thusa", "ntja peli ha e hloloe ke _sebata", "tsoho la rnonna ke mookolla", "re batho ka ba bang" ·
(Sekese 1994: 53). What theseexpressions have in common is the idea of solidarity, of eo-
dependency as.the way to live. These expressions complement one another's meaning and thus
give a much richer understanding and meaning to community.
The basic attitude or the virtue that is being articulated and one which underlies these proverbs
is that of kutloano or friendship in which the emphasis is on the tone of interpersonal relations
and the value of living in friendly relationships. The term kutloano comes from the word utloana,
denoting the act of hearing each other which in turn comes from the verb utloa-to "hear" or
"feel". But for the Basotho .Iike most Africans the seat of all feeling, thought, will and all life
is placed in the heart (cf. Casalis 1861: 243). Bujo describing this as the characteristic feature
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of an African says
the ethical African does argue with his or her head, but attributes everything, including
speculative arguments, to that organ which is central in the human, namely to the heart
(1992: 100).
Accordingly, kutloano in this sense denotes a feeling where there is a bond of friendship in
community characterised by agreement of wills. Something akin to the christian idea of being
one in miad and heart. This is because as Maritain points out
friendship brings about agreements of wills, required by nature but freely undertaken,
which lies at the origin of social community (1986: 119).
Where this spirit prevails the Basotho say of the situation "there is kutloano" and of the people
involved "ba ea utloana". Kutloano is, therefore, a kind of social relationship plus the
corresponding emotional feelings akin to what we know as friendship.
Friendship as a way to describe the idea of kutloano must not be confused with the modem
conception and use of the concept, where affection is usually the central issue. Rather it must be
understood as referring to a type of social and political relationship, rather than a type of
emotional state (cf. MacIntyre 1981: 146). This does not mean that the affective dimension of
the bond of friendship is unimportant in friendship as a social or political relationship. What it
means is that this does not become the sole defining feature of the b,pnd of friendship between
community members.
Friendship as a paradigm for community will then mean that such a relationship can not be
derived and be based upon utilitarian or pragmatic motives, nor can it be defined solely in terms
of the mutual pleasure brought by being in that relationship. The bond oLfIj~Il_Q~hip between
members of thecommunity-derivesmainly from. their shared concern with the community as the
(~:~,,.. _ _ ,,... ... . _ . .--- .__, .e'· · ·' · ' . ~:;~;,~,~,: : ,,, ,.,., , ,,, ;~,~k~...,~il;, ~ ~: \.1, ~_ r.-'t~ if ~ i\':_¥ ~" ' ,_~,' V\~.
CO~~?d~~~_!~~l~goal_~~._R~mQs.e. Kutloano as a description of Basotho understanding
of what community is in many ways closer in meaning to this view. This can be seen in the
difference in the usage of the term to describe on the one hand the relationship between two
close friends and on the other hand to describe the relationships obtaining in the community.
When used to describe the bond of friendship between two friends, kutloano has the same
meaning and connotations as the modem conception of friendship where affection is often the
central feature of the relationship. However even in this context the term still maintains that
element of an agreement of wills. As a description of the bond between members of the
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community we find that the centrality of affection decreases in prominence, not importance, and
the communal understanding of kutloano increases as a social relationship in which the agreement
of wills is that of the whole community.
As a description of a social relationship it, therefore. means living together with a high degree
of mutual concern, feelings for one another. and a general agreement among members with a
common will. As a main feature of community among the Basotho kutloano may be described.. - ------ -- - -~- -
as a genus, and its sI?.~~~~~~iI}R.va~.~es lik~ communal solida,E!,tY!_.~'.lr}Eg!}iQ!!~J;~J~!i9_l}§~~P'~!._ ~~.".. _
all other African values and virtues.
What is important to note here is the extent to which the sense of being community is an
important aspect of the way of life of the Basotho. This is also the case with African culture in
:x::: general south of the Sahara, where one finds that the most prominent feature of life is the sense
of community and concern that people had for one another. This is so basic to the African way
of life that it could be said to be the rationale behind much of the observable aspect of the
African culture. Because of this in traditional societies every person was thus related to another ,
and there was no person who did not belong, not even strangers'? or unknown persons. These
relationships which could either be by blood, by marriage, or friendship were emotionally seated
and cherished dearly.
4.1.1 Community as Life-together
Kutloano as the basic feature of life in community presupposes a life in common. As a virtue it
is, therefore , highly valued and necessary for the community to be community . As the main
characteristic of the life of the African person this means that Africans by nature are community
people. Somewhere in the nature of the African is this strong sense of community or belonging,
and because of this there are still traces of this even in the lives of modem people.'>
Commenting on this Setiloane says that the most common complaint among many Africans who
are studying in Europe or America is the lack of community they experience. The privacy of life
and individualised form of social living which Western culture has come to almost make a
10
In Seso tho there i s no word f or a stranger . A pe rson who was u nknown was simply cal led mots amai ,
the one who t ravels . And when 'the t rave ller ' arrives in a village he would be a s ked t o r ec i t e h i s or he r
s eboko, (t otem) in o r de r t o establish who i n the vi llage a r e me-hahabo, h i s own pe op le , L e thos e with same
t otem. After they have been i dentified they are charged wi t h the care o f this person until h i s stay is ove r .
I f t here 1 S none , s uc h a per son becomes the res pon s i bility of t he ch i ef . ' ,
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religion of, for these poor Africans he says becomes an unhealthy environment which results in
loneliness and depression (1986: 9ff).
From this we can see that community even today, impoverished as it may be, is more than just
a nostalgia for the past. It is a need that is real and deeply felt. This also shows that community
is more than being in the company of other people, because these African students would most
definitely be around other people. !TI,fl!} j~·f[i,C:Cl~ ,~,l},~~rstanding c()IE"J!1,~,!!!.!Y,,,~Cl;.~..~!?,£l:!L,!~,~,"9~~lity.-
oL~ionsh,.!Q~i!l~>~.lif~Jiy~~!Lin,"G"QIDmOn (Ibid. 1986: 9f). This is perhaps what is found missing
in the individualised, private social living of Western culture and indeed most of contemporary
African culture. Life that is lived in common.
By saying that a life that is lived in common it must not be assumed that this means there are
not differences. What it.me@..§j_~"j)_~QPJ~ _Y'ltl:1,~gJiy!!!g _ !gJ?~~.~:"~"Cl"£2~_~_!!1l!JyiJ:l §p.!!~..of...~~
differences and som~e~-.k.Y~n...cnnflicts. Because of this in Sesotho there is a saying that say'-------
"ntoa ke ea ma lula 'moho ".. ID~~fighLisJOLthose-whoJive together. ';"
Th~.5s!~~ _~hindthis is that even people who Jive Joge~herJheyt09 99 hClY~_ g_!ff~~ences . and now
.-.... .... . . .' - . . ,-..- .~"",..~ .., .-",. ..,..' .'" -_..- ." .-. -'_ ., \
and then wiJl '~ fight~~- or: ,have-.different.points.of.view. The moral lesson here is two fold. First,
.~"'-"""""-~' """ ' '''' -' '' ' ''--''' '''
the members of the community are told on the one hand that the fact that they are in communion




On the other hand they are told that when they do have fights or differences, which may
sometimes lead to mutual excommunication, they must remember that it is not unusual. They
must know that this does not mean they cannot and indeed should not be in communion with
each other or one another again. According to this we see how community was important. It was
so important that even when personal differences made it difficult to be community people were
discouraged not to let these be the sole determining factors of their communion with one another.
Rather they were encouraged to transcend these and get back to living life in common.
4.1.2 Community as Knowing Face-to-Face
The African understanding of community as life together whereby kutloano prevails also means
that there is a greatemphasis and value put on a face-to-face presenceof persons. This person-to- .
person relational presence formed an integral part of the African experience and conception of
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community. People were expected to relate to one another just like that, face-to-face. This type
of relationship, as the expression of relational proximity, is the practical and theoretical
actualization of the presence and proximity of the other as a person.
One of the sad things about our inter-personal relations today is that even though we are highly
inter-dependent on one another in so many ways, this inter-dependency is not only shallow but
very abstract. In fact it is because of the abstract nature of modern social inter-actions that much
.-
injustices have been done to the majority of third world countries by modern economic systems.
Our trust in one another is no longer in persons who are known, but rather in abstract social
inter-actions. As such even our face-to-face relations in most cases they lack depth and have no
real significance, and because of this not only have we failed to know people as people, we have
also failed to recognize their presence. According to Dussel the experience of the nearness of
persons in the face-to-face relationship makes the other one's neighbour, because it is by being
face-to-face before another that one becomes someone (1986: 9£).
In other words in a face-to-face presence before another, a person-to-person relationship, it
becomes important to know whose face am I face-to-face with. When that face begins to matter,
the other is known and their presence felt, and notust seen.
It is this that was important for the African experience and understanding of community. Such
.'if
a relationship enabled members of the community to know one another in a way that is not so,
common today, and by far superior to how we know one another these days. It was knowledge
in a way that everybody knew everybody else's experiences. This meant knowing and sharing
one's neighbour's difficulties, happiness, sorrows and many other aspects of life that today we
would not necessarily know of our neighbours. Because people knew one another in this way it
was easy for them to care and be concerned about one another. Even more important is that it
became possible for people: to have faith and trust in one another. In this way, faith in one
another became the communities' hope in one another in their common purpose of being
community, and all this was sustained by love as the bond of friendship or kutloano in the
community .
These virtues were thus not only central but formed the foundation of community life. They were
also a statement about life in common because of their emphasis on the importance of
harmonious relations with one's neighbour as a special charge to individuals within the
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community. Thus these virtues as a way of making concrete and giving shape to the practical
living of the relational demands made and expected of communities, affirmed the communal
nature of life as found among African communities.
4.2 The Basotho Worldview
,"
Much of what I have been saying about the Basotho culture and way of life, is based on their
understanding and ideas about reality. In other words on their basic assumptions or worldview.
In this section I want to look at that African worldview. This will in many ways assume and be
heavily depended.on the past. This is because it provides a relevant background for understanding
the current situation. In other words even though my concern is with the present, without a good
understanding of the past i.e. the traditional way of life it will be difficult to make sense and
understand what is happening at present. In other words without a better understanding of
traditional African ethical traditions i.e. where the contemporary African comes from,
understanding his present situation will not be easy because the present is the result of the past,
and the future is the result of whatever is being done today (cf. Mugambi 1992: 16). To
understand who the present Africans are we must recognize that the history of their lives is part.,.
of the history of lives lived before. So to get a better understanding of what is happening in their
moral lives and environment we will need to take into consideration their past. For this we must
examine the African culture and in particular its worldview, because a worldview affects people's
decision about what they should be and how they should act (cf. Kammer 1988:21). In other
words the way they conduct themselves.
By worldview I mean people's basic assumptions about life and reality and that which informs
all other aspects of their life. I mean those things that form part-of what a particular people have
taken as a given and which function as their basic framework. Because it functions in this way
it is often so familiar that its interpretative processes are routine.
This means that often we are unaware of them and if we are they almost seem automatic (Ibid.
1988: 19). In the moral sphere this results in what we can call habits, and I will argue that habits
have more to do with who we are i.e. our characters than with doing things out of custom. A
worldview, therefore, as Kammer points out has to do with
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general presumption about the final principles and powers that underlie existence of both
natural and human history... presumptions about human nature, the nature of the world
in which we live, and human society (1988: 20f).
The Basotho worldview is very much like this. It is a set of presumptions about life and what
it means to be a person. These are found in one way or another in two inseparable and inter-
dependent key elements, namely holism and religion. In this way we can speak of one of the
legacies of even a contemporary Mosotho as being the sense of the religious. We can therefore
expect to find this reflected in his or her life. Basotho, like most Africans, do not draw a sharp
distinction between the social and the religious, religion and culture, or morality and religion.
Life for them is a single reality understood as a unity with religious and moral obligations that
are lived out in community. In other words in addition to being communal, ethics for Basotho
is rooted in their religion, e.g. in the significance of ancestors to their life!'. Studies on the
subject of ancestors have far too often been used to highlight only the religious sphere of the life
of the African people. The very same studies have shown, even if in a limited, way that ancestors
do affect people's decisions about what to be and how to conduct themselves. In this way the
ancestors had an ethical role, because as religious figures they influenced the life of the living
and the way they conduct themselves (cf. Pula 1988: 30, Manyeli 1992: 46).
In examining the African worldview I will argue that holism and religion have great mutual
influence on each other. Some people add communalism as the third element. As I shall argue
communalism or community is the corollary of the African belief in the unity of all things. As
such in giving the description of the African worldview and how it impacts on life and ways of
conduct, I will not treat these as separate elements.
4.2.1 Holism as the Basis for Community
According to the traditional African worldview all things belong together. In the eye of the
African the world is made up of supernatural and invisible rea1.i!~~§J.J}!lmal)J~~i~gs, plants,
"'-"'~~"' ' ' '~>~'-' '' '"''" '~' '"'' ' '~ "-,-,. ,,..-~ ' " ' " " -- " -'- ..·._·.• "c~_ ~~ .¥ .... ~ _."__ ~".,, . . .. .. .. . _, _. -" ",- ,_. ""-" ' 4 '_ .._~",~
aI}}mals and all othercreated-things all.belong together. According to tradi~!QI!~~~E~f..!hj§.JJ!1ity
o~~inates from the.commonorigin.in .the .Supremcbcing .t~ . their creator (cf.Moyo 1992: 50).
11
• For more on the significance of ancestors to the African way of life see Bujo's African
Christianity, chapter 3.
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It is because of this belief that the African worldview is holistic in orientation. This implies that
in examining some aspects of African culture one has to bear in mind the significance of these
to the larger reality. It means that a fuller understanding and grasp of these needs an awareness
of the place they have in the overall schema of the African worldview. As such this is an
important reminder for us as we look into ethical traditions and practices of the Basotho.
It means we should not understand them fundamentally as self-contained and explanatory or treat.-
them in isolation, lmLrather.<that<they should be regarded as p<art~_QfJt<~J)ole within which their
~..._.~ •.~...._. ,_~ ..~_. , _~"_>.__..~.-•.,.•", .. .. ,_... - _ .. .. .. " .' ~"'-W""'O."'~·'M~_' '" ~~''''' _ ' __''''''' '_'' '~''"' ' ' ' ''' _ ' '' '' ' _' "." '~' ' _ """ " _ " " " ~
full meaning andsignificance..derive and take.form. Kasenene, describing this, notes that the
"-~ . , <..~,~ ." , . -..".""..",,.._.,,., , .~ . , . ', '";-;...,,._.,.... .. .-'.
African worldview blends the sacred with the mundane and that the religious and the moral
intermingle with the physical, material, political and social concerns of the people. This means
it stressed the wholeness of life and not just that of humanity but of human beings and their
environment. As such he argues that
in all they do, Africans strive to promote thewell-b~i~g o~ ~e II1eII1~~rs of society, and ~
~is- <i~r Iit~~<~~C~fi~r~·.·,ili~ii< !s .P~i~9Jj3J · . i~~~~<lt!9ij, <..~nY!rQIjfu~!i~L.~g~.~!!~,~':lJ!1 ' ~2ci<l1 . v~,
hirmony < in~ .hal1l:!QI)Y, .b~1ween Jhe individual . and both . the ~IlyimJ:1JJ:l~Il! and the
s2ifiiiiunliY•.(129~E · 1 42) .
This belief had even greater obligations towards human beings themselves. It meant that this
connectedness of.all.things.and .the.idea of belonging together mU~tI?feyen more visible among
human beings themselves (cf. Bujo 1992: 23).
In other words if people were expected to live in harmonious communion with the rest of
....,.....,..._•..,..,.""'...~~_".,...."".~~.,"'''7.T. _~.- . _",,.c'..."._...-,·.·'''...._ "'~"""""" " " " -""'-''''~''-~,-~" " -, .~ ;",. ·" ·,c .., ,,...,.,~,..,,.,, , ...,...; _._.;_...".",,
creation, ~~t:_Il~g£~<l~r ~ll§ that expectation in r~lati2n to their fellow human beings. In other
words this unity must bereflected in the way human beings live including the way they live their
moral life.
According to traditional thought, therefore, people were not only expected to be in communion
with th~_(eSL,oLr~Y..!"_ .QE"!,< "!h,~y» ~er~ '!1sQexpected to Jive..in unity and solidarity with one
another. HumC!l1 <exi&l~nc~" w.'!§Jhlls primarilyunderstoodin terms.of.corporate existence through
which life,"reaches .its.fullness and wholeness.
'-~"'- '''''~_''_'''._'_.'",.h''''- '''"'"~
4.2.2 Holism and the Wholeness of Life
African worldview as we have just seen was essentially holistic, and as result its view of life was
a holistic one whereby life was seen in its <wholeness<._This~.PQlenessoflife meant that there was
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no separatiorLQLhumanJi(ejmQJh~ different compartments such as modernity requires. The
.,- :;<_ . . _ .~. . ,,, '",.,...•. __ ,. , .. . . -- - .. .. .... , _'•.. .,." ..•. ..,• .,' ,, ' ._.,.,._. ..,.•_., .OJ .__ ,•.• • . ;~ ,_ ,."_. """~~~.~,, _ , _" _ < ..,,._,-'__A.,, ••_ "~ _ ._, ·__ . ' .
P_~E~2I!~"~l'1gJ:;"ommunal.privateand public aspects of life all blend~cl together.
However this did not mean that.there was not distinction between them. In other words there may
~""_~~ ~' " .. .. . _""~...". ;..-...~......._~)~.='..>'... ".;,:.,:,~".,,.;,,,."'''''..;''''''-~;''''".l'''..'''A.''.~._. ;"'~ .._ ,-"._ --<~~.'.;"._•._,.,:, .•.. ,-,-" " -,'.'- :" -,-,-,,,,-- -.. ..,-,-., '.-..•., ..,_ ..,'~~ . - -:. .~._ ." -".".,, ." ,. . ~~"'" ,....,..,....''''''\''' ',.,.....~,.'~'-'=''''r
well have been a distinction, but it was one without separation. Besides the exact nature of this
distinction according to traditional view would not be interesting nor would it be seen as
important. What was important was that life be understood as a whole, whereby the present of,-
one's life was lived and understood in view of their past and their future with no separation
between the private and the communal.
Describing the post-enlightenment period regarding this says MacIntyre says that
any contemporary attempt to envisage each human life as a whole,... encounters tW9
different kinds of obstacle, one social and one philosophical. The social obstacles derive
from the way in which modernity partitions each human life into a variety of segments,
each with its own norms and modes of behaviour (1981: 190).
It is this understanding of human life that marks the difference with contemporary societies.
According t() tragHiQnalJhQJ!ghtJh~ftlU!!~§§ __oL~Lm~r~OIl:~... life and wholen~§~Qflife could not
.' " . .. .",'- ~•• "' ......_ _ " _.,_.,_,. ,';; ; ,__. ._._ ,, . "" . __.~ _ ..,..,. ' ~.•. ~-,tE..' ," " - ~ .• - >
be achieved apartfrom.Iiving.with others in community. A life that was lived alone was
considered not whole and fulfilled.
Because of this conception one sees the enactment of this belief am"png most African peoples
from the very beginning of the person's life, in the elaborate communal rituals celebrating life
at birth. Among the Basotho for example when a child was born the understanding was that it
was born to the whole community, whereby the new life (the baby) was regarded as a gift to the
family and the community. As such they celebrated this life as a communal responsibility from
the moment of birth (cf. Bereng 1987: 36). The women of the village would bring various gifts
and be around for a week or two to help the family and take care of mother and child. Many
African peoples as a result lived life primarily as a communal thing and there was very little if
any at all of the notion of a personal life in the individualistic sense. In other words for Africans
life by definition was that which is to be lived in community and never individually.
Because life was essentially communal it was permeated by strong social concern. This started
with the smaller and inner circle of the extended family community, where it was most intense,
but by no means did this end there. It went beyond this level to the broader level of the village
community, which in turn is part of the larger national community. As Moyo points out
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it is this sense of belonging together, of being a community of related person, that makes
it possible for members of traditional society to share what they have with the needy in
the community (1992: 53).
So what we see here is how the African understanding of life as a communal enterprise
influenced social behaviour and lead people to a sense in which members became keepers of one
another and feeling responsible for every other (Ibi(r:~ 1992: 52). This seems to be a more
plausible -explanarion for the interest in community among Africans rather than mutual
dependency for the protection of self interests, as some critics have supposed. This traditional
understanding of life was not only significant but determinative of the way the African looked
at life, understood his or her identity and conducts himself or herself. Within the African
worldview holism as the totality of reality, played a very important role as that which informed
daily conduct in community.
Since my argument is that there is a need for a paradigm shift in ethical thought and practice,
a shift away from a universalistic and individualistic ethics to a communal and local approach
to ethics, I need to clarify the secondary claim I am making i.e. the value and necessity for
community. In other words in order to make this argument persuasive it is necessary to explain
the moral significance of community as understood and experienced generally by Africans, in
view of drawing out the implications and lessons of such an understanding for how we should
build communities in our present way of life.
5. THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE AND VALUE OF COMMUNITY
Earlier I pointed out that moral decisions are made from the stand point of the persons we are.
Among the Basotho people "who we are" which was essentially to have "botho"-personhood, is t
intrinsically bound with community, because according to traditional thought there is no existence
apart from the community. The community as the social embodiment of a specific configuration
of values and virtues, therefore, did not only confer roles and responsibilities, which formed part
of the moral identity of its members, it was also the moral context within which people found
their identity and character. It was in the community that character was formed and shaped.
Because of this it was not only unthinkable that one could live one's moral life outside it, but
/~ .
.I
that one could chose their identity or character and way of conduct. As the primary context
within which individuals lived their moral life, the community determined what was good and
what was bad. It gave content and meaning to "right" and "wrong". It is in this way that
~=~ .......
Richardson explaining the ethics of ~~stotle says that
~"""~~•••,_,'t"",,,,,,.,,,,,<-
there can be no way of judging the goodness or otherwise of the person without reference
to the particular community in which the person belongs (1994: 93).
According to this, not only is what is good socially relative, but that which is regarded as morally
acceptable in one community is not necessarily going to be regarded in the same light in another
community. Again this shows the contextual nature of ethics and the normative function of
community. The following description of community among the Basotho is, therefore, to illustrate
and explain this function of community because that which is good must be understood according
to the describable nature of each community (Ibid. 1994: 93). The most explicit statement about
community in Basotho culture is perhaps found in the well known proverb "motho ke motho ka
batho'?"; a person is a person through other persons.
Since it was not of the nature of traditional African thought to be formulated with the kind of
scientific and philosophical style normally found among academics and scholars, it is in such
expressions as this that the deepest convictions and what was regarded as important was
if
communicated, narrated, retold and 'preserved. In this proverb we get important beliefs such as
the Basotho understanding of community and of "botho", personhood. We fmd in it the deepest
and most profound statement and understanding of the importance and value of community and
the place of the individual in it. It is expresses the African version of what Augustine Shutte
describes as intersubjectivity of persons whereby
there is a unique form of dependency on other persons for the exercise, development and
fulfilment of precisely that capacity that makes us persons and subjects, the capacity for
self-awareness and self-determination (1994: 28).
The proverb is in this way both a theory of community and of individuality. In it there is on the
one hand what it means to be a community and what community ought to be, and on the other
hand what it means to be a person and what a person ought to be. To analyze this proverb I am
12
In Zulu and Xhosa there i s s i mi lar prove r b 'Umuntu ngumuntu ngab antu' (Shuttle 1994 : 28) . The
Ve ndas too ha ve a s i mi lar one, 'Muthu u bebelwa nunwe', a person i s bo r n for the ot her (Ka senene 1994 : 141).
Whi le I c a n no t speak f or t he t hese peop le , I do however believe t ha t in the s e prove r bs we f i nd a n e xpression
o f wha t i t me a ns t o be community .
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going to look first at its communal implications and in the following chapter at its imperatives
to the Basotho understanding of botho, being a person.
5.1 The Community as a Moral Criterion
The proverb as a statement about what ends the community wanted to achieve and what values
it wanted i·o embody, expresses how the Basotho understood not only their personal relationships,
nor what it meant to be a person, but also the moral function of their communities and their
purpose. In it we, therefore, have the richest deposit of Basotho thought and insight about the role
and purpose of community. The proverb expresses the ideal of communal solidarity as the basic
feature of their life.
The idea that motho ke motho ka batho, communicates a deep seated sense of mutual eo-
dependence of persons, solidarity and concern. This is understandable because the way of life as
~
found in the family and village communities of the Basotho was primarily communal and each
person felt called upon and understood it as their responsibility to care for the other. Thus
according to their understanding to be a person, as our proverbs indicates, was essentially linked
to the idea of being community. Describing this Shutte points out that this expression
.'4
presents us with the distinctive African idea of community that underlies so much of
African culture and so many traditional practices and institutions. It is a view of
community that is sharply opposed to all kinds of individualism. It is, however, equally
opposed to collectivism of a European kind (1994: 29).
It did not only underlie traditional practices but also traditional African ethics. Traditional African
morality and its ethical system did not evolve in a vacuum. Rather it developed and functioned
within a specific context, namely the community (Kasenene 1993: 3). What this shows is that
traditional morality emphasised and focused on inter-relationships. While ultimately it was about
proper conduct of a person or a group, its main objective was the quality and exercise of this in
relation to one's relationships with neighbours, subordinates, seniors and the community at large
(cf.Ibid 1993: 4).
This means that African ethics governed social relationships by indicating the individuals proper
places and prescribin~ourse of conduct (cf.Nasimiyu-Wasike 1992: 165f), and in this sense it
was a form of communal ethics. The community through its well known customs and norms thus
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became a moral criterion because, breaching these constituted a moral offence.
The community was the moral standard and as such the criterion for evaluating and judging the
conduct of its members. In other words it was on the basis of which the moral conduct of the
members was checked against. In expressing the normative character of the experience and
understanding of community often the members of the community will use the expression "this
is not how we do things". This understanding of community as the moral standard echoes
.'
Hauerwas' phrase that the community does not so much have an ethic, but is an ethic itself (cf.
1983: 99).
What we observe in the Basotho way of life, customs, practices and rituals is in this way a
manifestation and a living out of their ethic. As an ethic, the community thus becomes that to
which moral reference is made and that by which people refrain from doing certain things on the
one hand and allow themselves to do certain things on the other.
The community as an arena for moral eo-responsibility, also became a moral criterion by being
a point of reference for judging what conduct would be teleologically appropriate i.e. whether
it is coherent with the aims, goals and purposes of the community. In other words it acted as a
kind of measuring line for what would be in line with what the community regards as its ultimate
ends purposes and characterises of the good life. This ties in with the traditional understanding
1
where by ethics was about proper ways of conduct as a purposive shaping of one's life towards
final goals and ends.
I am going to argue that this idea too is implicitly the meaning of the proverb motho ke motho
ka batho. The reason it may not be that obvious seems to be the exclusive understanding of the
proverb in terms of its social meaning. In so doing the teleological aspect has become less and
less recognizable. As such to the majority of Basotho today this idea will be regarded as suspect,
but a closer look and analysis of the proverb and familiarity with how it is used will show that
the suggestion is not in opposition with the meaning behind this proverb.
If I am right, besides telling us that Basotho lived their life in community, the proverb is also a
statement about what goals and ends they wanted to achieve and what purposes they had. These
goals and ends were that which was behind their actions, the ultimate end and hence the reason
behind the way they lived. The proverb, therefore, tells us that communion with others was for
the Basotho a central part of their purposes and goals. This makes sense because according to
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traditional African thought to be a person, which is the ultimate end and purpose of every
individual, was understood as achievable through communion with others. So being in
communion with others, in thought and practice, would have been understood as one of the
purposes and ultimate end for people. This communion because of the African view of reality,
would include both one's relations with the living and those who have already gone or the living
fi\e dead.
.'
Among the Basotho communion with the latter becomes prominent in their burial rituals".
These rituals shows the great concern to be the person's acceptance by the community on the
other side of the grave. A person seems to have indirectly prepared for this by a proper conduct (j ol¥)
_ ••. _ _ • • • ---~---.~ . _-_._-- -_...........~~-~_.~_••_ -- . _-- . -~ "--. _ _ ._ • • " . • ' ._."• • .>0. ~_ , __ , _ _ _ _ " t ) ~ t
during their life time. ' S~-~onducting oneself properly formed part of a person '~g~ai; ~;;d-- f v' .
.... . ,, "'"... .. •.,..;;:.<$i'J. Jt't. .~" '!',~:.Yr'1r','JJ."'''' .Jr.:~~.,...".-',"»..;".~""'"' ;. ...~~r. ,.,.x~
purposes because it played an important role within the larger goal of communion with the living
dead.
According to MacIntyre traditional morality by being contextual, was such that human purposes
played a major role in their conduct (cf. 1981: 57, my emphasis). Morality was a common ecl'(
responsibility and a purposive shaping of one's life towards final goals and ends in community~ -
. ~-------._--
The morality of the Basotho can be described as such a morality. The community and its well
being was the telos or the purpose guiding their conduct and that by virtue of which they
. ~
conducted themselves. It was that on which all other purposes found their true meaning. So in
answer to the question "how do we arrive at what is right or wrong, good or bad?", which is the
essence of ethics, the Basotho would say "through identification with the community". This
meant a person or their actions were all judged good or bad on the basis of their impact and how
they affect the community. Kasenene, describing this, points out that
community is the key to understanding the African view of a person. A person 's identity,
worth and, indeed very life are valued through membership of a group (1994: 141)
In this way we can see as Kasenene says that according to African philosophy, a person is a
person through, with and for the community and as such the individualistic conduct that we are
now seeing is something new to Africa (Ibid. 1994: 141). In the same way the moral goodness
13
Ac c ording t o Basotho buria l pract ice a pers on wa s placed i n the grave in a squatting position
f a c i nq east . Th is i s because t hey believed t hat de a t h was a passage by wh i ch they r e t u r n t o where they
or lg l ~a l ly cam e from o r ' home " a s they would s ay . And accord ing t o traditiona l belief t hat home is "Ntsoana-
t sats l " - where the sun c omes from. And so the y bu r i ed their dead f a ci ng east , so that t he p e r s on c ou ld rise with
t he sun at s u n rise t o go home.
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or ugliness (badness) of actions and conduct was evaluated in terms of the community.
5.1.1 Evaluation of Character
Our conduct as people is not only about what we do i.e. actions, it is also about who we are or
our characters i.e. our being. In traditional African ethics, character and personal identity were
judged and evaluated in terms of the community. This means it was in the nature of the,-
individual's ability to live in community that he was judged either good or bad. Such judgements
while they referred to the actions of the person, they were primarily statements about the person's
character. The concept botho (personhood) which refers to qualities of character was, therefore,
a moral attribute indicating the person's moral character. So statements like "James ha se motho"
(lames is not a person) or "James ke motho", (James is a person) were statements about the
person's low or high regard and the value they place on community. In the case of someone who
was regarded as particularly lacking in this he or she was called "phoofolo" (a beast)", Some
one who was thus called was as it were symbolically stripped of human status and given the
status of animals i.e. a creature which is incapable of having qualities of botho. In other words
disregarding communal values and expectations was like self excommunication. The
understanding was that such a person had automatically disqualified'fthemselves of the honour
and privileges of people who have character or botho. Eugene Casalis, one of the early
missionaries among the Basotho, describing this points out that :
the external appearances of moderation and decency constitute in the eyes of the natives
what they call botu,(sic) the title of dignity of man, in opposition to bopofolo (sic), the
brute life; a name they apply to every immoral act of an excessively scandalous nature
(1861: 303, my emphases).
Immorality as used in this sense should be understood as referring to any conduct that would be
seen as not befitting a person who is a person or who has botho, and this need not be excessively
scandalous. Casalis' view is, therefore, slightly misleading, because these qualities of moderation
were understood as more than just external appearances. The expectation was that they become
characteristics of one's identity or character. As such their external appearance was to be only
14
Such people would often not enjoy most of the benefits the rest of the members of the community
enjoyed. ?ften this meant withdrawal o~ communa~ support, something like economic sanctions on a person. In other
words thelr treatment would be a symbo11c excluslon from the rest of the life of the community. While nothing would
be taken away from the person, nothing would be offered either.
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a reflection of the internal character of the person. The community as a kind of a yard stick on
the basis of which a person was judged good or bad, was also a statement about the character
of its members and what it should be.
5.1.2 Moral Co-responsibility
The function of the community as a moral criterion also meant that the community had moral
.'
authority. That authority had a corresponding role for the community and that was to form its
members into "batho bao e leng batho", people who are persons in accordance with its identity,
history and tradition. It was also on the basis of this role and responsibility that the community
made moral claims and demands upon people without this necessarily leading to major conflicts.
This was possible because the community as a moral centre not only did it provide members with
a common moral base, which made it possible for people to have shared goals and values, it was
also the embodiment of the general will or all the community's ideal.
The fact that members of the community shared common values did not mean blind obedience
or repression of individual thought. Rather it meant moral eo-responsibility and mutual
dependency, because as Shutte points it is important
to see dialogue or conversation as the typical activity and, indeed, the ultimate purpose
of community as understood in traditional African thought, s1nce this is a co-operative
activity that is achieved simply by the presence of person to person, rather than them
fulfilling any further function, as would be the case in some practical activity such as
building a house ( 1994: 30). .
Moral eo-responsibility highlights the necessity for inter-dependency. It leans away from
privatization of the moral life to a collective responsibility of ways of conduct. It is a communal
undertaking, where all the parties concerned are equally charged with the responsibility of the
moral life of the community. This made it possible for authority to be constructive as a guardian
of the community's moral ideals, without it being perceived as hostile to the interests of the
individual and thus an enemy of the individual. At the same time it made it possible for
individuals to make an input into the moral tradition of the community. In this way the
community must be seen as Shutte suggests like a family. It has no function outside itself and
as a means of growth for its members, it became an\end in itself in which there was an
interaction, conversation, companionship and learning between .the younger and eldet\members
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of the family (Ibid. 1994: 30). In such a social organization the community was the bearer of
moral ideal and teacher of what was appropriate and what was not.
This is how valuable the community was to the Basotho and in turn how influential it became
to their moral life. All this was by way of highlighting the significance of community and in turn
its moral value and function. While much of this experience of community is fading and in some
cases lost the legacy of these traditional Basotho communities, i.e. their sense of what is good
.'
and bad still underlies much of the present day Basotho life style including how they make moral
judgments. Kasenene makes a similar observation that in modern day Africa,
new or adapted institutions have been introduced and some new social patterns have
emerged, but the traditional ethos has survived" (1994: 138).
It is because of this that in the context of contemporary moral environment, many Basotho
experience an inner moral conflict hence the moral inconsistency they exhibit in their lives.
5.2 Community and Moral Individualism
The central role of the community in the moral thought and practice of the Basotho means that
their ethic is going to be in conflict with individualistic and privatizing moral tendencies. It also
'4
means that it is not going to be inclined to be universal, because being ethics of community, its
primary context is the local and particular. As a type of communal ethics its objective is the good
of the whole i.e. the community. It is in this sense that the African experience of community as
eo-dependence of persons must be understood as sharply opposed to individualism. Shutte is,
therefore, correct in his observation that
the traditional African idea of community ...avoids individualism by insisting on our
dependence on other persons for our development as person (Shutte 1994: 30).
This understanding of community encouraged a way of conduct that placed value on the good
of the whole and values and virtues such as ubuntu, kutloano and goodwill. When understood
in this sense community must not be misunderstood as a kind of collectivism" because
15 . According t o Menkiti quoted by Shutte, col lectivism h a s strong over ton e s o f an a ggregat i on of
i ndiv i dua l s an d denotes me re col lection o f individuals , whi le commun ity 'asserts an on tologica l i nde p endenc e to
human society , and it moves f rom society to i nd i v idua l s ' r at her than , in a manne r o f European thought , ' f r om
ind i v idual s t o society' (1994 : 29f) .
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community being
funded on dialogue and reciprocity, the group had priority over the individual without
crushing him, but allowing him to blossom as a person (Ibid.1994: 30).
As the experienced and lived reality community, denotes unity of persons, where the dignity and
value of the individual is not ignored. The African idea of community as a rejection of
individualism should however not be seen as opposed to individuality. While it rejects
individualism, it does not ignore the well being of the individual.
Shutte further more makes an important statement, that as volitional beings we depend on the
influence, in particular the strictly personal causality, of other persons in the community for the
exercise and growth of our capacity of self-realisation (1994: 29). As moral agents we are equally
dependent on the community for our moral growth and self-realisation as moral subjects.
Community among the Basotho functioned in much the same way. It was that which was the
arena of moral inter-dependency. As such even though the community had priority it was at the
same time that in which the individual grows, develop and found their identity. In such a
worldview, the individual existed corporately in terms of the family, the clan, the tribe, and the
whole nation. It is in this sense that for the Basotho, the primary principle for conducting one's
affairs, would not have been "I think, therefore I am", but rather "re batho ka ba bang",-we are
'4
people because of others- or "I am because We are". This meant that moral judgements would
always be made in terms of what was good for "us" Le. the community. Accordingly what was
good for me as the individual was that which was good for my community. This collective
conscience did not only end with personal identity, it extended to personal conduct. My moral
life as a person was thus never going to be my own personal and private affair. The community
which formed and continues to form me, was a stake-holder in it, because as a member I
represented its moral values and virtues. In this way the community became not only a critique
of moral individualism, but also curbed individualistic moral tendencies.
5.3 Community and the Practice of Virtues
The moral value and function of community, as the location and social arena where people are
"conspiring together Le. united among themselves even to the very centre of their being (Ibid.
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1994: 30) was to provide the individual with the context more conducive for moral growth and
development. It was also the living social reality in which they learn through practice to integrate
moral values and virtues with their over-all way of life. As the context in which the practice and
perfection of moral virtues took place the community was the place where people learnt to be
virtuous. This was because the community, as a configuration of norms, values and virtues, was
itself a kind of exercise. The kind that could not be practised alone or individually, but rather the..
kind that MacIntyre describes as a
coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through
which goods internal to the form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of activity...(l981: 175).
This means that moral virtues developed in the individual and thus became part of his or her
character, through active participation in this practice. It was, therefore, not enough to know that
I ought to love, or care for others. I needed to learn how to be a loving, caring person, and this
was provided by the experience of community. Such a practice or learning of virtues as this,
becomes possible only in the smaller social context of community and less so in a society. A
society which is a multiplicity of communities is too big and because of this it lacks the feeling
of intimacy and friendship of a smaller group both of which are essential for the exercise and
practice of these, and hence their development in the person.
Once we have learned to practice these with those who are intimate with us or those with whom
we are more familiar, it will be easier to apply them -even to those who are not so familiar to
us. The community offers us that manageable environment within which, in the context of
contemporary society, we can take the risk of practising these virtues and in so doing making
them part of our character.
5.4 Community and Shaping of Loyalties
Loyalties are another area of human life that has direct impact on our ethical conduct. Recently
this idea has been a focus of attention in the field of what is called contextual therapy or inter-
generational therapy. What therapists working in this field have discovered is that loyalties or
legacies, have great bearing on people's lives and that often they assume a normative character.
66
These therapists noted that in human relationships (communities) there are legacies or specific
configuration of expectations and invisible loyalties with obligations, that the individual has
towards those in relationship with him or her e.g. family members. They further discovered that
the effects of loyalty coupled with legacy expectations upon the individual, are such that they
assume a normative function in the person's life. The reason is because they are perceived as
things one ought to do rather than things one would like to do (Van de Kemp 1987: 292), and
."
because they are perceived that way they become factors that influences conduct. In other words
they become the basis for people doing certain things and not others, included here also are
things ethical or moral.
The experience of community among the Basotho, and indeed among many African peoples is
in many ways a living out of a complex multiplicity of inter-generational human relationships,
e.g. of ancestors, family, friends and one's village neighbours; All these have their own implicit
expectations, all of which form the content of what is expected of individuals. These in turn
become things that people become committed to and they too become people's loyalties.
Understood in this way the ethical implications of legacies and invisible loyalties, are not only
applicable and relevant, but also help to clarify the relational orientation of Basotho ethics where
the emphasis is on a healthy give and take between the individual an~ the community. Here too
the idea of community as eo-dependence of persons, highlights further the ethical function and
value of community among the Basotho.
As people we all have loyalties, and often very diverse loyalties. These loyalties influences;the
way we present ourselves as moral agents in the world in all kinds of ways. Because of this we
need a framework by which we determine which of the various loyalties are proper and which ./
are not. The role and function of the community .once again has to be stressed here.
In Sesotho the individual is expected to value the community highly and regard its well-being
as one's responsibility and ultimate purpose. In other words the individual must be loyal and be
seen to be concerned about the good and well being of the community. This loyalty to the ,(
community is that by which all other loyalties were interpreted and evaluated. Because of the
high value placed on loyalty to the community, it does not only become morally significant it ...
r-"
also assumes a normative function . This is because in many ways that loyalty to the community
determines what we do and in part what sort of persons we become. Charles Kammer thus points
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out that whereas worldviews emphasizes the cognitive influences on our moral life, loyalties
emphasize affective influences on our moral life (1988: 23). The loyalty to the community acts
as a link which connects the individual with the basic framework, namely the community which
provides the necessary information in determining what are proper loyalties and which ones are
not. The point about all this is to show that among the Basotho there are certain expectations
about the individual in relation to the community, and that these loyalties and expectations
»
assume a normative function because they become what one ought to do. In other words, they
are the reasons that inform the individual's choice of action, and hence the process by which he ,<'
or she arrives at moral judgments.
5.5 The Community as a Guide to Personal Conduct
Since African ethics has to do with ways of conduct within the context of community, then it
follows that the community would have a significant role to play as a guide to conduct. This is
because as a type of communal ethics, African ethics deals primarily with the question of "what
am I as a member of this particular community supposed to be?" and not so much "what ought
I to do?". The emphasis of such an ethic is, therefore, on "how" the iqdividual arrives at making *
moral decisions. With African ethics the answer is "by way of the community". This means that
the primary source and reference point towards answering this question is the community itself.
In other words if I found myself confronted with a situation in which an ethical decision has to
be made, such as seeing an opportunity to steal some money with a great chance of getting away ./
with this without being caught, I will ask myself the question, "as a Mosotho i.e. a member of
the Basotho community, which has its own ethical standards, are we the sort of people that would
steal if we can get away with it? My answer to this question will be in terms of an answer to
another related question "is this what we do as Basotho?". And it will be on the basis of how
being a Mosotho is understood that I will steal or not steal that money. This means using a
certain range of reasons for acting rather than others. Reasons which have to do with who I am
as a person and member of my community. On this Maclntyre makes a very important
observation when he speaks about the general passing of moral judgements. He says that
up to the present in everyday discourse the habit of speaking of moral judgements as true
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or false persists; but the question of what it is in virtue of which a particular moral
judgment is true or false has come to lack any clear answer (1981: 57).
In African ethics the answer is clear. It is by virtue of people's identity i.e. who they are both
as individuals and as members of communities. It is in this way that Bujo describes the morality
of the African as community focused (cf.Bujo 1992: 22). African morality can thus be described
as anthropocentric and so is the Basotho's. Using the community as the answer to the question
"why do you do what you do?" does not mean a fundamentalist reply such as "I conduct myself
this way because I belong to such and such a community". It is on the contrary a much more
serious act of explaining one's convictions, ideals, goals and ends, factors which not only
influences conduct, but are part of who we are and the way we want to live our lives. What it
means for African ethics is that the people used the community as justification i.e. reason for
their conduct, because the community was like the embodiment of these factors. From here the
person then goes on to show why these are valid reasons for conducting oneself in that particular
community by pointing out that "this is what we" i.e. as this community. In other words what
they Will allow or will not permit themselves to do and not to do. This in turn was further
explained in terms of what "we believe and value as this community" together with the ethical
imperatives involved in being a member of that community.
This was then how Africans came to make judgements of right and ~rong and in turn how the
community was a guide to conduct. This did not mean that individuals acting in this way had no
moral autonomy. As we have said earlier the dynamic relationship or interaction that exists
between the individual and the community ensured this (cf.Bujo 1990: 95). The community as
a kind of family, had conversations, dialogue and participation between members. Besides this,
by choosing to adopt the ethical imperatives of the community, and using that as a guide for
conduct the individual is in fact making those values and ethical imperatives his or her own, and
owns them from the moment he or she chooses to respect them. They are no longer external
guides which he or she still had to decide upon. Rather they are internal qualities belonging to
his or her character.
The freedom to choose to act in a particular way is what guarantees moral autonomy. Even
though as individuals we do not always choose the communities we belong to, we do
nevertheless choose to remain part of them, and hence choose their moral values and thus make
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them our own. By choosing to remain part of these communities both physically and emotionally,
we are, by implication endorsing their moral values as the norm both for our personal lives and
that of others in those same communities.
This is also how we should understand moral autonomy within traditional societies. Another
important point about this is that the person's adoption and owning of these values can not be
a pick and choose reappropriation. It is a commitment to the whole moral system, not a half
.'
hearted commitment. That is not to say that the system can not be challenged or pose problems
even for those within it. Rather it means that any criticism and questioning of the adequacy of
the system, which always happens, is done from the perspective of one from within i.e. starting
on the firm believe in the value of the system as a whole.
Perhaps this is why traditional communities seemed to have had less differences in comparison
to our communities today. It would seems that it was not so much that there were no differences,
because no amount social control no matter how strong can effective do away with all public
unhappiness or descending voices. On the contrary it seems more plausible that there were
unhappiness, but the important difference was that when people did differ and subsequently
criticise the system, they still believed in the system. They were not raising their unhappiness and
differences primarily from the perspective of people who had lost f~th and hope in the whole
system, something which contemporary Africans seem to find very easy to do. This means that
even though important ethical questions of "what am I to do?", were answered in terms of one's
membership to the community, this was not a simply following of what has always been. Rather
it means people explained what they do in terms of the community and commitment to its moral
framework.
Put differently we can say it is by knowing who I am first that I know what I ought to do, and
knowing who we are and what we ought to be is something which we learn by virtue of our
corporate existence Le. living and growing up in community. For members of the community
to do or act in a particular way was, therefore, a consequence of their being or who they were.
As members of the community they were beings that were supposed to do things that will not
harm the good of community and its well being. In other words they ought to be people that live .
according to the will of the community.
In order to avoid a very individualistic interpretation of what was the will of the community,
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which sometimes can have adverse consequences, the priority for its interpretation, was located
in the community and not outside it. In other words the discernment was done within the context
of life in common. When ethics is understood in this sense it means that there can be no radical
dichotomy between ethics and the community which formed its context. This was not only
because of the holistic orientation of the African world view, but also because as we pointed out,
the community as the social setting which gave meaning to ethics was in that sense itself an ethic
.'
for its members.
5.6 Community as a School for Character
According to what we have been saying it will have become apparent that the focus of moral
formation and hence of ethics, for the Basotho was not so much on the decisions that individuals
had to make, but rather on the type of people that would make those decisions. The function of
the community was, therefore, primarily the formation of character and acquisition of its
qualities. The concern of the community and in turn the aim and goal of ethics was the integrity r,
of the persons that it produced and who in turn shaped the quality and nature of the community
which they were apart of. Such an ethic, unlike much of conteme..orary moral attitudes and
modern ethics which places more emphasis on "doings", is primarily concerned with what goes
on before even coming to making those moral decisions. It is concerned with persons or "being"
hence the centrality of character and its formation to such an ethic. By putting great emphasis
on what its members ought to be, the communityp~ its attention not on actions as such, but
rather on persons. The task, therefore, of formation and development of the person's character
was one of the fundamental functions of the community. In this way the community was a school
for character. Describing the moral relevancy of character, Hauerwas quoted by Neville
Richardson, says
character is thus the qualification of our self-agency, formed by our having certain
intentions (and beliefs) rather than others...Our character is our deliberate dispositions to
use a certain range of reasons for our actions rather than others..., for it is by having
reasons and forming our actions accordingly that our character is at once revealed and
molded (1994: 92).
Our character is in this sense a qualification of the way we present ourselves, because it
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expresses the type of person we would like to be. However this is not done through preferential "-
choice, which pays no attention to one's commitment, obligations and communal goals. It is done
rather by habitually doing certain kinds of actions and not others in community. The community
helped members to achieve this by providing them with a context for moral goodness and the
attainment of virtues. In other words the community availed itself as a form of practice in which
the person in communion with others practices moral values and virtues necessary for character
»
formation and development. So our character, Le. the agents' intentional action, is not something
that we possess naturally, nor is it something that people can develop by themselves. It needs the
input of already existing systems of intentions, on the basis of which its further development can
take place.
Among the Basotho character formation meant the community making its members "batho"-
persons, a quality which is acquired by being taught to values certain things and not others and
what are good and bad intentions. The term "motho"- person, therefore, as a statement about
character means a certain level of achievement or performance (through practice), in which one
has shown excellence in moral values and virtues. In other words to be regarded as a person,
"motho", meant one had proven themselves (in the eyes of the community) to be a moral person.
This does not mean that people strove for maximum integration of th~se values and virtues with
their way of life in order to get community recognition. They did so because they valued and
wanted to have "botho"-personhood, whether the community was there to observe or not. On the
other hand if a person failed to prove themselves in this regard Le. to integrate values and virtues
associated with being a person with his life and hence become part of his character, the Basotho
would say of such as person, "ha se motho", he is not a person. In other words such a person
lacked the moral depth and qualities of one who was a person, "motho". While this may be said
of someone in relation to the person's lack of depth, credibility or integrity in various spheres
of life, the meaning behind such usage originates from the moral description of a person and their
lack of moral character.
So even though the significance of character to moral issues may not appear to be that important
in daily life it character is an important component of ethics and it plays a major role in the kind
of people we choose to be as members of the community and moral agents.
Among the Basotho the community played a major role towards the formation of character for
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its members, but this did not mean that individuals had no input in the process. This is because
character as referring primarily to the capacity of the individual for intentional action (Macquarrie
& Childress 1986: 82) cannot happen without the individual's involvement. The only significance
of the community in this was in its influence on the development of character, because one's
character could be very different depending on the nature of the community in which he or she
was formed and grew up. Depending on the type of influence the community was exerting, this
~
capacity to intentional action could either be individualistic or communal in orientation.
Since the Basotho way of live was primarily communal it follows that its influence the character
of its members would be such that it encouraged the spirit of community rather than
individualism. So as the context within which the individual's character was formed, the
community naturally encouraged a communal character in its members. In this sense ethics of
the Basotho resembled Richardson's understanding of Christian ethics whereby the moral
reference prior to any consideration is the character of the Christian person i.e. their identity
(1994: 100). This implies that the main ethical concern would have been the question "what am
I worthy of doing?" rather than "what is right?". As I have pointed out earlier, our identity Le.
who we take ourselves to be is defined partly in terms of the community to which we belong.
For the Basotho community, the goal was to form its members in spch a way that their basic
approach to personal.conduct would be based on their character, where the main consideration
prompting them to action was "what may I permit myself to do in the light of who I am". By
placing the moral weight on character, the focus is not so much on rules and laws or the right
thing to do but rather on what is . worthy of its members. In this way it is the character of the
person that would determined the course of action a person chose. It is, therefore, as Richardson
points out not enough just to ask the general moral question "what is right?" but "what is right
for me?". The latter question requires making a careful consideration of our identity and who we
,
are (Ibid.1994: 91) as members of a particular community. It is in this way that the community
among the Basotho was a school for character.
5.6.1 Moral Formation and Personal Responsibility
The general perception about traditional communities regarding the relationship between the
community and the individual is often an unhealthy one. The picture that is often painted is of
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individuals having no active role in what happens to them. Unfortunately this is not true as we
have shown in the explanation of the African idea of community. Likewise in terms of moral
formation this is not true because as I have pointed out the concern with being a "person" and
acquiring the corresponding quality of character called "botho" was the person's felt need and
as such this was their active role in their own moral formation.
The role 5>f the community in the moral formation for members was such that it taught its
members what were proper intentions and what were bad intentions. As the context within which
character formation took place, the community must be understood as an availing of historical
and cultural setting for the appropriation of grand-narratives and the way of conduct they contain
(cf. Macquarrie & Childress 1986: 83), through the community's grand-narrative, stories of the
good life and in general the purpose of life. The role of the individual in this must be seen as
participatory involvement whereby the individual responds to such grand-narratives or stories.
The response which enables a re-evaluation of one's historical givenness and provides normative
criteria for exercising the capacity for intentional action. In this way the responsibility for moral
formation, will not be something that happens without the active participation of those in being
formed. This role is better understood in terms of what Bujo describes as morality of the heart
(1990: 95). It is important to make this clear because often claims fQr community, particularly
regardingmoral issues, are sometimes perceived as depriving people of personal responsibility.
The impression is that in most traditional societies the individual was so absorbed by the
community that he or she had say in their own life. However a closer look at African morality
of the heart shows that people did in fact ha~ say and an active role towards their own moral
formation and that of others (Ibid.1990: 95). Explaining this Bujo point out that
a deeper insight into African life shows that...he has a deeply embodied moral
consciousness...this is shown by the ...fact that the heart is looked upon as the main seat
of moral life (1990: 98).
According to this the heart is the African way of understanding interiorization of the ethical code,
because from the heart comes forth virtues or vices. It is that which makes a person humanity
and character. In Sesotho one of the commonest ways to describe character is in terms of the
heart, and so we say of person "u pelo e mpe" or "u pelo e ntle", which the good or bad character
of the person respectively. According to African ,ethics it is this capacity of willing good or bad
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that is the essence of personal responsibility and in term moral autonomy.
So even though the African person took responsibility for his or her community, he or she was
personally and most profoundly affected by its ethical demands. He or she did not follow blindly
or automatically the inherited norms and values. Rather the respect of these traditional values and
way of conduct were things that put before the African the choice and the decision for good or
for evil. So through the principle of participatory involvement, the individual made an interior
.decision to respect or not to respect these communal norms and values (Ibid 1990: 97) and by
so doing they expressed their personal responsibility.
Formation of this nature must, therefore, be understood as happening in a dialectical manner or
in a reciprocal relationship, where the community and individual mutually fed into each other.
Moral formation was thus governed by the principles of intersubjectivity and inter-dependency
between the community and the individual. Neville Richardson's description of how character
is shaped makes this point much clearer. He says
the community shapes my character and, reciprocally, my character contributes to the kind
of community of which I am a member (1994: 93).
According to this our membership as moral agents to a community is an important aspect of how
as individuals we are not absolved from personal responsibility in our moral formation.,
Traditional African communities must be seen in this way too, whereby it was only by virtue of
the individual's membership to the community, that he or she was able to account for what is
morally good and bad.
6. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SELF TO ETHICS
Traditional societies were not only unique in the value they placed on community, but also in
the conception of the self that they had. Like community, the African understanding of what it
means to be a person had a significant influence on their ethics. As I said the proverb "motho
ke motho ka batho" is both a statement about community as well as individuality. In order to
understand this with regard to the latter we must ask what sort of relationship between the
community and the individual was envisioned in this proverb. I believe it is in the examination
of this relationship that a clear picture of the African understanding of individuality and
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personhood will emerge. This is important for two reasons. Firstly because much of contemporary
moral attitudes are based on what is taken to be the nature of this relationship, the debate
favouring more and more the individual than the community. As we have pointed out earlier, this
has resulted, in part, in the general confusion and lack of certainty being experienced by
individuals, mainly because people are expected to carry all the moral responsibility on their
shoulders without the necessary corresponding resources as was previously the case . Secondly
."
it is important to take a closer look at this relationship because it is a hint to the understanding
of what is taken to be the nature of humankind and in turn what it means to be a person. And
depending on what our views on this are, we are going to arrive at different moral values. As I
will argue, ethics is largely shaped and given meaning by what is believed to be the nature of
man, i.e. his purposes and ends in life. Morality, therefore, as a code of conduct by which
people both as individuals and collectives live will be coherent with this belief, and it is on the
basis of this belief that certain things are forbidden while others are allowed and encouraged.
This means that our understanding of the self is central to moral questions and differences we
experience. This has significant impact on both private and social morality or how we live our
moral life. For instance if a white farmer believes white people are superior to black people he
may well see it as right to act in a superior manner towards black people working on his farm.
'i4
This will not be the case with someone who believes in the equality of all people irrespective of
their race. To such a person the farmer's conduct will be judged as bad and hence wrong.
This demonstrates how significant our belief about human nature is to the way we conduct
ourselves as moral agents. It is that by virtue of which we say some things are bad and wrong,
and that others are good and right. This implies that the meaning and hence interpretation of
moral concepts or judgements is relative to what we believe as communities to be the nature and
purpose of human beings. Moral terms such as good and right, bad and wrong presuppose what
we believe and taken to be our purposes and ends in life.
In order to understand why certain things are forbidden and others allowed it is imperative to
know the conception of the self informing such judgments. We must unearth the ground upon
which moral concepts grow and see what gives them life. In ordinary discourses this is not
always possible to do. However if we were to analyze our moral arguments in this way we would
find that often there are many more missing premises. We would discover that those that are
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explicit in the argument would be like sub-arguments and that they presupposes other missing
or implicit premises. It is these missing premises that form what I call our basic beliefs or
assumptions.
The reason we are not aware of them is because they form part of our worldviews, and often we
take these for granted, they are like the air we breathe-And since we have interiorised so much
of the contents of our worldviews likewise we have interiorised these assumptions. For this
reason it is impossible to completely disown or rid ourselves of these basic moral assumptions.
They have become a part of who we are and of our moral identity. If I am right the reason for
moral differences lies in that which is assumed and implicit than what is explicit and said. What
this reveals is that depending on what is our understanding of what it means to be a person, we
will most likely arrive at different moral standards or ethical imperatives and indeed different
policies (Sandel 1984: 6). This is because in ethics we commend and forbid certain things on the
basis of
how we determine good and evil, that is to say, on our moral, religious, intellectual,
economic, and aesthetic values; which are, in their turn, bound up with our conception
of man, and of the basic demands of his nature... our solution...is based on our vision, by
which we are consciously or unconsciously guided, of what constitutes a fulfilled ahuman
life (Berlin 1984: 31, my emphasis).
In other words our belief.about the nature of human beings is that by which we are consciously
or unconsciously guided of what constitute a fulfilled human life, and in turn what is good and
bad.
This can be seen in the debate between those on the one hand who follow the Kantian liberal
tradition and those on the other hand who espouse the communitarian ideals or follow the
Aristotelian tradition, where one of the key areas that they differ is on the conception of the self.
In view of our purpose I will not go into this debate" again here. I will only recast the debate
as it concerns the conception of the self that they both suggests.
6.1 The Communitarian Conception of the Self
..
16
Fo r an in depth e xami na t ion o f this debate see Aviner i and Avne r de -Shalit, 1992 . Comrnunita r ianism
and i ndividua lism , Ox fo rd Univers ity Pre s s, a nd Chap ter o ne o f Daly's book Communi taria n ism A New Pu bl i c Eth i cs ,
1994 . .wads:wor t fi Publ i s h ing Compa ny , o r Phi llips D.L . 1994. Looking ba ckward : A c nt lca I Appral s aI o f
Commu n l t a r lan Th ought , Pri nce t o n , NJ : Princ eto n University Press .
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One of the central features of the communitarian position is the significance of narrative to its
account of the self. In this view the self can never be fully understood·as -utterly-distinct from
~ _._---~----_._--- _ ._- ---. __._-- _.._-~ -- .
itssocial.embodiments. A person is _!hll~__understood as .one -who-is-a-bearer-of-roles :and a
~ . -""......n'~ •. " .,. ·_ · ·, • • • •
p~cular social id~I}Jity. Unlike the liberal self which becomes what it chooses to be, the
narrative self is a._~~lL~hoseJife_stQryjs _.~IDbe(tg~d. InJ}1~ st9D~._oLthe _cQmmunity ..from.which
iLQ.~.riv<&jtsjdenti!y (MacIntyre 1981: 205). In this way such a self is never wholly self chosen.
!.!D!f~_is_a1.~J!Ys a j~i~_~K QL~n. .alr~~<:lY .e..xj~i!!&Ji.!o.ry. Such a self is therefore in key part what
iUl}h~.rits, namely a specific past that is prt?sent to some degree in its present (lbid.1981: 206).
Liberals reject this because not only is this seen as running the risk of dissolving the self into a
mere reflection of the various roles imposed by its social positioning (Phillips 1994: 181), but
also because
being so thoroughly embedded in the community, then, the individual is portrayed as
lacking the intellectual independence to examine the community's morality and compare
it either with morality else where or with a set of independent standards (Ibid. 1994: 183).
According to the liberal perspective as individuals we are not bound permanently to live
according to the dictates and within the parameters preset by our social positions and situations.
This is because
no matter how deeply implicated we find ourselves in the roles and practices of our
s~~Jy-,._w..~ ~IJ,JL~~PJlhle_oLquestioning~the~xalue_and_.justificatiQll....QLtllQse_roles_~nd
~ces. And while the specific roles and practices help constitute who we are, we all
have the capacity to envision ourselves without our present relationships and preferences,
and with different ones altogether (Ibid. 1994: 179)
It must be pointed that this seems to be only a theoretical possibility, rather than what is really
the case. Either way it does not take away the fact that while liberalism does not seem to reject
so much the idea that the contents of the individual's aims, preferences, and interests are social,
it does reject the idea of a self constituted by social roles and that one's identity is decisively
determined by factors such as birth, sex, upbringing, race etc. etc. This objection however seems
to be derived from a wrong supposition about the narrative self. In anticipation of such
suppositions MacIntyre pointed out that to say that the self finds its identity from its social roles
does not mean however, as some theorists have supposed, that the self is or becomes
nothing but the social roles which it inherits (cf MacIntyre 1981: 30, my emphasis).
What this means is that the self does not find its moral identity apart from the community. This
78
is because we are who we are, partly due to our history. According to this our individual life
stories form part of a set of interlocking narratives. These carry within them moral expectations
of one who is formed by such narratives Le. rightful obligations and expectations. It is this that
forms the givenness of our lives and identity. As such we have no choice about it because
whether I recognize it or not
I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in individualist mode,
is to deform my present set of relationships (MacIntyre 1981: 205).
It is this attempt to undermine current personal relationships by liberal individualism that gives
rise to the concern with modern societies which are experienced as exhibiting more cases of
frustrated, confused people who feel lost as a result of the lack of common purposes and
meaning. According to the narrative account as agents we do not conduct ourselves only out of
following customs, we do so also as bearers of social roles, and in relating to someone we regard
that person's role or their relationship to us as really making that treatment right. In other words
the fact that a woman is my sister makes it wrong and bad to marry her, and that this man is my
chief makes it right that I respect him. My relationship to these people, as a result of our
membership to a social organism called community makes it obligatory or impermissible to act
in certain ways towards them and permiss~le to act in certain ways (cf. Charlton 1993: 9±). In
this way identifying terms like; father, mother, parents, child, banker, lecturers, judge, minister,
teacher, and many more are essentially designating roles. Roles have an inherent ethical function
and that is they tell us how we ought to relate to and treat one another.
In relating to one another we cannot simply relate to individuals as such. We always relate to
people partly in view of their social roles. I as a student know how I should relate to someone
who is my supervisor on the basis of these roles. The same is true in the case of child-parent
roles. As a child of Mr and Mrs Mokolatsie I know how I am to relate and how I should not
relate to these people as my parents.
This because as people we live as social beings and our activities are conducted with an eye to
these relationships and their corresponding obligations. In other words it is because roles as
denoting and as a way of describing a certain relationship between people e.g. the role of father
which describes the relationship between a parent and child, will always include duties or
obligations to act and refrain from acting in certain ways towards those we are in a relationship
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with (cf. Charlton 1993: 8).
6.1.1 The Self as Situated in Community
According to the narrative account people are essentially beings that are located within social
;;l:i~~~hips, b~ause as Gharles Taylor points out - --
men cannot simply identify themselves as men, but they define themselves more
immediately by their partial community, cultural, linguistic.. confessional, etc. (1984: 193).
,!,his.u.nderstanding of human nature recognises our embeddedness as yeople. 1?~~_.by contrast
to the liberal self the narrative self is a self situated in community. It is not a free floating
...---.._.~ . - --._--- -- -"..- -._- .. - - -- - -,_._------_. --- -. -. ~-
individual with no particular locale as its context. As people we are not born into a moral
vacuum where we have to create our own moral standards, but at the same time this does not
mean that we are inescapably held captive to the moral particularity found in our communities.
Against such an impression MacIntyre says one must notice that
the fact the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in
communities such as those of the family, ...and the tribe does not entail that the self has
to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community (cf.
MacIntyre 1981: 205).
This is because there is-no perfect moral system and members of the community need to be
consciou~of this fact, and in turn be- open to an engagement of their moral tradition in a
critical dialogue both from internal voices and external ones. What is important in this is for the
self to acknowledge the possession of such a moral particularity, unlike the unencumbered liberal
-~- -_ .-- ---,- ..... ,-.......- ._~ - .
self who cannot siIIlPly be identified with any particular moral attitude or point of view
(Ibid.1981: 30). It means that as people with such moral particularity we have a specific moral
starting point from which we can dialogue with other moral particularities.
i The refusal by the liberal self to be identified with any particular moral attitude and insistence
on the centrality of choice for personal conduct seems to serve as a safe guard allowing the
} iberal self to continually recreate itselfin accordance with the demands of preferential choice.
In this sense it is hard to envisage a liberal self as having any consistent character, and in turn
its moral identity is enigmatic and unpredictable. By contrast the situated self is almost
predictable. Its moral identity is consistent because it has a social status Le. roles and obligations.
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As such it does not change significantly in the way it presents itself in the world. This is
because its character and identity are constituted by its social attachments, attachments which
secures enduring qualities of character. And because of this its deliberations go beyond purely
preferential choice. Such deliberations are conducted in view of the suitability to the person "I
already am". I ask as I deliberate not only "what I want" but "who I really am", a question which
takes me beyond an attention to my desires alone to reflect on my character itself (Sandel 1984:
173).
6.2 The Moral Universe of the Self
Besides the conception of the self the narrative account poses a different view about the moral
universe than that of the liberal perspective. Sandel says that the moral universe inhabited by the
independent liberal self is devoid of inherent meaning and that
only in a universe empty of telos,...is it possible to conceive a subject apart from and
prior to its purposes and ends. Only a world ungoverned by a purposive order leaves
principles of justice open to human construction and conceptions of the good to individual
choice (1984: 168).
In other words in such an environment we become perfect self originating sources of valid
J!.
claims. This is the self that has been described by some critics as the democratised self, a self
with no necessary social content and social identity. This becomes possible when the self evades
necessary identification with any particular contingent moral attitude or point of view. In such
a moral universe the self
finds no limits set to that on which it may pass judgement...Everything may be criticised
from whatever standpoint the self has adopted, including the selfs choice of stand point
to adopt (MacIntyre 1981: 30).
In the liberal moral universe to be a moral agent is as MacIntyre points out
precisely to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved,
from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgement on it from
a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social
particularity (Ibid. 1981: 30, my emphasis).
Such a moral habitat that requires total detachment from all social particularity in making moral
judgements, means that the self will naturally find it easy to become anything or take any point
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of view because it is in and of itself nothing. This denial of the fact that we are primarily local
animals as opposed to universal animals, "is an illusion with painful consequences" (cf.MacIntyre
1981: 206), because it has resulted in some moral particularities presenting themselves as
universal and assuming a superior attitude in contact with other moral particularities. MacIntyre's
warning must once again be stressed because as he says
when men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too
easily and too completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave
worse than they would otherwise do (Ibid. 1981: 206).
As moral agents our basic form of existence and identity are located in the local and particular
habitat, and it is from this that we inherit and develop our purposes and ends. The universal
habitat that is suggested by liberalism, through the evasion of particularity, does not only make
of the moral subject a self-created individual whose identity is not only chosen but one who has
no necessary ties with its aims and attachments. Thus Rawls could afford to say that no
transformation of our aims and attachments can cast doubt on our identity because as individuals
we have the moral power to reconstitute, define and pursue our conception of the good, and that
the continuity of our identity is unproblematically assured. No transformation of my aims
and attachments could call into question the person I am, for no such allegiance, however
deeply held, could possibly engage my identity to begin with (Sandel. 1984: 172).
In other words according-to moral environment proposed by liberalism whatever social positions
or attachments I may have as a person they are not constitutive of who I am, nor do they have
any significant moral relevance to my personal identity.
According to the narrative account we can not regard ourselves in this way because we are
basically created animals. To do so will greatly cost us in
those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living
by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-as
members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history...(Ibid
1984: 172).
This is because such loyalties, obligations and convictions are more than just values I happen to
have or inherited or aims I espouse at a given time. They go beyond obligations I voluntarily
incur. They are part of who I am and in part define who I am. As such to imagine a person
incapable of constitutive attachments is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent but to
imagine a person wholly without character and moral depth (Ibid. 1984: 172). Maclntyre in
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similar words describes such a self not only as utterly distinct from its social embodiments and
lacking any rational history of its own, but also as having a certain abstract and ghostly character
(1981: 31).
What we have said about the moral universe of the situated self should not be understood to
mean that the self is locked in history and incapable of reflecting on its history. On the contrary,
as the only creatures thatare self-interpreting, we are indeed able to reflect on our history. What
it means is that we can distance ourselves from our histories, but this distance will always be a
precarious and provisional one. It is one which is never utterly secured outside such a history
(Sandel 1984: 172). In the moral environment suggested by the narrative account even as one
reflects on their history, one knows nevertheless that they are heavily implicated in various ways
in that history.
6.3 The African Understanding of a Person
In this section I want to give a broad articulation of the African understanding of what it meant
to be a person. As I have mentioned the expression "Motho ke rnotho ka batho" is also a
statement about individuality. What will be important is to find out what conception of the self
I!,
is reflected and projected in this expression and in turn how this informs and shapes ethical
conduct. In other words what view of the person do we get from the African worldview and how
does this shape their ethics. In looking at the African understanding of personhood we need to
slightly change our language and as such I will not speak so much about the African conception
of the self because most African people do not think like that. Instead what makes sense to them,
and hence how they would speak: about what we are investigating is how personhood i.e. "botho"
is understood.
While the expression is generally known for its communal ideal, it is at the same time a
description of the relationship of the community to the individual and the significance of the
former to the latter. In other words in this proverb is a rich deposit of how personal identity is
understood within African thought. Following our previous explanation of the meaning of this
,"
proverb, it follows that regarding identity like wise its meaning is centred around the community
i.e. collective identity. According to this then, personal identity is essentially understood in terms
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of the corporate identity. In other words it is in and through its relationships with others that the
self truly finds its identity. In this way the self does could not create or choose its own identity,
just as much as it could not create and choose those social relationships it inherits, which gives
its identity. This means that the individual cannot not be envisioned as utterly distinct from his
or her relations with others. As such a person exists always corporately i.e. in terms of the
family, the clan, the tribe or the village community. The reason is that as Shutte points out
as human subjects,...we depend on the influence, the strictly personal causality, of other
persons for the exercise and growth of this capacity for self-realisation towards fulfilment
(1994: 29).
In other words as people, and more so as moral agents and subjects we are not the sole producers
of personal growth and its development. Others too have an important role to play in my personal
growth. Our growth develops from being both knowing and known subjects. The self is in this
way constituted by an internal relationship to itself Le. knowing and affirming oneself, and also
in relationship to what is other than itself Le. the natural and social environment, and especially
other moral agents (lbid.1994: 27). This is because as Kammer says
the development of our humanity is a collective undertaking. We are largely formed by
the communities of which we are a part, and through our actions, which shape our
communities, we influence the development of ourselves and others. For better or worse
we are inescapably tied to each other and offer each other new possibilities for
development, while placing significant restrictions on each other's development (1988:
141).
According to this human development in each one of us is significantly shaped by our
communities. To be a person, therefore, in the African understanding was closely linked with
living in community. However this in itself was not enough. To be a person implied a particular
way of living with others in community. It had to do with the quality of that relationship. As
such , not just any kind of relationship would do. Living in community was supposed to be valued
and respected. To be a person was then to be able to live well in the community and to value the
common good, which was all the objectives, purposes and ends of the community explicit and
implicit. Describing this Maritain says
the common good of the society is their communion in the good life ; it is therefore
common to the whole and to the parts, to the parts, which are in themselves wholes since
the very notion of person means totality (1986: 94).
A person who did this well i.e. one who did well in being in communion with other in life, as
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I have pointed was thus regarded as a "person" and someone who didn't was regarded as "not
a person"-"hase motho". What was being said and hence the meaning at the heart of this
statement was the person's deliberate failure to live well in community or with others, and to
respect community values often as a result of self centredness, pride, greed and inability to share.
What this shows is that personal identity, according to African thought, was basically communal
or social and as such it was not only the individual who was an end, but rather the corporate
person Le. the individual in community who is the end, and never the individual apart from the
community. In this way the individual would not, as a member of the community be
serving an end separate from him, rather he is serving a larger goal which is the ground
of his identity, for he only is the individual he is in this larger life (Taylor 1984: 182).
This is because in the community as Maritain says the common good
is common to the whole and its parts over which it flows back and which must all benefit
from it. Under pain of being itself denatured, it implies and demands the recognition of
the fundamental rights of the person (1986: 94).
According to this in the community people go beyond the conflict and tension of self-goalfother-
goal. In similar words Bujo says
when we say that, on the grounds of the participation theory, an individual is not in a
position to live outside the community, then the same community must be eager to
promote and to snpport the interests of the individual (Bujo 1990: 97).
Traditionally once the self sets itself apart from the community it loses that status and
significance possessed by batho bao e leng batho-people who are persons Le. selves in
community. It could no longer enjoy the corresponding privileges and treatment but rather those
appropriate only to those who did not belong to the community. The community i.e. the corporate
existence as the end, was that in which all else found their proper significance and meaning
including personal identity. Traditional understanding was that a person becomes conscious of
his or her own personal identity, only in terms of other people, his duties, privileges and
responsibilities towards himself and towards other people. The individual's identity was
understood as being shaped in part by and found in the community. The individual could only
say "I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore, I am" (Mbiti 1969: 141). So in an African
worldview the individual who is stripped of the membership of a variety of social groups in order
to discover the "real self' simply did not exist. The self embodied by the African worldview is
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one which has social roles and obligations.
MacIntyre describing the situation of the self in pre-modern societies says that it was through
his or her membership of a variety of social groups that the individual identifies himself
or herself and is identified by others. I am a brother, cousin and grandson, member of this
household, that village, this tribe. These are not characteristics that belong to human
beings accidentally, to be stripped away in order to discover 'the real me'. They are part
of my substance, defining partially at least and sometimes wholly my obligations and
duties (1981: 32).
In an African view this was precisely how personhood was understood. This did not mean a static
and fixed form of being, but rather being placed and given a certain point in the ongoing journey
i.e. the grand narrative of the particular community. Because the individual could not exist alone
except corporately, he owed his existence to others.
Showing how significant the community was to personal identity and its formation, Mbiti states
that physical birth was not enough in order for the individual to be i.e. have personal identity,
the community had to make, create or produce the individual (1969: 141). It was in this sense
that the community was so important for the African and the way he lives. Without this, without
the presence of the community the African was indeed living in a very precarious situation. Thus
describing the contemporary African situation in which the majority of Africans are increasingly
living in an environment where it is very difficult to become develop this corporate identity,
Mbiti laments that the contemporary African, exposed to modem change, is in a severe strain due
to increasing processess by which individuals become detached from their traditional
environment, leaving them in a vacuum devoid of solid religious foundation.
And not only are they devoid of religious foundation they are also bereft of communal
foundations and solid moral foundation (Mbiti 1970: 3).
. Such foundations i.e. traditions, customs, rituals and history of people not only kept individuals
from dislocating, but also had the effect of instilling confidence about oneself, they made it easy
for people to know what were appropriate intentions and which were not. The common life
ensured by these foundations minimised the feeling of alienation, which comes about when the
individual ceases to define his identity principally by the public experience of the society and
on the contrary, the most meaningful experience, which seems to him most vkal, to touch
most the core of his being, is private. (Taylor 1984: 187).
These foundations enabled individuals not to see the goals, norms or ends which define common
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practices or institutions as irrelevant or even monstrous, or redefine these norms in such a way
that their practices appear a travesty of them (Ibid. 1984: 186).
The status of the individual in an African understanding was, therefore, such that the individual
was an ally of the community or on the side of the community and not on the opposite side. In
such a context and world view, it was hard to imagine a person detached from his or her
community or with aims and goals different from those of his or her community.
7. CHARACTERISTICS OF BASOTHO ETHICS
If ethics is that which has something to do with ways of conduct, and if ethics is a reflection of
a particular people's history in response to questions of who we are and what we ought to be,
and not so much what we ought to do (cf. Hauerwas 1983: 116), then Basotho ethics will be a
reflection of their self understanding of who they are and ought to be. We have seen that as
Hauerwas says all ethical reflection occurs relative to a particular time and place, necessitating
what he calls a qualified ethic. Consequently ethics always requires an adjective or a qualifier
(1983: 1). This is important because even though ethics does
address an identifiable set of relatively constant questions-the nature of the good or right,
freedom and the "nature of human behaviour, the place and status of rules and virtues-
...any response to these questions necessarily draws on the particular convictions of
historic communities to whom such questions may have significantly different meanings
(Ibid. 1983: 1).
In other words ethics will always be contextual whereby it will reflect particular convictions,
goals and values that each community regards as important. For the Basotho one of these
convictions was community as a communion among people in a common life and the unity
thereof. Like most African peoples they understood life as a unity in which there is no separation
between the ethical and the social, between morality and religion or religion and life in general.
As such their way of conduct or ethics was weaved in all these aspects of life, and in turn was
shaped by them.
At a first glance it is not very obvious how the African worldview influenced and shaped their
approach or attitude to ethics. I have already shown how this belief formed the basis fur the sense
( '
of community among the African people. Here I want to show how this belief is the rationale and
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basis for the communal nature of African ethics.
The emphasis by the African worldview on the basic unity of all things (cf. Kinoti 1992: 76)
implied that the same unity ought to apply to human beings too. So according to traditional
thought, it would not have made sense that human beings would be in communion with nature
but not with one another. This means that people were not only expected to be in communion
with one another, it was what they ought to be. The kind of communion required was that in
which there is a strong sense of belonging, commitment and accountability to one another. Such
a communion meant that people approached life i.e. theirs and that of others as communal
responsibility.
Such a view of life had implications to other aspects of life, and in particular the moral life. In
this sphere it meant that people were to be in communion with one another regarding personal
conduct. Being in communion with another in this sense means eo-responsibility and a sense of
common duty towards ways of conduct. It is in this sense that African ethics was communal.
This makes sense because personal conduct as an aspect of the community's life formed part of
the common good and as such could not be wholly an individual responsibility nor could it be
equally become a private matter. In other words this aspect of life like all others, was subject
to the logic of communal living i.e. communion in a common life including the moral life. It is
f;
in this way that the link between the experience and concept of community and African ethics
is neither accidental nor incidental. It is essential.
In order to understand ethics of Africa this link must not only be known but be maintained. This
is because the community is the primary context giving African ethics its meaning, authority and
significance. In other words the experience of community is fundamental to a proper
understanding of African ethical traditions and moral practices.
Because of this traditional African ethics was primarily communitarian in orientation and hence
it could only be intelligible within that context. Unlike contemRorary Western ethics where
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a communal practice in which the existence of the community stood in a substantive way towards.-
being perfect at it. We can thus ,Q~s9jhe .sJJ,<:.:h".,~"~"."~5~£.J!§.J!!!, et_~ic_!D.Et tQQk .R.ri<ie_ofits_c~onteXJ_'__,
This is what contemporary African ethics needs to do and in the process maintain that contextual
88
perspective. This means that as an ethic that is closely connected to its context, it must allow
Africans to be able to reflect on their history and in this sense distance themselves from it, while
at the .same time being aware that such a distance is always precarious and provisional and that
the point of reflection is never fully secured outside that history itself (Sandel 1994: 172).
As an ethical reflection it should aim at helping Africans to achieve some degree of independence
to allow them to transcend and suspend their own loyalties and worldviews temporarily, so that
they can see more clearly who they are (cf.Kammer 1988:26), and having reflected on this know
what they ought to be and in turn what they can and cannot do, what they will allow themselves
to do and refrain themselves from doing. This will keep African ethical reflection not only
closely linked to its context but always remain true to its context.
Stanley Hauerwas, arguing against universalisation of ethics describes ethics as a reflection of
a particular people's history and experience (1983: 96). This means that ethics is not only
contextual but also historical. According to this then contemporary African ethics over and above
being true to its context, will have to reflect the history and experience of the African people
particularly their moral tradition.
This is very important in the light of the individualistic nature of contemporary ways of conduct.
As such it is also important to be aware that history as a st~ry or an account of human
~
experiences is always of a people and not of individuals. So when it is said ethics is a reflection
of history, it is history in this sense. Communities have histories and not individuals. Only
through the history of the community can the person speak of having a history. These histories
contain not only historical facts, but also people's moral traditions, values, aims and goals. This
means that as we reflect on ethics of Africa we need to examine their history in particular their
traditions as they unfold and are enacted in their lives, particularly in their communities.
This is because in these communities chapters and chapters have been written and continue to
be written about ethics and many other aspects of the African way of life. I say continue to be
written because the community is not a static thing, it is a living and evolving reality. The village
community that my mother belonged to as a little girl in the remote parts of Lesotho, was not
the same community I grew up in when I lived there with my grandmother. In many ways it had
."
changed and yet in more fundamental ways it had not e.g. most of its values were still the same.
To fully understand this one has to experience and be fully familiar with the African way of life
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in particular the experience of community in its local variance. How this is interpreted will often
depend on the local variation of that experience and conception of community.
For this reason African ethics as a reflection on the moral life of African peoples and the
adequacy of their norms and values can never be understood or studied in abstract concepts. This
is because African ethics is always situated in a specific social context. As an ethical reflection
it is best done by taking note of how common African ethical concepts and experiences often
take on local variance. It cannot be understood in the same way ethics has generally come to be
understood in the West where it has the status of a separate discipline. Rather African ethics will
be an inclusive account in which religion, culture and the political life of the people all have a
part to play in one time or another. By contrast with much of western ethics, African ethics is
not a separate compartment of life, nor is it a set of dogmas or do's and don'ts. It is a way of
life founded on the logic of communal living. That is why the community is not only important
but central to it. This is particularly significant in the context of modern Africa, where as in so
many places, the democratization of society and indeed of the individual has meant an over
emphasis on the individual and their rights on the one hand, and a loss of the sense of
community on the other.
As such any study of African ethical traditions and moral practice which begins with the
.,. < , ';/: ~1
complacent assumption that the community is less important than individuals and devalues the--:>r-::- I
.' . I ' '
moral significance of communal obligations, is going to fail to understand the logic of the moral
thought and practice of the African. Secondly a study of African ethics that does not recognize
internal links with its context, i.e. the community, will remain superficial and fail. It will fail
because a way of conduct informed by other conception of reality like the individualist bourgeois
or liberal capitalists, and is lived within the framework of free choice and rights, will espouse
very different set of values from a way of life based upon kutloano - friendship, where the bond
of friendship is the common good. Here personal conduct is informed and influenced by concerns
with communal solidarity, sharing and mutual care of one another. While the one emphasises
freedom and autonomy of the individual, and places the primary locus of ethics on the individual,
the other by contrast stresses a dialectical relationship between the individual and the community.
t"
A relationship in which social roles and obligations due to each member are important aspects
of the community as the primary locus for morality. Because of the significance of the experience
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of community life African ethics is, therefore, by definition, communal ethics. Owing its origin
from traditional morality, it is an ethic that centres and emerges from communities. It is an ethic
from "below" and not from "above" and it gets its social content and meaning from its context
i.e. the community. In other words it will not be individualistic in approach or tone but rather
communal.
7.1 The Primacy of Good over Right
The proverb motho ke motho ka batho as a statement about community points to life in common
or being community as the object of desire which everyone was encouraged to be. As an object
of desire community was at the same time an ideal to which the community aspired. According
to traditional thought it seems it was desired because it was thought to be good and not because
it was right. So to live as closely as possible to this ideal was regarded first as good and only
afterwards as right.
In this way the proverb is an implicit statement about the priority of good over right in moral
judgments among the Basotho. Goodness as the ability to accomplish some desired end or goal
is thus differentiated from right which has to do with conformance to rules or principles (cf.
Kammer 1988: 84). However this should not be understood in exclusive terms. Rather that the
priority is placed on ability to do good and sometimes in order to do this there is a need to
observe certain norms.
So according to traditional thought and practice, what was right was essentially linked with the
good, and the good is that of the community or the common good. This means that the good of
the community" in addition to that of its members was that on the basis of which the Basotho
made evaluations and determined rightness of conduct So the value of community among the
Basotho as we have just seen, was such that its wellbeing and good were major factors
influencing personal conduct
This reveals another character of ethics among Basotho, and that is it~s teleogical perspective.
..
17
• Because the African worldview and their communities in general emphasised the oneness of all things,
the common good i.e the good of the community as a collective must be understood in the most encompassing
manner, where it does not only mean~ the good for humans.
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by the people express exactly what it denotes, that which is ugly or dirty. To say, therefore, that
something "e mpe" meant that it was morally ugly and dirty, and it was because it was thus that
it was wrong~ This was and still is the basic pattern for making moral judgements in Sesotho.
Evaluations and judgements are not made in terms of what is right and wrong, rather in terms
of what is good and bad. In other words among Basotho it was the latter that formed the
underlying basis of most judgements of right and wrong. The prevalence of the concept "babe"
and "botle" (goodness) in the moral language of Basotho means that for them it would make no
sense to speak of moral judgements apart from the idea of goodness and ugliness. The activity
of evaluating conduct was intrinsically linked to the idea of goodness, specifically the common
good which was their purpose and an end which they aimed for.
This shows the extent to which Basotho ethics was teleogical. Because of this a full explanation
of their behaviour required some reference to the value they attach to the community as a
common good and purpose. This is because as Sandel says
we must consider people's aims and values if we want to understand who they are. We
cannot analyze their behaviour as if they were abstract entities, as if their values existed
somewhere in the distance, 'outside', so to speak (Avineri & de-Shalit 1992: 3).
As people we value and aim for certain things because we see those things as good. This is
ultimately the process by' which we make moral judgements i.e. in terms of what we see as good.
~
In African ethics this was in terms of what was good in its most broadest sense Le. common
good. In other words something was judged right or wrong because it was good or bad and in
turn this was assessed in terms of the common good Le. well being of the community.
7.2 Community as the Moral Sovereign
One of the basic features of ethics as found among Basotho and Africans in general was that it
starts from the basic premise that moral sovereignty rests with the community. It begins from the
conviction that morality is the thing of and designed for communal living and practice. It is
because of this that African ethics is primarily relational ethics. It is ethics derived from the
relationships that obtain between people as inter-dependent social beings who bear social roles.
Social roles which map out how people are to act towards one another and how not to act
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towards one another. In other words "because this lady is older than me", by which reference is
to her social role and public status as an elder, "it is good and, therefore, right that I respect her",
or "that this person is my sister she cannot marry me":' In other words because of the type of
relationship obtaining between us, brother-sister in the case of the latter, and older-younger in
the former, it is proper that I treat them -and they treat me- according to the way people related
in that way are to relate to each other.
Within the moral framework that does not recognize communal roles and their inherent normative
function this sort of judgement will appear suspect and irrational. According to such a moral view
ways of conduct are a purely personal matter which is not socially dependent. In other words the
community or society has nothing to do with personal conduct. This is not true. Personal conduct
always has social implications. It cannot just be that which affects me as an individual, and for
the Basotho this is why it made sense that moral sovereignty be with the community and not the
individual.
Take for instance the case of suicide. For many people this is regarded as wrong and often there
is a strong social reaction to it The reason for this is the implicit belief that individuals have
no right to take their own lives. If this is so, the question is "who then has the right to determine
what is wrong and what is right, if not the individual?". The answer will be found in the
underlying assumptions t>ehind such social attitudes and reactions.
Often underlying such social reactions is an important, but often unacknowledged, truth about
moral judgments, namely that they derive their normative authority from the community.
Personal conduct is not just a matter solely for the individual. It is also in part the business of
the community. It is in this sense that a way of conduct that condones or involves things like
promiscuity, dishonesty, lying or selfishness are disapproved in many communities. In the case
of someone killing himself the strong social reaction is an implicit reprimand to the individual
concerned in which the person is, as it were, being asked "who told you that can do that when
we, the community clearly have not said so?"
Although it is not always explicitly stated or acknowledged the priority to determine what is right
and wrong, and what is good and bad, does not always rest with the individual. It may be argued
that in practice it is individuals who make decisions not the community and this is true, but even
here those decision are more often than not consistent with generally held standards of conduct.
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So even though at times it may appear as if moral sovereignty rests with individuals, something
which contemporary moral attitudes wants us to believe, this is nevertheless done within the
framework of what the society upholds. In others words such sovereignty, where it exists, must
be understood as conferred upon the person and as such subject and subordinate to the higher
level of authority. It is important to stress this because often the moral atmosphere in which
ethical decisions are made in modem society is one in which on the one hand, at the conscious
level, an impression has been created that the choice is with the individual to make moral
decisions, while on the other hand, at the subconscious level, there is a deep seated belief that
it is with the community. This tension is no where clearly visible as in the thorny issues of
abortion, prostitution and gay marriages, where in spite of modem attempts to spread the gospel
of rights, autonomy of the individual and free choice, the society has not given up the moral
claim to these ways of conduct
This goes to show that it is not entirely true that individuals have the final word in what happens
to their lives. If it was so then there is no reason for all the emotions and in some case violent
behaviour about some of these issues. The fact that one finds the public so divided on such issues
shows that the moral sovereignty on this particular issue at least, if not on almost all major moral
issues, does not lie entirely with the individual as liberalism suggests. The extentfto which
~ .
governments ensures that there is enough consultation before making any decision on such issues
as abortion is also indicative of how strong is the community's claim as the moral sovereign, as
opposed to individuals.
Among traditional Basotho communities this claim was even more forceful. The reason is that
in their understanding, and this should not be taken lightly by contemporary Basotho, ethics and
morality consisted in real relationships among people which are defined in terms of social roles,
and social roles are properly categories found within a community and not individuals. They
describe relationships more than personal descriptions. This can be seen in the terms like father,
mother, brother, sister, child, lecturer, priest, woman or banker. These terms do not only denote
personal identity and ones status in a hierarchical structure.
What is more important about social roles is that they also describe they way people are related
,"
i.e. a social relationship. They tell us how we are to act towards one another and how not to act
towards one another, which is what ethics is all about. The community as a moral sovereign is
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an arena of practical relationships and whence it is there that the drama of morality and ethics
is played out. It is in this sense that the individual can not be a moral sovereign.
7.3 Ethics as a Communal Enterprise
In the previous section we saw that among the Basotho the understanding was that moral
sovereignty did not rest entirely with the individual. However this should not be understood as
saying that ethics was therefore entirely the responsibility and business of the community either.
Such a mutually exclusive "either or" interpretation of ethical approach can not be applied to
Basotho because for them ethics, like other aspect of their life, functioned within the framework
of community, community as a eo-dependence or inter-subjectivity of persons. This means that
ethics was going to be lived by the principle of eo-responsibility. According to this individuals
never exist solely as individuals. They are always members of their communities and in what
ever they do they reflected something of the community from which they come, because they are }
representative of their own communities. That is why ethics is, in the least, a eo-responsibility ~
/ -,
between the community and its individual members. In other words a communal enterprise. /
For this reason the individual's way of conduct was necessarily of concern to, and the \
responsibility, of the corilmunity and as the term suggests eo-responsibility requires the active )
/
participation all those involved i.e. participation of individuals. This happened through the (
principle of participatory involvement by the individual in ethics as a communal practice. To this
Bujo says that freedom and the ethical responsibility of the individual within the black
community is attained through the reciprocal relationship between the community and the
individual (1990: 97). Such a participation will always be in communion with others, and never
apart from others because as a common practice, ethics is something that has to be practised
together. Such an attitude to ethics makes it essentially a communal enterprise. Among the
Basotho this was how ways of conduct were understood: a joint responsibility of the individuals
and the community. This meant that even though in practice it was individuals who give the
concrete social expression of ethics this was done with a clear consciousness on the part of the..
individual, that what ever they do is a reflection of their community, because they embody the
ideals of the community. As such their way of conduct was not just theirs alone but the
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community's as well. This meant that individuals approached personal conduct with much
greater awareness of its communal dimension that perhaps is the case nowadays.
So even at this seemingly personal level ethics remained a communal enterprise in its application. .
This implies that it can not then be something that is solely my responsibility which I can do as
I please or rather as I choose with it. In fesotho for instance if some one had done something
wrong this became a communal matter. The whole community would be involved in dealing with
it through the village gathering or "pitso'" : These gatherings had a moral function which gave
expression to the community's moral responsibility and role regarding personal conduct. This
could be seen in cases where a crime or an offence has been committed. At the "pitso" which
was attended by every adult person, the issue would be presented and discussed. The people
involved would be reprimanded or punished in front of the whole community gathered there
because often crimes were not only seen as criminal offenses but also as moral offenses, due to
their impact on the wellbeing of the community. For example if children, say boys stole someone
else's mealies they would be brought to the "pitso" and all their age mates would also be
summoned to be present. The "bad boys" would be caned in full view of their peers. What is
significant that the boys who were innocent were also called,
The reasoning behind this is that as part of its moral function Le. formation of its younger
members, the community shows the other boys by this act what not to be. This is because in
Sesotho it is believed that it is important that the wrong doer Le. the person not so much the
deed, must be corrected in public so that he can not teach others, because as we say in sesotho
"u tla ruta ntsi" (Sekese 1994: 69), "he will teach others" . In other words a person who did
something unbecoming was as it were being presented to the rest of the community as an
example of a bad person. In this way the community would be saying to those present "this is
not what we are as this particular people" and in turn what you should not be i.e. by doing such
deeds or conducting yourself in that fashion.
What becomes clear out of all this is two things: First there is the common moral formation of
the young generation . Secondly there is the common moral responsibility by the community. All
."18 .
. Th ,S seems t o be a development from the traditional ' kh o t l a", the chiefs pu b li c court , which wa s
o n l y attended by men (cf . Ca sal is 18 61 : 124; Beren~ 1987 : 70ff) . But a vi l lage ' p i t s o' tha t I am ta l king about
w~s meant f or al l adu lts , male and fema le because l t was here t hat legal a nd some admi nist rative ma t t e r s we r e
dlscussed .
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this goes to show the degree to which ethics among the Basotho was a communal affair. For
them ethics as a communal practice, therefore, was thus oriented to what is acceptable human
conduct and manner of speech that allow order and peace in the community. Eugene Casalis,
describing this said of the Basotho that
morality among these people depends so entirely upon social order, that all political
disorganization is immediately followed by a state of degeneracy, which the re-
establishment of order alone can rectify (1861: 302).
What Casalis calls political disorganization is in fact the break down of community, particularly
shared beliefs and common values at all levels from the smallest scale of the family community
to the largest scale of the national community. From this we can see that the main thrust behind
this type of ethic was the community and not so much individuals. This is because according to
traditional thought and general understanding of Basotho, what may be called rules of conduct
were not primarily for the individuals' conduct in relation to themselves. Rather they were for
the individual's conduct in relation to the community i.e. social relationships between peoples.
This is perhaps the chief difference between an ethic expressed by African traditional morality
and Western ethics. According to traditional African morality it is clear that rules are not
primarily about the well being of the individual, but rather of the community. Most of these
rules were simply known through tradition and were passed down the ages through communal
legacies and customs.
The community as the hallmark of ethics among the Basotho was, therefore, the basic framework
upon which all other ethical imperatives found their true meaning. And within the larger
spectrum of their worldview, community was one of the most fundamental aspects of their life,
giving coherence, meaning and rationale to their moral norms and values. Ethics was thus
communal both in practice and in the way it was thought about. It is because of this that their
experience of community was very central to how they arrive at making moral judgements. This
means that ethics as a communal enterprise is concerned primarily with the horizontal plane, i.e.
relationships between people. Its area of operation is in the here and now of inter-personal
relationships. Its orientation is "this worldly" and not "other worldly". Like many Africans the
moral order of the Basotho was seen as a matter not of the relations between human"beings and
God, but of the relationships between human beings themselves in their communal living (cf.
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Bujo 1992: 32). This means that as regards relationships with the ancestors and ultimately with
the supreme being, these could only be right and authentic if social relationships on the horizontal
plane were in order. In other words if there was "kutloano" Le. living together in friendly inter-
personal relationships. Without this any such relationship would be false. I will, therefore, argue
that one will find no reference within traditional Basotho morality of an offence against the deity
and that any such reference in which moral conduct is described directly in terms of the ancestors
or God is the influence of Christianity and Christian upbringing. This implies that these
relationships did not play a leading role in this regard. However this does not mean that they
were not important To be sure such relationships were very important as can be seen in the case
of ancestors. It must be stressed that the moral life was not lived in direct reference to these or
as the primary moral reference point guiding ways of conduct.
Ethics among the Basotho was situated and functioned not only on the horizontal plane it was
also a practice to be practised communally and properly the game to be played on this plane.
7.4 Problems in Basotho Ethics
The picture of ethics that I have presented has said very little about the weaknesses and problems
of the ethical model I ha~e presented. Before looking some of these problems it is important that
we understand how the situation that will be described as problems has come about. Since I have
argued that most of the problems in Africa have come about as a result of modernity, we need
to understand how modernity works and in particular what happens when it interfaces with other
cultures. The best way to describe this and one which I found very helpful is one in which the
project of modernity has been compared to a luxury passenger bus, like Greyhound or Translux.
According to this the most distinctive feature of modernity and its mode of operation in relation
to other cultures is that either they climb aboard or get run over. Modernity and modernism allow
no alternative forms of social institutions and cultural expressions.
African communities have been the worst hit by this attitude. Contrary to the widely held
assumption that these communities have no room for plurality, and as anyone who has
experienced modernity from the outsiders' position will know, it is modernity that is most
intolerant of other cultural attitudes. Life in the modem is lived on subtle fixed rules with less
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room for plurality than was before. So every aspect of life has nicely been placed into a
particular category or partition and as such we have our private life, love life, public life,
religious life and not only are these not to be mixed in anyone time, they each have their own
fixed rules and modes of behaviour. As such it would not be seen in good light today to let your
love life influence your public function e.g. choosing to hire someone because they are your
boyfriend's sister. In the economic sphere liberal capitalism is the way to go, any other form of
~
economic arrangement is tactfully made to appear as self defeating and labelled as uneconomical,
when in fact it has not been given room at all.
The modernity bus with its heavy luggage of modem ethical standards was particularly hostile
and uncompromising when it interfaced with traditional African morality. There was no room for
dialogue and most probably no "time", that most revered modem concept. African culture was
thus left with only two options since it could not run away nor keep the bus from coming. It
either had to climb aboard or curl itself, eyes closed and hold its head and wait to be run over.
For many cultures the latter was no alternative and so they climbed aboard with their baggage
of traditional morality. However since in the modem luggage is limited to so many kilos, many
of these African passengers were forced to reduce their luggage and take only what they
considered essential. So they did, right there on the road side. With ~pry little "time" they were
given, mind you the bus has a strict time schedule, they sorted their belongings, took what they
could and left the rest. Many of these items were run over by the bus as it continued on its
journey. Many reflections by Africans on their culture such as this one are reflections en route.
They are written on board the modernity bus with its tempting comforts and luxuries.
As such to speak as if one were entirelyfree from its influences is not only impossible but is
simply being dishonest. This is important to say because often critiques of modernity like this
one, are sometimes quickly dismissed, by pointing out that those making them are themselves
typical products and beneficiaries of modernity. As a friend of mine Sipho once said in seminar
when I was presenting my proposal " Chris is the right person to talk about adulteration of
African culture, because he is a living example of this by wearing a cap indoors". What Sipho
was saying was true. Many of us have not been and are not immune from the influences of
modernity, and it is precisely because of this that we are critical of modernity or as Kinoti
pointed out 9 as the new emergent African, Westeni educated and Christianized we are
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indeed something of a caricature, least pleasing to oursleves (cf. Kinoti 1992: 80). So in many
ways such critiques should not only be seen as a way of addressing the reality of contemporary
African culture by these individuals, but also as addressing the same reality in one's own life.
The imaginary scenario of the luxury bus, seems to be the best way to tell the story and explain
the moral problems of contemporary African societies. As I hope to show it will be in
understanding this story that many of the problems in African ethics can be understood with
better clarity.
We all know what happens if you pack in a rush as many of the African cultures had to. Many
of the essential things get left behind, and either upon arrival or on the way you discover that
you have brought a whole range of single items that are supposed to be in pairs. e.g. socks
something I always do. With out the other pair these socks are pretty useless. If in spite of this
.you go ahead and use them i.e. wear different colour socks for instance, you will not only look
funny ,but the whole thing begins to make no sense, unless you are clown. This is because those
socks no longer serve the purpose or an end for which they were designed for as pair. They may
well be able to perform certain functions, but not the purpose they were meant for such as
looking decent by not wearing socks of different colours is one of them.
This is largely what happened to African ethical traditions with the advent of modernity. In the
rush to get on board many of the essentials of traditional morality were left behind and a whole
range of single items or fragments were taken. Among the essentials that were left behind, or
rather correctly which are not present in the modem is the communal moral framework within
which the various African values and virtues functioned and found meaning. Without this many
of these are like single items. They are fragments which not only do we not understand but are
often vulnerable to abuse. The communal moral framework, of which I am not sure would have
been allowed on board, ensured that this does not happen. Along with it was the social
organization that concretized the social application of its moral values and virtues. One such
institution beside the family was the community which unfortunately many African cultures were
not able to bring along with them.
Most of them managed to bring aspects of traditional morality e.g. communal solidarity, sharing,
giving of gifts to people of authority, respect for authority and many more, and in the context
of the modem framework all these are like fragments of a moral framework that has seriously
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been damaged. Because of this, that which bonded them together has been lost and as such they
are made to function without that vital guiding principle i.e. community. In other words for their
meaningful use and function they need the moral framework and corresponding socio-political
organization which gave coherency to their application. Without these they are vulnerable to
abuse and misuse. This is where many of the problems in African ethics derive.
In other words the situation is similar to MacIntyre's view of the status of contemporary language
"
of morality. According to him
in the actual world which we inhabit the language of morality is in the ... state of grave
disorder... what we possess...are fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack
those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of
morality...(l981: 2[).
Contemporary African moral environment bear many similarities with this analyses, and I believe
it is these fragments and their use in the context of modem ethical systems that constitute the
bulk of what we now experience as problems in African ethics. The reason is that as Kasenene
points out many people have found it difficult to smoothly intergrate traditional values with
Western ethical values, because
on the one hand there is the African ethics which is based on a different type of social
organization, political system and economic structure; a base which emphasises communal
solidarity, appreciation of authority with gifts, unity of persbn and office, respect for
seniority... On the other hand there is the Western philosophical system emphasising
impartiality, accountability, individual responsibility and a separation of office from one's
personal life (1993: 6-7).
With modernization of African communities, new socio-political and economic systems and
,organizations have been introduced and it is within the context of these new types of social
organization and systems that the problems in African ethics must be seen. I will look at some
of these problems and attempt to trace their socio-cultural origins. It is only in knowing this that
I believe we can be able to effectively deal with them by exploring and devising appropriate
measures. For this purpose I will borrow a lot from Peter Kasenene's reflection on the subject
and his outline of problems facing African ethics. .
7.4.1 Communalism or Nepotism
As I have already pointed out earlier, according to African thought "motho ke motho ka batho".
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Affording_to this belongillgj LQLthe__~~s~j}C:~ 2LQne'~~x~~t~?ce. The individual only becomes
aware of their own being and identity in terms of the other. As such one of the highly regarded-- - - - ~'----'----' --'-'- -----.------ -
values was the welfar~_~ithe c~_~~~~_ ?r._¥_~~~_to~-~ich 0£!eJ2~19_~g~d. In ~sotho for instance
we say 11metla khola u e lebisa ho oabo", which denotes the idea that in your fortunes always
remember your own kind i.e. family, relatives, friends or your group. Azariele Sekese says the
PIQYer~-II>eans-that-when-a-pers0n-has -found-a·-foFtune-he-must-not"forget--:-l)i,s,-people (1994: 98).
This idea is again found in another proverb "Bana ba khoale ba bitsana ka mololi'?" (Ibid.
1994: 52). In all these people are discouraged from keeping fortunes to themselves, but to think
- ~••• 'v._···.•'- ._.__ ...'''~- . _...,...__.......~_~_,_~. _ .~_•._ . , .,.., •..•_ _~ ••, .~ ._- ~ .•.~.... ~_.__ .._....".,_ •.c •• _ •• • ••_ ...,..".• • ~ • •• , _ _ ~._ •• ,~,, _ " ,
of other.members of. the community. This kind of understanding of common welfare and-the
i;di~idUal~S~~I'!~~_i.~_.~_t _h_~ s.~ri~_U~-~thical implications in the modern way of living@ractice /'
- .- - '
WIthin a social organization that has no place for communal solidarity will seem to be nothing
otherjhan.blatant.nepojjsm, particularly with regards to places of work and public offices.
~ -----:---- - ~ . ~- -_._ . - -- ..-.-~-~----- -- -'- ._- .- ----.- - - ._-- -'-~- ~.---_.~-
- -
CommunaLS.91idari~y__;:lS ._~ \V'!Y_9f,_ lif~_j!L:whi~!L.~~_~ng plays an important role thus seems
~•.,,~ ~_ ""'b,,·,~ ," ~ __.._- ,. "._,_" ...,,,-. ~, .•... _~ "'_""~.••_,..•..~•., '~." " " ._
incompatible ~!lLsocio-::polit!~~ _ and~onomicc systems of __modernity which encourages
-=:... . - _.. - ....._...
individualism and demands impartiality. Such systems with their corresponding conception of the-----_..............._~--,....._""~_..,_..-..,.-.""...-...." _. ,-
person are key to understanding the phenomenon of nepotism e.g. in public service.
Many Africans who render public services and hold public offices eften find themselves in a
dilemma and uncomfortable situation as a result of being subjected to Western assumptions upon
which much of modem work ethic is based. Many of these people were not only raised within
a social framework that does not make a distinction between the person and his office, they have
also inherited elements of a cultural background that values communal solidarity, sharing, and
mutual aid to one's family or community (Kasenene 1993: 10). In the modern these have been
stripped of any public status. At best they are values appropriate for one's private conduct. So
many people have been forced to make a distinction between private and pubic spheres, a
dichotomy which is not part of their worldview. All this has resulted in a situation where by that
which was good within a particular social organization e.g. communalism has developed and
become something bad i.e. nepotism.
19
• This proverb derives i t s meaning from the ob l i ga t ions bro the r s have t owards one a nother when t hey
are in a battle. They are being t old i n thi s proverb that their responsibility i s to look after one a no t he r
other and seek one an other when the home side is l oos ing .
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The challenge then for African ethics is to become a tool for social analysis that will enable
Africans to understand better, both as individuals and communities, how this transformation
happened. Having done this African ethics will then enable us and lead us to explore and
identify, within the new types of social organizations, areas in which values such as
communalism can be legitimately practised and encouraged, without the current misuse and
abuses. What has happened is that because of the prevalence of nepotism even the good that is
,"
found in communalism tends to be lost. As a result communal solidarity is increasingly
disappearing from all aspects of life today, to the extent that even where we live or the so called
private lives e.g. in our homes, neighbourhood or communities we find it difficult to be
community.
The truth is that we can not turn back the clock and go back to old social organizations in which
it was possible and easy to practice communalism in almost every sphere of lives, but we can
certainly stop the modern work ethic and individualistic spirit of liberal capitalism creeping into
our communities and relationships. In other words African values will need to be redefined
bearing in mind the living conditions of modem life style. Values like communal solidarity e.g.
with relatives will need to be carefully watched so that it doesn't become a cover up for the
abuse of the person's kindness by relatives or the community. 'i4
In the changed modern conditions not only are these traditional values vulnerable to misuse due
to the demanding nature of the individualistic modem life styles, but as Bujo points out, in some
cases unadapted practice of some of these traditional notions provide room for injustices e.g..
solidarity where it can be used in a discriminatory fashion to those not belonging to one's own
group (1990: 102). African ethics as an ethical reflection must help us to see through current
distortions and avoid destructive alternativ71 by defining the border line between the genuine
obligations of charity on the one hand and exploitation or parasitism on the other.
7.4.2 Authority or Power
Another grey area within contemporary African societies is that between authority and power.
The line between these two is so fine that the danger of slipping from the former to latter is a
real one. We have already seen that according to traditional morality the person's concern with
and striving for the common good or welfare of the community was not only regarded as good
104
but was encouraged. This.means .thatwithin-the.African way ()fJife beneficenceJ)e9alll~_ ,Ll1!gl1Jy
valued virtue and often commenged. A~~X~~!.1J!jL~'J!S not§(['!Qg~J9r people to take initiatives
-- . - . .___-."_ t - - ...._~...~ -- -~_ ,,__4<._ ,. ,_ , _ .. _' '-' _ ~ _ ...... '"'_" ,
and sometimes even commit sacrifices to bring good for the community.
___ - ;;;:;_,_..-.-- - ---.•.~--_·_...._--,_ .._ -..........N~--,..,.,.·~-"""-·.." ....,- ...·-'""'-c,..... .<"""'.,.,,.......,"'._ ... -~..__~__..._";O
On the socio-political level this often lead to a kind of paternalism, in particular regarding the
relationship of the leader and those whom he leads. This was because in an African community
the leader, was also regarded as the custodjan_o f.Jhe_coIJ1.!!1unity's welfare. The leader had
.a ~- ---~-~.__ ._ ......
authority even to make and tak~ ~Q.~isions when necessary on behalf of the community (Kasenene
• • • _-c _ . - '.' -> - ~ - - --.. -"--'--_.~----" '---.- -~~--.""-- .-,<""~"""'.'--""----~"""""""--."" - "'''''''.
1993: 15). The reasoning behind this is that as the leader he was trusted to have the interest of
.• _.• ~;,",-.~_","",><•. , ,,•.• ' _••0... . . "-" • • '"'~_~_" '~"" ~" " ""~~' " "' ~ "" 'r · · · "'- . . ~,,... - ~" -"'~'" '~"'."'? '. - "" ' . - ,. . ," ." -',-" '-- ' ~z,... · "."'. - - - ' - ' -- ', •.~, _ .. ,. .
the community at heart
Thus as Casalis observed of a certain chief named Libe. People "would gladly have rendered
homage and obedience" to him, but because he did not have their interests at heart, but instead
"disgusted one after another of his most devoted adherents ...he was forsaken" (1861: 216). So
there was a lot expected of the leader and as such when he did take a decision the understanding
and expectation was that it had to be for the good of the community.
Because of this there were rare cases where a leader would make a decision that is clearly to the
detriment of the community. This made the leader or person of authority to be highly regarded
and respected. Such a figure was not expected to fail or do wrong e.g';4by being selfis~ or unkind
and merciless. His character was supposed to be like that of a father towards his family Le. one
full of care,love and compassion. It is within this context that expressions like "father of the
nation" must be understood. A person of authority was the embodiment of all that the community
regarded as good and was meant to serve as an example. Because of this often such a person
would not flaunt their authority. Contrary to what modern views want us to believe such figures
were very careful to be accountable to the people, hence the saying in sesotho that "morena ke
morena ka sechaba", a chief is a chief through his people. In other words these figures were
conscious not only of the community's trust in them but even more importantly of the fact that
the authority they have is given to them by the community. This is the chief difference between
power and authority.
We mentioned that a person of authority was expected not to fail or to err. This was the ideal
to which the Basotho aspired in their leaders. As such it was not necessarily that which was
always found in actual practice, because often what ought to be is not the same as what is. So
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if these people in authority did err or abuse their authority the moral gravity of their offence was
regarded more serioubthan if the offence was done by some one who is not in authority. This---is the picture of authority in the context of traditional society, which is not the case any more.
In contemporary African culture, a modified version of this conception of authority continues to
function with its significantly impoverished framework of accountability to the community. This
has transformed authority into sheer exercise of power in which the consent of those upon whom
."
it is to be exercised is often disregarded. Power in this sense means authority that does not
recognize the consent of the community for its legitimacy and exercise. Once this happens it will
not be long before authoritarianism, dictatorship and domination take the place of authority and
beneficence. The political manifestation of this in African is the pervasive dictatorial forms of
governments.
With the modernization of African social-political institutions and systems, this is what developed
in many African countries. Many cultures brought on board the modernity bus as it were the
traditional conception and notions of authority, which was often enshrined in mystique (cf.
Casalis 1861: 214), but stripped it of socio-political framework. Needless to say this was the
beginning of unaccountable exercise of authority within African social and political life. No one
describes this better than Kasenene. He points~that 'i
in many African countries, after independence, a mentality developed regarding the leader,
the party and the nation as one. The interests of the leader and those of the party were
seen as one with those of the nation (1993: 15).
This mentality he argues made it easier for dictators or life presidents to emerge because these
people riding on the traditional notion of beneficence justified their actions by saying that they
know better what is the best interest of the people or that their actions are for the good of the
people (Ibid. 1993: 15f).
One of the realities and behaviour that has baffled most people is the seeming complacency of
many Africans with one dictator after another. The reason is that the African conception of
authority is conducive to these opportunists and partly the close similarity between the African
'"C..-
conception of authority and the tactics of these modem dictators.
The contribution that African ethics can do regarding this, is not only to disapprove of this abuse
and misuse of the people's trust and respect for authority, but also help the people to see through
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some of these distortions.
7.4.3 Gifts, Bribery and Corruption
Another aspect of the African way of life that has been negatively affected by modernity is the
tradition of giving gifts to people particularly important people. In their social life the African
people often gave and presented gifts to their chiefs or people with authority, e.g. when these
."
figure visited or when a person needed a favour from them. According to tradition this was not
only good but the proper way to conduct oneself in the presence of such community figures.
However as Kasenene points out the practice of this in the context of contemporary social
organization in Africa has resulted in a serious moral problem of corruption. Describing this he
says
in all these cases a public motive is replaced by a private one in performing one's duties.
Corruption involves a violation of public duty or trust in exchange for or in anticipation
of personal gain (Ibid. 1993: 12-13, my emphasis).
The important difference between this and the traditional practice is the secrecy that often
surrounds this. So what we see here is that due to the changed social conditions, we have
something that was essentially good to the community being transformed into something bad.
Corruption of this nature is a. product of the abuse and often misuse ofo4the tradition of the respect
of authority.
Bribery which is the commonest, as the social manifestation of corruption is a practice that is
found both among those holding positions of authority e.g. public officials, or any office holders
and those whom they serve i.e. the public in general.
What is worth noting is that bribery as we know it i.e. as a general state of corruption, was
something not so rampant in traditional African societies. In the past such presentations of a gift
were not a precondition for getting services from a chief or a person of authority. But today
people in authority do not only ask for such "gifts", in most cases they are a prerequisite to
getting any service. In order to overcome attitudes like these and the abuse of such values,
African ethics will need to reflect and put under scrutiny the traditional ethic of presenting gifts
to those in authority as one possible. origin and explanation of bribery and corruption III
contemporary Africa (Ibid. 1993: 13).
107
7.4.4 Excessive Community
Another area that African ethics will need to look into. especially in the context of contemporary
African social organization. which is increasingly becoming individualistic. is the possibility of
clash of interests between the community and the individual. In other words a clash that could
result into the community being in error and therefore being bad. Within traditional societies the
community was always right. because it was a collective embodiment of the general will of its
members. Describing this Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote that
the general will always be right and tends to the public advantage; but it does not follow
that the resolutions of the people have always the same rectitude (1994: 32, my
emphasis).
In those social systems the community was essentially about common interests or the general will
as opposed to the will of all. which Rousseau describes as a collection of private interests, not
common interests. Only when the community is seen as the will of all i.e. a collective of private
interests, is it possible to think of it going wrong. This is because being wrong in this sense
would be an external statement made as a result of dissatisfaction with the collective, but when
community is understood as the general will i.e. a collective embodiment of the moral will of all
those who belong to it, it will not only be sovereign, but always right. Since wrong and right are
essentially relational terms, if such a community were to be said wrong who would it be wrong
against? Certainly not its members or in relation to its internal relations. This is because such a
community could only be seen as wrong from the perspective of one who does not share its
values, and ideals. In other words only in terms of its external relations i.e. from the outsiders'
viewpoint, a stranger or one who does not belong could the community be wrong.
But the situation today in Africa has changed, more and more people paradoxically understand
and see community as a collective of private interest. not as a collective of the general will, while
at times they will identify themselves with it. For most people today they are increasingly
defining themselves as separate from their communities. For this reason the community could in
some cases be experienced as a negative thing. As Bujo points out
the individual... is deeply rooted in the clan community, but besides the many advantages,
there are also negative elements which must not be ignored (1992: 101).
Within contemporary African situation it is possible to argue, theoretically at least that the
community could be wrong. It is here that the job of African ethics become necessary. First it
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must help Africans not to make an arbitrary distinction between self and the community.
Secondly it must help communities not to make unwarranted communal demands on individuals.
As an ethical reflection, African ethics must assist Africans to avoid excessive community on the
one hand and extreme individualism on the other. It must help us both as individuals and
communities to know what is our rightful expectations and deserts, so that the two mutually
enrich each other, while avoiding an antagonistic relationship towards each other.."
What I have been discussing was by way of showing some of the problems in African ethics in
which I showed that the change in the existing social organization brings with it change in the
moral sphere and that this is what happened with African ethics. As such in order to address
adequately some of these problems we encounter within contemporary African culture we need
to realize that
African ethical values were adequate and relevant in the past. Now that there is a different
social set up, new standards have to apply (Kasenene 1993: 18).
In other words what Kasenene is saying is that new ways of thinking about and living out the
ethical values of traditional morality will have to be found. However these will have to be
meaningful and consistent with the African way of life, their conception of the good life, of who
they are and what they ought to be. Such ethical exploration must be such that it aims at
.~
rediscovering traditional African values for the purpose of learning how to use them communally
in order to transform contemporary moral attitudes in which they are either intentionally abused
or misused.
7.5 WHY COMMUNAL ETHICS
As we have shown in the course of this work, among the Basotho and the African people in
general ethics as a vehicle by which a people were to move from who they are to who they ought
to be, was essentially a communal thing. As such it was embedded in narrative or the story of
the community. The examination of ethical traditions of Basotho within the larger context of
African ethics was by way of demonstrating this communal or narrative nature of ethics as found
among traditional African communities. This in turn was an attempt to show why the
contemporary moral framework, which is largely universalistic and individualistic is not only
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insufficient, but has failed as a foundation for the moral life of both individuals and communities.
By implication I am, therefore, suggesting that a communal account of ethics, similar to that of
traditional African communities is a better alternative offerin!jfeal solution to the pervasive moral
individualism. This is even more significant for us in Africa because not only does it threaten
to destroy the fabric of traditional African morality, it threatens our culture and the essence of
WhiUY.~J!t:~LM._.Africans.
For this reason a modified re-discovery of traditional ethos, a re-instating oftf0mmunal approach
and adoption of a contextual perspective to ethics is not only important but necessary. The reason
is not only because ethics is fundamentally a game or practice which properly belongs to
communities. It is also because as human beings we are political-moral animals, and because we
are moral animals, we have a natural sense of what is just and moral. We cannot be moral while
our communities or societies are immoral, and in order to have moral communities, we cannot
do it as antecedently individuated, independent selves, but as communities in which we are inter-
dependent on one anther. This calls for common vision and a communal perspective to conduct.
In other words as human beings we need one another for a meaningful and coherent moral life.
For this communal ethics is not only necessary, but is better placed to address this than the
individualist model. The realization or bringing about of a just and.moral socio-political and
economic society, can,...not be left entirely to the care of personal ethics. The hundred and so
many years of the history of mankind in which his systems were largely informed and run by
principles of individualistic ethics bea~ testimony to this. As such in agreement with Niebuhr
we can say that although individually men are moral, this in itself is insufficient as a impetus for
creating moral societies. The responsibility for making our society more moral and just than they
are caujiot be left to the individual's conscience or personal ethics (cf.1960: xii).
Individual ethics or the Western model is thus insufficient as a leaven to society and hence of
bringing about both people and communities that are not only moral but have goodwill. As
Niebuhr points
as individuals, men believe they ought to love and serve each other and establish justice
between each other. As racial, economic and national groups they take for themselves,
whatever their power can command (1960: 9).
The reason that our natural inclination towards justice and goodwill quickly fades in such
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groupings is that when people relate to one another as big groups, that face-to-face presence and
proximity, which enabled the OTHER to be known gets lost. In the absence of this, our inter-
actions become faceless encounters, and when inter-personal relations are primarily conducted
in an atmosphere like this they become impersonal and less just. TJ:1is is not the case when
people relate to one another in face-to-face presence, a real I-THOU20 encounter because that
natural sense and inclination towards what is just and moral is evoked and activated because the
.'
OTHER can be seen. They are right there in front of us. In other words their presence is real.
Niebuhr makes an important observation here namely that
"moral attitudes develop most sensitively in a person-to-person relationships" and that this is "one
reason why more inclusive loyalties, naturally more abstract than immediate ones, lose some of
their power over human heart" (Ibid. 1960: 54). Such moral attitudes that Niebuhr is referring
to are easier to develop in much smaller groups of communities and likewise when our
communities are moral and just, our society has a greater chance of being moral and just. For
this to happen ethics and ethical reflection need to be a much broader business involving not just
individuals but communities . In this way ethics will function as a kind of self imposed coercive
method to check upon the selfish impulses and attitudes. It is for this reason that I will suggest
that communal ethics or the narrative account is a better model to~ards this larger objective.
Niebuhr, commenting on this, points out that throughout history society has failed to reflect that
moral code found in its individual members and that its greatest ethical challenge is "the tragedy
of man's collective behaviour" i.e. the inability for society to conform its collective life to the
individual ideals (Ibid. 1960: 9). In other words it is very rare to find in society those moral
ideals that often individuals have and may even live by. This is because the natural impulse is
not powerful enough to apply with equal force on social groups or group behaviour (Ibid. 1960:
xi, 13).
The gravity of the situation that Niebuhr is describing is by implication indicative of the necessity
of bringing back a communal account of ethics to ethical reflection, and it further validates my
point about the necessity for a communal perspective to ethics. It is precisely because of this and
20
For more on the I and Thou relationship see Martin Buber's book I and THOU, 1958 .
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the fact that people as a whole cannot live happily in an immoral society that the need for a
communal approach to ethics is necessary. It is also because personal ethics or our natural
impulse towards justice, sympathy and a fair measure of consideration for the other has failed
to make its impact on our inter-personal relations and social interactions.
But in those societies where the predominant ethos has been founded on the logic of communal
living there has been a fair measure of man's individual ideals or moral code, his natural sense
.'
of what is right and what is good, being reflected and having an impact on the larger community.
This was made possible by the communal approach to ethics that these societies had. The
problem of group egoism in contemporary societies I will argue is partly explained by the fact
that our "communities" are really not communities, but a collection of individuals with no shared
values and interests.
8. CONCLUSION
The basic argument I have put forward is that modem ethics is inadequate as a moral framework
within which communities live their lives. Basing my argument from the past experience of
traditional African communities I have suggested a paradigm shift forrq the mainly individualistic
and universalistic modem ways of doings ethics to a more communally oriented and contextual
approach reminiscent of traditional ethics. I have argued that if we hope to avoid the current
moral individualism we need to develop a moral framework that encompasses both the ethical
code governing the individual i.e. personal ethics and the ethical code governing social groups
and their conduct. That framework will be something similar to the communal model that we see
in traditional African communities. What has happened in the course of time and as societies
become more advanced and social organizations more complex, is that the ethical code governing
individuals became the main focus of ethical reflection. In Africa the role played by religion in
this regard cannot be ignored, in particular Christianity's idea of personal salvation, which
developed into an introverted religion concerned with the self-centred quest for personal
immortality and wellbeing (Kammer 1988: 146).
Whatever the reasons, with the advent of modernity morality became more and more that which
has to do with individual ethics. As I said communal ethics is necessary because it is like a
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bridge between personal ethics and social ethics, while the community is the link between the
individual and the society. For this reason communal ethics has a much greater chance of
injecting society with those moral ideals with which human beings are endowed with naturally
(cf.Ibid.1960: 13).
One of the problems with modern ethics as we saw is its attempt to be universal or what
Hauerwas terms "unqualified ethic". If we are to avoid this kind of moral universalism we need
.'
to re-introduce a contextual perspective to ethical reflection . This will help in the development
of a moral framework that acknowledges its particularity and rootedness in a particular tradition
and history. Only when ethical reflection is based on such a foundation will its universal
component not seek to find moral absolutes upon which a universal ethic can be constructed.
Such an ethical reflection will ensure that ethics remains true to its context, even as it explores
. .
the universal implications of conduct and dialogues with other moral particularities. In other
words in view of modern approaches to ethics, as individuals and communities we need a moral
schema that will go beyond the limitations of moral individualism and universalism, both of
which have failed to provide contemporary African societies with a solid moral foundation and
a coherent moral thought and practice. The pursuit of both as a basis for developing a system of
values that enjoys a shared public rationale and justification has faile,p. Communal ethics, with
its concern which goes beyond individual concerns is, therefore, a timely corrective. .By
acknowledging and recognising the uniqueness' of the local and particular on the one hand and
the social dimension of personal conduct on the other, it avoids both the dangers of moral
individualism and universalism. It also lessens the intolerant impulses because it seems most
likely that moral intolerance emanates from universalistic moral tendencies and the felt need for
moral absolutes, which manifests themselves in similar fashions as any totalitarian ideology
would i.e. accommodating no alternatives.
The adoption of a communal and contextual perspective to ethics should be the new paradigm.
This requires first a conscious effort not only to make physical communities, but to think, act
and, most importantly develop attitudes coherent with being community; attitudes of caring,
moral goodwill, and communal solidarity. Secondly it means not only identifying what forms of
community are appropriate and possible in the context of modern life styles, but redefining the
meaning of community. What ever the social climate of our times and, no matter how awesome
'-'
113
human developments become, now and in the future, the basic requirement of life in community
namely kutloano i.e. the bond of friendship as the basic tone of inter-personal relationships, will
be essential to any new forms of communities we will have to create. This is because such
relationships are conducive for the functioning and coming into operation of an approach to
personal conduct that is communally based and created, as opposed to individually chosen and
manufacnjred.
For this reason I have maintained that when it comes to ethics the priority of the community
within which ethicslflust be our starting point. The community precedes, as it were, reflection
on ways of conduct because ethics emerges out of a community as that which Hauerwas calls
a reflection of a people's history and experience (1983: 96). This means that the logical
relationship between ethics and community is such that the community comes first and hence
determines and gives meaning to ethics. In the same way morality does not exist out there
independently of its context, nor does it come down from above and communities apply it to their
life. Morality, rather is a creation of the community, and as such it is something that emerges
from below.
The African way of life, as a social expression of African ethics is basically a life lived in
community and for the sake of the community. As a way of conduct o'a people who understands
themselves basically as a community it is fundamentally communal in orientation and
functioning. This is because being a form of communal ethics African ethics emerges out of the
life experiences of the community who make up its context. It emerges from below where it gets
its meaning and content. As an ethic that takes the particular community seriously African ethics
is firstly a reflection on the question and answer; "What am I to do, I who am a member of a
particular community with its own history or ethical standards?" Secondly African ethics is an
ethical reflection to help Africans to achieve some degree of independence to allow them to
transcend and suspend their own loyalties and worldviews temporarily, so that they can see more
clearly who they ought to be (cf.Kammer 1988: 26) and subsequently what they can and can not
do. This implies that in the context of contemporary African communities, African ethics will not
only have to uphold those positive and relevant aspects of traditional morality, but will also need
to help contemporary Africans to avoid current misuse and abuses that have resulted in problems
like nepotism, corruption, parasitism and many others.
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We also pointed out that community as one of the basic features of the African way of life, was
the criteria by which Africans arrived at making moral judgements. As we saw in the brief
exploration of the significance of the experience and concept of community among the Basotho,
the community played a major role in the formation and interpretation of ethics. We also saw
that because of the holistic approach of the African worldview and their conception of the self,
their waypf conduct became necessarily communal because the understanding was that people
belonged together and because "people are people through other people".
Such a worldview did not only influence and shape their understanding of what it means to be
a person, it also shaped the way they organised their life, which was mainly in communities.
These communities as we saw emphasised a life in common in which relationships were
characterised by kutloano,
In describing the African understanding and idea of community, I have also introduced a
conception of community and a theoretical model for our times, and that is the conception of
community not so much as a locale but rather as a an attitude. An attitude along the lines of
kutloano in a face-to-face presence and proximity of the other. The immediate problems.with this
conception and its ethical implications is the absence of concrete examples. In the absence of
these it may then be dismissed as ,nothing but nostalgia for the "past, motivated more by
theoretical speculation than by concrete positions. As a result it might also be argued that there
is not much sense in entertaining such a model because we can not go back to pre-modern
African forms of life on the one hand and neither can we have community in this sense because
of our diverse interests and values today on the other hand.
To ask for concrete cases is not being premature, but also pre-judging the model. What I have
tried to do with much difficulty, because it is very difficult to describe sufficiently what is
community, was to present an alternative way of thinking about community. An alternative that
I believe offers a real possibility for establishing the necessary supporting communities for a
contextual and communal perspective of ethics.
To the extent that it is a conceptual alternative it will be inappropriate to ask for concrete cases
and in turn to have misunderstood its purpose. As a theoretical conception it is not only a model,
but indeed an ideal that may never be fully realised. In some ways it's like a vision of the goal
to be achieved and of the communities to be created.
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It is a vision prompted by the realization that
any significant response to our human dilemma must begin with the awareness that
personal destinies are forged with the destinies of our societies ... We are...tied to our
communities. Our personal destiny, the very shape and quality of our humanity, is linked
to that of all the other persons who are part of our community (Kammer 1988: 151, 153).
And like all true visions it will at best be approximated, but never be fully realized in actual
history. Il§ perfection is not only contained in our aims and purposes, it is the content of history
itself and its full realization transcends temporal existence (cf. Niebuhr 1960: 22).
In view of this, the conception of community and its ethical function that I have put forward, was
probably never fully there even in the past, but in comparison to the modern age it was much
closer to this ideal that we are. What is important, therefore, is what we can learn from this
conception of community and its function in ethics. Its value is it helps us to find new ways of
thinking about community and the alternative communities it promises thereof.
One of those ways is to think about community in terms of the spirit or emotional tone of
interpersonal relationships. That spirit is what I have referred to as kutloano or friendship as a
social and political relationship. The lesson that we can learn as modern people is, therefore, not
so much to seek and think of community in terms of geographical place, or homogeneity, or even
common history, but that in our heterogeneous complexities of modernity, we strive to establish
friendship in the way we relate to one another. That we develop the emotional tone of our
relationships with one another along the lines of kutloano or ubuntu. What this means among
other things is that, since this functions better in the context of community as a basic form of
social organization, there is an urgent need to reconstruct those communal structures that are
relevant and re-define afresh those corresponding moral attitudes.
In other words we must first start re-building and in most cases build those intermediate social
structures that exists between the individual and larger society which have been destroyed or
broken down by the ills of modernity. The first of these is the family community both in its
narrower Western understanding of a nuclear family and the wider African understanding of the
extended family. No other institution or structure has gone through turbulent times as the family
has and continues to be the case in the face of modernity. In places like South-Africa where
families have been torn apart by the political situation or violence, this need is imminent. Equally
great is this need in other places like Lesotho where not only did migrant labour system disrupt
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families but like many modem African societies the very concept of family is under going a
phenomenal transformation in the wake of the growing number of single parent families (cf
Nasimiyu-Wasike 1992: 161). The idea of single parenthood as the basic form of the family of
the future for many people means that we have to re-adjust our conception of family and re-work
its new ethical role. In other words the theoretical task facing us today in this regard is the
construction of new ways of thinking and reflecting about the nuclear family, as the basic unit
of the community.
Life in the modem world makes it very difficult to be community and in turn have shared values
and standards. It is going to be a hard thing to do, but it is not impossible.
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